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RACIAL AUDITORS AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: DATA WITH THE POWER




In the winter of 2002, the Enron scandal dominated the mass media.1
Enron, a Houston-based energy giant and purportedly the seventh-largest
company in America, was, it turned out, more like Tom Thumb than the Jolly
Green Giant.2  Much of the media commentary bemoaning Enron’s fall into
bankruptcy, however, attacked not Enron but its auditor, Arthur Andersen.3
The public auditor’s job is to collect and verify information, disseminating it to
two audiences: corporate managers, who can act on sound data to improve a
company’s performance, and the stock-purchasing public, who have confidence
that audited financial statements are accurate and can therefore serve as
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1. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Enron’s Many Strands: Early Scrutiny, 10 Months Ago, Questions
on Enron Came and Went with Little Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A11; Lanny Davis, Enron?
We’re Missing the Point, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2002 at B1.
2. Enron had engaged in a variety of allegedly deceptive transactions and accounting practices
designed to boost its reported profits and minimize its reported debts, thereby artificially inflating its
stock prices.  See Davis, supra note 1; Editorial, Investigating Enron, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2002, at B6
[hereinafter Investigating Enron].  For example, Enron created outside entities—investment companies
where liabilities and losses were hidden and thereby excluded from Enron’s accounting statements.  See
Davis, supra note 1; Investigating Enron, supra.  On October 17, 2001, Enron was forced to announce
that it had hidden $1 billion in losses in the outside entities alone, the next day reducing its reported
assets by $1.2 billion.  See Davis, supra note 1.  Less than two months later, on December 2, Enron filed
for bankruptcy.  Its stock promptly fell from the ninety dollars a share it had reached during the previ-
ous year to a mere eighty-seven cents.  See id.  Thousands of company employees lost jobs and pension
plans, while banks, investors, and trading partners who had advanced money to Enron faced the pros-
pect of massive losses.  See id.
3. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Big 5 Accounting Firm to Pay Fine in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2001, at C1.
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reliable guides in stock-purchase decisions.4  Auditors may also specifically
advise companies on how to improve their performance effectiveness in
specified tasks.5  As the Enron scandal unfolded, much of the media concluded
that Arthur Andersen had failed spectacularly in doing its job.6  The pundits did
not argue, however, that Enron’s collapse demonstrated the uselessness of
financial auditors.  To the contrary, they opined, Enron collapsed because there
was insufficient “transparency,” a word that became the mantra for reform.7
More and better information was the way to change a deceptive and greedy
corporate culture, of which Enron was but a very visible symptom.8
This article explores the current practice of “racial auditing” as a method of
police regulation.  Enron’s collapse and the accompanying calls for improved
auditing have surprising lessons to teach society about how to better regulate
police search and seizure practices—especially those with a disparate racial
impact.  The analogy between financial or quality auditing and racial auditing is
far from perfect, but the flaws in the analogy teach their own lessons as well.
Both racial auditing and financial auditing rely on a strategy of using
independent investigators to disseminate data about an organization to broader
publics.  Both strategies thus rely on sunshine as a method of institutional
control.9  Racial auditors, however, are not accountants but rather human rights
4. See O. RAY WHITTINGTON & KURT PANY, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING AND OTHER
ASSURANCE SERVICES 6, 776–99 (13th ed. 2001); Investigating Enron, supra note 2.
5. See WHITTINGTON & PANY, supra note 4, at 776–99.
6. See e.g., Norris, supra note 3.  Said the Washington Post:
The regulatory failures begin with the auditing profession.  Over the past four years,
Enron’s accounts overstated its real earnings by half a billion dollars.  At the end of 2000,
Enron reported debts of $10.2 billion; in its bankruptcy filing last month, it listed debts of
almost $40 billion.  This sort of deception is supposed to be prevented by a firm’s outside
auditor, whose job is to certify the accuracy of accounts.  But Arthur Andersen, the auditor in
the case, knowingly certified misleading financial statements.  In 1997 Andersen identified $51
million of problems in Enron’s books.  It suggested that these should be put right.  But when
its advice was ignored, it went ahead and certified Enron’s accounts anyway.
Investigating Enron, supra note 2.
7. See Davis, supra note 1.
8. See A. LARRY ELLIOT & RICHARD J. SCHROTH, HOW COMPANIES LIE: WHY ENRON IS JUST
THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG 12–13 (2002) (“Managed mendacity, systematically applied to the investing
public, has become the new science of publicly traded corporations.”); Davis, supra note 1. Proposed
reforms included: barring auditors from getting lucrative consulting contracts with their clients, thus
minimizing auditor conflicts of interest; creating more effective disciplinary systems for the accounting
profession (in effect, auditing the auditors); and tightening legal loopholes and Securities and Exchange
Commission oversight of auditors.  See, e.g., David Hilzenrath, Auditors Face Scant Discipline; Review
Process Lacks Resources, Coordination, Will, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2001, at A1; William Safire, Edito-
rial, Andersongate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at A15.  Lanny Davis, former special counsel to President
Clinton, urged the mandatory creation of a group of “auditing whistleblowers,” a small number of truly
independent members of boards of directors who would “have the authority to provide strict oversight
of outside auditors and to ensure the integrity of financial reporting.”  Lanny Davis, The Rules Are
There, So Learn to Live By Them, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2002, at B3. Only then, he claimed, would
there be sufficient investor confidence in the accuracy and completeness of financial information to
enable market discipline to do its work.  Id.
9. I (and others) have previously written about sunshine strategies as ways to regulate police
search and seizure practices, albeit in other contexts.  See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The
Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hear-
ings, 16 GA. ST. L. REV. 709 (1999) [hereinafter Taslitz, Slaves No More!] (describing the historical
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organizations, usually non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and the American Civil Liberties Union.10
Under some circumstances, governmental entities can also serve as effective
auditors; the United States Commission on Civil Rights is the most obvious
example.11  All these organizations have done major investigations, issued
critical reports, or pursued lawsuits that disseminate information about abusive
police search and seizure practices.  These efforts have helped to inform
decision-making and create incentives for reforming certain police departments
and practices.12
I add the word “racial” to the term “auditors” to highlight several features
of these organizations’ activities.  First, their investigatory efforts have often
revealed overt or covert racial discrimination by the police.13  Second, even
when no conscious racial animus or stereotyping is involved, abusive police
conduct is likely to have a disparate impact on racial minorities simply because
minorities are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system and
among the poor.14  Moreover, police conduct may have a disproportionate
impact on minority communities even when police interactions do not result in
arrest.15  Third, for reasons to be explained later in this article, encouraging
auditors initially to focus on racial animus and impact can make sense even
when reforms ultimately address matters other than race.16  A race-based focus
can provide a particularly effective strategy both for monitoring and deterring
police misconduct and for serving other political functions of the Fourth
Amendment that are consistently ignored by commentators.17
Political functions are what set racial auditors most starkly apart from
financial and other traditional auditors.  A successful republic must create
institutions that foster certain character traits and political emotions in its
basis for this strategy); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000) (describing the
empirical basis).  No one has previously written, however, about the special contribution that “racial
auditors” can make to sunshine strategies nor about the value of such strategies in sparking the best of
the “political emotions.”  See infra Part IV (defining this term).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 164 (1999) (noting a direct relation-
ship between poverty and elevated crime rates).  See generally, MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN
NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND  PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).
15. See COLE, supra note 22, at 16–62 (discussing the disparate impact of “consensual” and pretex-
tual searches, racial profiling, and quality-of-life policing on minority communities); DAVID A.
HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002) (offering an
extended defense of the proposition that racial profiling harms more of the innocent and misses more
of the guilty than do alternative policing strategies).
16. See infra Parts IV.A–B (on racial enthusiasm and racial anxiety as emotions helpful in prompt-
ing progressive political change).
17. See infra Part IV (discussing raced political emotions and their role in sound republican gov-
ernance).
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citizenry.18  For example, most political activity is habitual.  Democrats usually
vote for Democrats and Republicans for Republicans; these voters generally
feel little need to learn much about the candidates or the issues.19  But novel
information or data that causes anxiety prods citizens into study, debate, and
deliberation, and leads them to depart from habitual behavior.20  Appeals to
race are often used to create white anxiety and competition among minority
groups that balkanize the nation.21  But the sort of information disseminated by
racial auditors can, at its best, create anxiety that unifies rather than divides by
stimulating white empathy and action.22  Racial auditors can also foster a sense
of “political honor,” a sort of principled but passionate self-interest that
requires risk and sacrifice.23  Only certain sorts of individuals respond to appeals
to political honor, but those most likely to respond are usually among those
persons best able to bring about social change.24  In post-Fourteenth
Amendment America, encouraging one sort of political honor—one committed
to racial equality—is a particular imperative.25  Racial auditors act as specialized
citizen representatives, giving the most marginalized members of the political
community an effective voice in the political process.26  Voice, in turn, promotes
a sense among the marginalized that they are true members of a broader
political community.27  The net effect of these appeals to political emotions is to
18. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual Indifference,
80 B.U. L. REV. 1284 (2000) [hereinafter Taslitz, Mutual Indifference] (explaining the importance of
encouraging racial empathy among the citizenry).
19. See infra Part IV.A.1 (elaborating on this example).
20. See infra Part IV.A.2 (reviewing the relevant social science).
21. See, e.g., Joseph P. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000) (explaining the self-defeating nature of white efforts
to promote shared solidarity around common social norms via harsh criminal justice enforcement rules
and the perhaps unintended resulting racial balkanization of American society).
22. See infra Part IV.A–B for an explanation of how this can be so.
23. See infra Part IV.C.
24. See id.
25. See id. The sort of honor I have in mind is in many ways the antithesis of the Southern “honor”
that defined antebellum slave society.  See Taslitz, Mutual Indifference, supra note 18, at 1317–22.  The
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments represent a decisive rejection of that version of
honor, but an alternative, post-Reconstruction form of American honor has an important role to play in
our modern polity, a role that racial auditors can help to advance.  Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning
the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 773–
77 (1999) [hereinafter Taslitz, Racist Personality] (explaining that Northern victors in the Civil War
sought to condemn the Southern racist personality, proudly defining the Northern character as the lazy
and violent racist’s antithesis, although Northerners continued to embrace their own less violent ver-
sion of racist thought).
26. I make this point here largely by example and by considering voice as an implicit corollary to
emotions of racial enthusiasm, anxiety, and honor.  See infra Part IV.  For illustrations of the mutually
reinforcing relationship between voice and Fourth Amendment privacy rights in gay and ultra-poor,
black, inner-city communities, see Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: Technology, Privacy and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 158–69 (Spring
2002) [hereinafter Taslitz, Twenty-First Century].  For illustrations of the connection between voice and
respect for individuals and groups under the Fourth Amendment, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of
Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257 (2002)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Stories].
27. See Taslitz, Stories, supra note 26, at 2283 (summarizing illustrative Fourth Amendment doc-
trinal changes to promote voice); Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note 26, at 158–65 (exploring how
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help constitute an engaged citizenry.28  But this citizen activism has a particular
purpose: To forge disparate individuals and groups into a “people” capable of
helping to define and protect their Fourth Amendment rights to privacy,
freedom of movement, and property.29
The Fourth Amendment embraces an informed citizen ideology that
requires monitorial citizens to guard against governmental abuses.30  In the
complex and busy modern world, it is impossible for all citizens to monitor all
government activity.31  Accordingly, that task falls to groups of specialized
citizens who watch for danger, then sound the alarm to the wider citizenry when
necessary.32  Racial auditors are important actors among those citizens who help
to monitor police conduct.  They recognize that “societies serve from the
bottom up—that an alert, vigilant, and properly informed citizenry is the front
line of a democracy’s struggle” and that “nations become paralyzed when they
cannot understand, much less trust, what they are being told.”33
Yet even when the alarm is sounded, not all citizens will initially respond.
Indeed, it is likely that the most immediately affected sub-groups—here, racial
minorities—will initially organize for action.34  But their very conduct—building
coalitions and appealing to shared republican principles—helps to reconstitute
Americans as a “people” who live a shared narrative of evolving, but
fundamental commitments.35  Exploring racial auditors’ actions therefore
highlights the respective roles of individuals and groups in making Fourth
Amendment freedoms real.
Although I will, along the way, suggest ways to improve the effectiveness of
racial auditors, my primary goal in this article is a different one: to use them as a
jumping off point for exploring the too-often-neglected political functions of the
Fourth Amendment.  This article therefore concludes by suggesting illustrative
ways in which the judicial, executive, and legislative branches might encourage
institutional changes that better serve these functions.
voice helped to advance gay rights under and via the Fourth Amendment); cf. ANDREW E. TASLITZ,
RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 134–45 (1999) (explaining the importance of voice in
resolving First Amendment free speech and related Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues at
rape trials) [hereinafter TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE].
28. See infra Part IV.B.
29. I examine “peoplehood”-promotion here largely through example and as a corollary of pro-
moting certain political emotions.  I explore “peoplehood” in the Fourth Amendment context at a
more theoretical level in a number of forthcoming pieces.
30. See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 9, at 757–61 (defending the point that the Fourth
Amendment embraces an informed citizen ideology).
31. See id. at 757–59.  See also MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 310–13 (1998).
32. See SCHUDSON, supra note 31, at 310–13; Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 9, at 757–61
33. Jim Hoagland, If It’s War, Spread the Sacrifice, WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at A37 (noting the
importance of an informed, activist citizenry in the war against terrorism).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 386–420.
35. See Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note 26, at 158–65 (gay rights struggle and coalition-
building is helping to bring gays closer to a reality in which they are equal members of the American
people); infra text accompanying notes 385–420 (illustrating and explaining how racial auditors help to
promote the activism and cross-racial dissent necessary to advance the cause of peoplehood).
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Part II compares the respective characteristics of traditional and racial
auditors.  Part II.A describes what traditional auditors do, while Part II.B
explores in more detail the two primary kinds of data—numbers and
narratives—on which traditional auditors rely and their respective probative
value.  Part II.C describes the two roles played by racial auditors: information-
dissemination and information-based advocacy.  These roles show the power of
what I will call “information politics,” the conscious use of data to enhance
political power.  Part III.A specifically illustrates the work that racial auditors
do, drawing on selected efforts made by Amnesty International, the American
Civil Liberties Union, and the United States Commission on Civil Rights.  Part
III.B examines the symbiotic relationship between racial auditors and the mass
media, explaining why auditors need the media, but also why the media alone
are not up to the job of policing the police.
Part IV examines the ways in which racial auditing can stimulate relevant
political emotions, including racial enthusiasm, racial anxiety, and racial
political honor.  It also explains how such emotions can lead to effective
political action as well as to struggle.
Finally, Part V concludes the article by examining some concrete lessons for
Fourth Amendment regulation beyond that already undertaken by racial
auditors.  These lessons include admitting evidence of patterns of racial abuse in
suppression hearings, expanding discovery about such abuses prior to those
hearings, creating police racial mediation panels, and creating citizen oversight
panels to monitor the expanded use of video surveillance cameras in the fight
against terrorism in our cities.  These “lessons” are not fully defended, serving
more as illustrations of the implications for institutional design that stem from
recognizing the Fourth Amendment’s embrace of power to “the People.”
II
TRADITIONAL AUDITORS AND RACIAL AUDITORS EXPLAINED
A. What Traditional Auditors Do
A classic auditing text links the growing need for auditors to the rise of the
information society:
Dependable information is essential to the very existence of our society.  The
investor making a decision to buy or sell securities, the banker deciding whether to
approve a loan, the government in obtaining revenue based on income tax returns, all
are relying upon information provided by others.  In many of these situations, the
goals of the providers of information run directly counter to those of the users of the
information.  Implicit in this line of reasoning is recognition of the social need for
independent public accountants . . . . 36
“Independent” public accountants, who do much of society’s auditing, are
not quite as independent as their title suggests.  The client being audited pays
36. WHITTINGTON & PANY, supra note 4, at 2.
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the public accountant for his auditing services.37  The accountant understands, of
course, that he has an obligation to parties outside the client, and that he may
face legal liability and ethical discipline if his audits are done negligently or
fraudulently.38  Nevertheless, from a common person’s perspective, an auditor’s
reliance on those whom he monitors creates at least the appearance of a conflict
of interest.39  That conflict becomes far greater when, as is often the case,
accounting firms are also hired to provide lucrative consulting services to the
very clients they audit.40
Many other sorts of professionals, however, provide auditing services.
Audits may be done, for example, of jail operations or university research
productivity efforts.41  In such cases, former jail administrators and former-
academics-turned-Deans may be the most qualified members of the auditing
team.
Among the most important categories of audits are: (1) audits of financial
statements to verify their accuracy; (2) compliance audits to ensure the
consistency of organizational behavior with legal standards; and (3) operational
audits, which study a unit of an organization to measure both its effectiveness
and efficiency in meeting its goals and responsibilities.42  Many corporations,
governmental agencies, and nonprofit organizations also have internal auditors
37. See id. at 6–8.
38. See id. at 63–121 (describing the ethical obligations of auditors).
39. One analogy supporting this point might be the dispute over campaign finance laws.  One side
of that dispute argues that our elected representatives—who are to regulate businesses—owe fealty to
the wealthy entities that finance them.  See GARY HART, RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC: THE
JEFFERSONIAN IDEAL IN 21ST-CENTURY AMERICA 9, 59, 69–70, 192, 232–33 (2002).  Such fealty
results in the corruption of the government watchdogs, who now empower special interests, subsets of
the “People,” rather than the People as a whole.  Similarly, where independent accountants derive their
income from those they monitor, at least one eyebrow is raised in the suspicion that these financial
auditors do not always serve the public.
40. See Arthur Levitt, Editorial, Who Audits the Auditors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A29
(arguing that corporate boards should rarely approve consulting contracts with those whom they audit);
cf. ELLIOT & SCHROTH, supra note 8, at 170:
If auditor independence is truly the way to produce accurate audits, let’s give them inde-
pendence.  What if corporations paid an audit tax, which created a pool of funds for the pay-
ment of auditors’ fees?  Auditors would not have contracts with corporations; they would
report to the SEC and be independent of corporations who pay them for services.  The SEC
would select auditors for assignments to companies for a reasonable period, say, up to five
years.  The SEC would hold the contract directly with the audit firm, thereby breaking the tie
between corporations and “their” auditors.  This is real independence.  The consulting side of
audit firms must still be separated from audit and cannot interfere with this new form of inde-
pendence.  Auditors, under this concept, could also become the extensions of the SEC pres-
ence in public companies.
Id.
41. I have some indirect personal familiarity with both sorts of audits.  First, one of my closest
friends, David Bogard, former Director of the Arlington County Jail, is the leading provider of opera-
tional auditing services to jails and prisons in the United States. Second, at my University, I serve on
the Research Think Tank Committee, which has the task of articulating a comprehensive University-
wide research plan to aid in the University’s attaining Tier I research status.  As part of that Commit-
tee’s efforts, the University has explored the possibility of an audit of its current research programs and
productivity.
42. See WHITTINGTON & PANY, supra note 4, at 11.
TASLITZ_FMT_2.DOC 05/29/03  10:10 AM
228 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:221
to apprise them of how well they are doing their jobs and how to do them
better.43  Internal auditors generally report the results of their investigations to
high managerial officials in the organization, rather than to the broader public
as external auditors do, though internal governmental audit reports go well
beyond the organization itself.44  “Inspectors General” offices in government
agencies and departments are an example of a sort of internal government
auditor, reporting results both to agency or department heads and to Congress.45
By statute, Inspectors General (“IGs”) have free access to information needed
to do their jobs and may engage in inquiries ranging from traditional financial
audits to individualized criminal investigations, program evaluation, and policy
analysis.46
A focus on collecting, verifying, and disseminating information is the
common characteristic for all the different types of audits and auditors.  The
goals of verification are to promote organizational honesty, efficiency, and
effectiveness.47  In the case of private (as opposed to governmental) internal
audits, these goals are achieved by alerting management to problems that
require action.48  Internal government audits and external audits reach a wider
audience, bringing marketplace pressures (such as from investors who will not
buy stock in a financially shaky company) and political pressures (from
legislative oversight, the media, and interested members of the public) to bear
on poorly performing institutions.49
Auditors rely on a wide range of evidence for their reports, much of it
measurable data that must first be collected.50  But even measurable data must
be verified, which requires auditors to act as detectives.51  Detectives are
necessarily skeptical, and their inquiries require them to craft sensible stories to
sort fact from fiction.52  Much like Ms. Marple and Hercule Poirot, the famous
detectives of Agatha Christie mystery novels, the auditors must interview
“suspects” (relevant employees or officials) to achieve an accurate sense of
what has happened.53
43. See id. at 12–13.
44. See id. at 12.
45. PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 24 (1993).
46. Id. at 17, 24.
47. See WHITTINGTON & PANY, supra note 4, at 2–13, 742–77, 783, 787.
48. See id. at 776–82.
49. See ELLIOT & SCHROTH, supra note 8, at 44–50 (explaining that market forces depend on
hard-to-find accurate financial information); infra Part III (illustrating how auditors’ exposure of
information can unleash political forces that improve governmental responsiveness, efficiency, and
fairness).
50. See WHITTINGTON & PANY, supra note 4, at 135–66.
51. See RONALD BLANK, THE BASICS OF QUALITY AUDITING 17–18 (1999).
52. See BARBARA NORVILLE, WRITING THE MODERN MYSTERY 4–14, 124–28 (1986).
53. See id. at 7–8 (discussing Ms. Marple, who often uses the police to do her legwork); AGATHA
CHRISTIE, MURDER ON THE ORIENT EXPRESS (1933); see also BLANK, supra note 51, at 17–18
(describing in part a narrative-building process in auditing).
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For example, one novella meant to convey the life of an auditor describes
the career of Jack Butler.54  Jack’s first major audit is of a cement plant.  To
know what information to seek, Jack reads widely about the cement industry
before starting his audit, and then visits the plant to observe exactly how
cement is made.55  His interviews reveal that a clerk has been advancing herself
funds from petty cash.  In addition, Jack measures the content of cement silos to
verify the quantity of their contents.  Finding the silos’ contents several feet
short, Jack mentions the shortfall to Walt, the inventory manager.  Walt
explains that they routinely use a “dead-fill allowance” to adjust their
measurements to get “the true reading” of the contents’ quantity because
structural features make it physically impossible to fill the silos to the top.56  This
assertion too is false, as Jack’s interviews reveal, and Walt had a motive for
lying: preserving his long-standing stellar reputation as a conscientious
employee.57
Narrative plays a particularly important role in operational auditing.  A
story must be crafted to explain why an organization is not maximizing its
effectiveness and efficiency.  That “why” serves as the basis for recommending
solutions for the future.58  Audits of large, complex organizations may often
require the examination of representative samples of information to verify
accuracy.  When these samples raise questions, the auditor must again craft a
tale (fraud? negligence?) to explain the discrepancies.59
Audit ineffectiveness can stem not only from client efforts to subvert the
audit, but from auditor failures to spot and adequately pursue leads.60  In
particular, governmental audits may suffer from a narrowness of vision.
Federal IGs too often, for example, investigate small problems, “ignoring the
larger systemic issues that produce the same small problems over and over.”61
They also too often describe problems without recommending an adequate, or
even any, solution.62  Furthermore, upon uncovering a problem, they may
subsequently accept management’s word that the flaw has been corrected.63
Moreover, partly because the IG reports deal with small matters and because
there may be political and financial obstacles to change, IG reports are often
simply ignored, both by agency heads and by Capitol Hill.64
54. JAMES K. LOEBBECKE, THE AUDITOR: AN INSTRUCTIONAL NOVELLA, at vii (1999).
55. Id. at 33.
56. Id. at 35–36.
57. Id. at 36.
58. See WHITTINGTON & PANY, supra note 4, at 785–86.
59. See id.
60. See MICHAEL C. KNAPP, CONTEMPORARY AUDITING: REAL ISSUES & CASES, at xix (4th ed.
2001); LIGHT, supra note 45, at 220.
61. Id. at 220.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 222.
64. Id. at 220.
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B. Racial Auditors and Their Data
Racial auditors are truly independent in a way that financial and other more
traditional auditors are not.  Racial auditors are always external to the
organizations they audit.65  None of their funding comes from the auditees, and
the auditors themselves do not operate for profit.66  Most racial auditors are
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), thus relatively free from political
influence.67  However, I include one government-affiliated entity, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, because of its renown, its wide (though
arguably, and sadly, declining) impact, its substantial functional similarity to the
NGOs in certain important respects, and its relative freedom (at least until
recently) from partisan political pressures in the area of monitoring the police.68
Like most traditional auditors, racial auditors act as detectives.  But their
goal is to uncover human rights violations and their causes, rather than to
uncover financial irregularities.69  Racial auditors, again like traditional auditors,
rely upon, verify, and generate numbers, such as the number of suspicionless
stop-and-frisks of African Americans in poor neighborhoods or the number of
allegations of excessive force against the New York City Police Department.70
Generating these numbers requires conducting interviews, reviewing
documents, and visiting the sites of alleged abuses to craft and evaluate
narratives.71  Racial auditors describe how things are, but also supply a vision of
how they should be and a roadmap for getting there.72
Racial auditors may also draw “samples” believed to be representative of
wider police operations.73  Because most racial auditors do not have a statutory
right of access to all information under police control,74 such sampling may be
65. This observation follows directly from my definition of racial auditors, which requires that they
be external to, and independent from, those they audit.  See infra text accompanying notes 109–135.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 109–35.
67. The primary examples examined here are Amnesty International and the ACLU.  See infra
text accompanying notes 109–35.
68. See Jocelyn C. Frye, et al., The Rise and Fall of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 449 (1987) (tracing the history of the Commission and arguing that the 1983
changes in its structure have compromised the quality of its scholarship, weakened its influence, com-
promised its independence, and damaged its spirit of cooperative bipartisanship, all unfortunate devel-
opments that are nevertheless curable); infra text accompanying notes 269–391 (describing the
structure of the Commission and its impact on policing practices).
69. See infra Part III (illustrating the work of selected racial auditors).
70. See infra Part III.A.3 (reviewing instances in which precisely such numbers were generated).
71. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing extensive investigatory efforts by Amnesty International con-
cerning the New York City Police Department).
72. See infra Part III (describing illustrative reports on police conduct crafted by Amnesty, the
ACLU, and the United States Commission on Civil Rights).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 151–55, 193–205, 254–69 (describing three instances of such
sampling).
74. The United States Commission on Civil Rights is one illustrative exception.  See Frye, supra
note 68, at 456 (noting the Commission’s subpoena power, completely independent of any need to rely
on the Justice Department’s power of subpoena).  Nongovernmental auditors lack independent sub-
poena powers for assistance in writing reports, but can gain access to the courts’ subpoena power by
filing lawsuits. See infra Part III.A.1 (describing the ACLU’s use of the subpoena power in a civil law-
suit to collect data on racial profiling).
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more a result of what information victims and witnesses are willing to provide,
even if anonymously, than of any “scientific” sampling method.75  This
observation may mean that racial auditors rely to a greater extent than do many
traditional auditors on individual narratives and pithier anecdotes.  Such
individual stories also convey things that raw numbers cannot, such as the
physical and emotional pain suffered by a man beaten by police or by a woman
arrested in front of her children and jailed for a minor traffic violation.76
Amnesty International’s use of “prisoners of conscience”—individual victims of
torture or wrongful imprisonment—stands out as one such use of storytelling.
These stories convey human pain and serve as vivid examples of more
widespread suffering, as symbols to grab the public’s otherwise short attention.77
Yet narrative and more episodic anecdote can, much like raw numbers,
provide important guidance for public-policy-setting and political action.78
Anecdotes can be seen as analogous to ethnographies or case studies of
individual persons or organizations by social scientists.79  Such studies serve
several functions.  Interpretive social science, which often relies upon case
studies, is concerned not so much with what causes a phenomenon as with its
meaning; such social science therefore treats social phenomena as texts to be
interpreted.80  This “hermeneutics” of human action is based on conveying a
“feeling for the individuality and uniqueness of persons; it is a way to
75. See generally RICHARD A. WEHMHOEFER, STATISTICS IN LITIGATION: PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS FOR LAWYERS 50–57, 258–60 (1985) (describing analogous social science sampling
techniques); WHITTINGTON & PANY, supra note 4, at 325–69 (describing sampling techniques in
traditional financial audits); infra Part III.A.3 (discussing an instance in which the NYPD refused to
make certain data available to a racial auditor, and then describing the auditor’s necessarily incomplete
report as based on unrepresentative samples, while continuing to withhold any supposedly more
representative sampling data).
76. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001) (describing, though incorrectly ulti-
mately discounting, the humiliation felt by a woman arrested in front of her children for not wearing a
seatbelt); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
37–46 (2001) (explaining the advantages of storytelling as a form of academic discourse); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
STUD. 387, 404–39 (1996) (analyzing psychological and social processes that give stories persuasive
power and exploring ways in which stories can be used or abused to aid legal reasoning); cf. Taslitz, Sto-
ries, supra note 26, at 2257–63, 2290 (explaining the value of individual and group stories in constitu-
tional reasoning and recounting several powerful stories to convey the emotional pain experienced by
the victims of racial profiling).
77. See Morton E. Winston, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Human Rights NGOs:
Amnesty International, in NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 25, 38–39
(Claude Welch ed., 2001) (discussing symbolic politics and prisoners of conscience) [hereinafter NGOS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS].
78. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence, 5 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 34–46, 57–68 (1998) [hereinafter Taslitz, Feminist Approach]  (discussing the value of
narrative and case study in setting evidentiary policy); Taslitz, Stories, supra note 26 (discussing the
value of stories in crafting criminal procedure policy discussed and illustrated).
79. See generally A CASE FOR THE CASE STUDY (Joe R. Feagin et al. eds., 1991); MARTYN
HAMMERSLEY, WHAT’S WRONG WITH ETHNOGRAPHY? (1992); DONALD E. POLKINGHORNE,
NARRATIVE KNOWING AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1988); Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Indi-
vidualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1 (1993) [hereinafter
Taslitz, Myself Alone].
80. See DANIEL LITTLE, VARIETIES OF SOCIAL EXPLANATION 68–69, 71 (1991).
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understand the inwardness of the other,”81 a task that can be fully accomplished
only by hearing participants’ stories.  What is true of individuals can also be
true, however, of organizations, for organizational cultures can give human
actions within the organization their own peculiar set of meanings.82
Furthermore, sometimes we are more interested in fully understanding the
unique history, meanings, and behaviors demonstrated within a single
organization, such as a particular police department or a division or unit within
that department.  Such an understanding can ordinarily be accomplished in all
its complexity only by exploring many converging, disparate types of data,
including narratives.83  Narratives and case studies can reveal psychological
habits or preconceptions that render observers unaware of certain evidence and
hypotheses or unwilling to adequately consider them.84  Correspondingly,
powerful narratives can sharpen investigators’ attention to details and their
significance, which might otherwise go unnoticed.85  Narratives may likewise
foster novel lines of inquiry.86  Additionally, case studies can sometimes offer
generalizable insights.  Thus, there may be theoretical reasons to believe that a
number of naturally occurring (rather than research-created) cases may fairly
be viewed as typical of a broader set of similar cases.87  Repeated case studies
and narratives culled from a variety of settings may be sufficient to infer
typicality much in the way that sampling in statistical techniques supports
inferences about a broader population.88
Professor Susan Bandes has summarized the critical function served by
collecting anecdotal information about the police.  Bandes did a detailed study
of allegations made by more than sixty African-American men, citing physical
abuse, even torture, at the hands of officers in the Area Two Violent Crimes
Unit of Chicago’s South Side.89  The courts had examined each of the incidents
in isolation, failing to see a pattern and viewing them largely as aberrational and
81. PAUL DIESING, HOW DOES SOCIAL SCIENCE WORK? 106 (1991).
82. See POLKINGHORNE, supra note 79, at 122 (“Narrative structures operate to give significance
and unity to group events in a manner similar to the way they operate in the lives of persons.”).
83. See, e.g, David A. Snow & Leon Anderson, Researching the Homeless: The Characteristic Fea-
tures and Virtues of the Case Study, in A CASE FOR THE CASE STUDY, supra note 79, at 148, 152–62
(making an analogous point and recommending “multi-perspectival analyses”; “triangulated research”
strategies exploring many data sources to focus on “persons, situations and context, and time”; and
careful attention to changing social processes over time).
84. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 78, at 64–65.
85. See id. at 59–60 (describing clinical social science studies as enabling the “acute observer”).
86. See Snow & Anderson, supra note 83, at 162 (“The final characteristic feature of case studies is
that they tend to have an open-ended, emergent quality that facilitates the discovery of both unantici-
pated findings and data sources.”).
87. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 78, at 65.
88. Cf. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 627 (1995) (holding sufficient evidence existed
in a First Amendment free speech analysis to support the Florida Bar’s assertion that early lawyer con-
tact with physically injured potential clients and their relatives caused significant social harm given the
combination of statistical data and anecdotal data “noteworthy for its breadth and detail,” upon which
the Bar relied); WEHMHOEFER, supra note 75, at 50–57, 258–60 (explaining sampling as a way to draw
inferences about a broader population).
89. Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1276
(1999).
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“merely” anecdotal.90  Bandes defines an anecdote as a “small, but polished
story that emphasizes and even embellishes salient and evocative details and
disregards those that might interfere with the moral or teaching point.”91
Anecdote may “bring alive” what may otherwise be a dry point, by both being
evocative and appealing to empathy.92  But critics stress the dangers of
anecdote: It may oversimplify, disregarding details that matter; it may present
itself as representative of a broader truth when it is not; and it may distract
listeners from weighing its weaknesses precisely by means of its powerful
emotional appeal.93  Critics worry that anecdote should not, therefore, guide
legal policy.94
Yet a judgment about representativeness, says Bandes, is always necessary
to structuring experience, a process hard-wired into our brains.95  Moreover, the
law’s reliance on anecdote—on the analogy and case studies that are the
hallmark of the common law system—is especially unavoidable.96  Furthermore,
anecdote may be arresting precisely because it defies expectations, forcing us to
question whether this vivid and new information is indeed representative of a
broader truth.97  Bandes explains:
Anecdote, when well deployed, may be an effective tool in challenging the authority
or universality of the conventional narrative.  The greatest danger of the grand
narrative is that it ossifies.  Without the pull of the anecdotal, there is no way to assess
the accepted story’s continued viability in the face of new understanding and new
information.  Its structural choice and assumptions become invisible, and its narrative
viewpoint masquerades as omniscient.98
Anecdote’s use in the law, as in social science, unsettles comfortable, often
unrecognized assumptions that may stand in the way of our ability to see
imminent patterns or alternative tales to explain police action and motivation.99
When similar anecdotes accumulate, and especially when they converge on a
similar conclusion suggested by other sorts of evidence, such as numerical data,
anecdote’s value is amplified still further.100
In the case of police brutality, Bandes saw the detailed, intense descriptions
of more than sixty alleged incidents of sometimes brutal physical abuse by Area
90. See id. at 1275–81.
91. Id. at 1310.
92. See id. at 1311 for a more detailed analysis of the importance of empathy; see also Taslitz,
Mutual Indifference, supra note 18; infra note 473.
93. See Bandes, supra note 89, at 1311–12.
94. Id. at 1313–14.
95. See id. at 1311–14.  Our use of this “representativeness heuristic” often stands us in good stead
in everyday life, but can also lead us into error if it is used in inappropriate settings or if the wisdom of
its application is never questioned.  See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND
TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 43, 46–49, 50, 57, 61–62, 67–68, 92–93, 185 (2000).
96. See Bandes, supra note 89, at 1314–15.
97. Id. at 1315–16.
98. Id. at 1316.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 6–9.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 146–170.
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Two Officers as challenging five standard assumptions about the criminal
justice system in this area:
1. The status quo is essentially just: This assumption manifests itself in the
belief that those punished by the state have brought that pain upon
themselves and that the police are, by and large, “dedicated police
officers whose sole motivation is to serve the public good.”101
2. Selective empathy: The assumption is that those of different class,
gender, race, and prestige backgrounds than the judge will act and think
in ways consistent with the judge’s experience or, alternatively, that the
judge will see those before him as so different, so “other,” that he is
incapable of standing in their shoes or believing their tales, a failure of
“imaginative empathy.”102
3. The fear of destabilization and chaos: This assumption reflects judges’
concern that acknowledging abusive patterns might require costly and
uncertain revamping of an entire system.  A judge may see the present
police reality as working well to protect him and others like him, thus
likely working well for most people—at least the most deserving ones—
and therefore something dangerous to fiddle with.103
4. The need for individual stories of motive, fault, and blame: The idea here
is that judges more readily accept explanations of deliberate, bad faith
wrongdoing by individuals than of subconscious, organizational patterns
reflecting covert institutional messages, willful blindness, and fuzzy lines
of authority.104
5. Private common-law attributes are the paradigm for public-law cases: The
private dispute common-law adversarial model assumes that a police
brutality plaintiff “will be seen as motivated solely by greed or fear for
his own well-being, that he can be easily bought off by money, that he
has no long term concerns for good government or community, and that
his adversary is an individual like him, of equal power and similar
motivations.”105  Yet, rather than being an isolated contest between two
warring individuals, police brutality litigation may involve systemic
failures, or actions by individuals acting in good faith.106
101. See Bandes, supra note 89, at 1309, 1319.
102. Id. at 1309, 1319–20.  See also Taslitz, Mutual Indifference, supra note 18, at 1362–68 (on imagi-
native empathy).
103. See Bandes, supra note 89, at 1320–21.
104. See id. at 1328–29.
105. Id. at 1338.
106. Id. at 1335.  Bandes also addresses a sixth assumption: the “preference for judicial isolation,”
id. at 1338, by which she means the “many devices [judges use] to assure themselves and others that
they have no choice but to affirm the status quo.”  Id.  This sixth assumption boils down to a sense of
“helplessness to which judges lay claim when they wish to deflect responsibility for a difficult choice,”
id. at 1339, that is, a refusal to take a stand against injustice, such as police brutality.  See id. at 1338–40.
This assumption seems to me to be conceptually distinct from the other five assumptions.  The first five
explain why judges will be blind to injustice, while the sixth assumption explains judicial inaction in the
face of the blatantly (even to the courts) unjust.  However, the mere existence of the sixth assumption
still has implications for racial auditors because auditors can help to circumvent the courts (by turning
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The combination of these assumptions and of the fear of untoward political
consequences—even impeachment, argues Bandes—makes judges reluctant to
declare war on police brutality.  Indeed, it makes the courts unwilling even to
consider much pattern evidence, because the pattern may be too unsettling to
view.107  Had the courts embraced in each abuse case evidence of the many other
instances of similar abuse by other officers in Area Two, Bandes implies, the
courts would have had to reject the assumptions of the standard police narrative
and be open to an alternative tale, one told from the perspective of those on
society’s margins looking in.108  Racial auditors use anecdote as well as
numerical measurement to press this systemic view of the police on courts and
other resistant legal institutions, forcing them to hear, if not always accept,
alternatives to the dominant narratives, as the examples in Part III will reveal.
C. Racial Auditors and Information Politics
Although racial auditors do not usually involve themselves in partisan
politics, they are nevertheless intensely political organizations.  They exist to
alter the distribution and use of power in society, specifically in government
policy.109  Their political purpose—to enhance the recognition and enforcement
of human rights—combined with their frequent (though not universal)
independence from the state and from partisan political processes sharply
differentiates them from other auditor types.110  Like all auditors, however,
racial auditors use information as their primary tool, albeit for nakedly political
ends.
The paradigm racial auditor is a nongovernmental organization that has a
significant focus on combating both racial bias and police misconduct.111  These
NGOs play the politics of principle, using moral shaming to pressure
to the legislature and to the executive); promote reformist settlement negotiations, see infra Part III.A–
B; or shame courts into action.  Racial auditors therefore help to explode the final assumption on
Bandes’ list.
107. See id.  Excessive use of force by the police in investigating crime or enforcing the criminal law,
the subject of Bandes’ piece, is, of course, regulated by the Fourth Amendment.  See ANDREW E.
TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 267–76 (1997).  But the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, and the efforts of racial auditors, extend to many far less violent
police–citizen interactions.  See id. at 86–125.
108. See Bandes, supra note 89, at 1339–40.
109. See generally NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 77 (collecting essays making similar
points concerning many of the NGOs that I label as sometimes serving as “racial auditors” and assess-
ing their overall effectiveness, including on numerous issues other than race).
110. See infra Part III (analyzing and illustrating racial auditors’ nature and activities).
111. I am not suggesting that an entity’s sole reason for being must be the pursuit of racial equality.
On the contrary, including the many important broader–based human rights organizations is likely to
foster more energetic coalition building around, and bring more resources to, the cause of racial justice.
Rather, it is when an auditing organization brings its guns to bear on questions of racial equality that
the organization adopts the role of a racial auditor.  Restated, a racial auditor is more a role than an
entity.
I focus on the auditors’ involvement in racial issues because racial appeals are a particularly effec-
tive way to build political action around issues of human rights in the United States, for reasons
explored in Part IV of this article.  But many of the lessons taught here, with some modifications, can
be generalized to political auditing roles other than racial auditing.
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governments into living up to the promise of international human rights
norms.112  NGOs have been so increasingly effective that the language of
international human rights and moral shaming has begun to make its way into
American criminal courts and the everyday practice of criminal law in the
United States.113  NGOs “combine the grass-roots organizing strategies of social
movements, the best versions of muckraking reportage in investigative
journalism, and the shaming techniques of deeply religious small towns.”114
Importantly, NGOs play politics on behalf of the common people, those
described in religious literature and in the Rolling Stones’ well-known call-to-
arms as the “salt of the earth.”115  NGOs marshal the “power of the weak” as a
challenge to the conventional pillars of power.116  Martha Minow put it this way:
Bypassing state-to-state international relations, the NGOs introduced a kind of human
rights enforcement dependent on the beliefs of ordinary people and their power to
pressure and shame governments.  In a real sense, the broad vision of human rights
imagined in the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] previewed and required the
development of some strategy of this ilk in order to tie human rights enforcement to
ordinary people and to generate a sense of international community quite different
from that produced by an assembly of sovereign state representatives.117
International NGOs, though most often touted for their reliance on
international human rights principles, also rely on more local declarations of
rights, such as those in the United States Constitution.118  In fact, some NGOs,
such as the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), rely primarily on such
local norms.119
112. See ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 193 (2001) (“The moral power of groups like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights is considerable.  Fully engaged in the mobilization of
shame, they are relentless, persuasive, and pervasive.”).  See generally JONATHAN POWER, LIKE
WATER ON STONE: THE STORY OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2001) (recounting the history of the
efforts of one of the leading NGOs to use shame as a weapon against power).
113. See, e.g., THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, IN AMERICA’S COURT: HOW A CIVIL LAWYER WHO LIKES
TO SETTLE STUMBLED INTO A CRIMINAL TRIAL 198 (2002) (“Instead of the Harvard Law Review, you
read the latest report of Human Rights Watch.  It’s scary how it’s now a way to ‘keep up,’ with what’s
happening in the law here, like having an advance sheet . . . .”).
114. Martha Minow, Instituting Universal Human Rights Law: The Invention of Tradition in the
Twentieth Century, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 58, 64 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
115. See Salt of the Earth, on BEGGARS’ BANQUET (Olympic Studios 1968).
116. See generally ELIZABETH JANEWAY, POWERS OF THE WEAK (1980); Minow, supra note 114,
at 64 (summarizing Janeway’s work).
117. Minow, supra note 114, at 65.  For background on the Universal Declaration, see JOHANNES
MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, & INTENT
(1999).
118. See infra Part III.B.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 138–45 (discussing the ACLU).  Martha Minow reminds her
readers of an important caveat to the assertion that NGOs tie the human rights movement to ordinary
people:
The vast number of people in the world may be understandably too distracted by their
own life circumstances to become engaged with problems in other parts of the world, so the
“ordinary people” recruited by the NGOs typically fall in the small percentage of the world’s
population that already enjoys relative material comfort and political freedoms.
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Although NGOs’ primary function is to collect and disseminate data, they
also serve as advocates on behalf of the disempowered.120  Such advocacy may
include lobbying, providing legal assistance to the poor or oppressed,
recommending specific policy changes and methods, and aiding in grass-roots
organizing.121  There is, however, no sharp division between these information
and advocacy functions.  Information is used as the spur for advocacy, and
advocacy is used to uncover further information.122
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have recently explained that NGOs use
four primary tactics:
1. Information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate
politically usable information and move it where it will have the most
impact;
2. Symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions, and stories
that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far
away;
3. Leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a
situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have
influence; and
4. Accountability politics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their
previously stated policies or principles.123
Some or all of these tactics are at work in the brief case studies discussed below.
As will be seen, organizations that embrace tactics of advocacy-based
information politics are particularly likely to be effective in monitoring racially
tinged police behavior in the United States.124  Indeed, although this article may
have comparative and international implications, my focus is a local one:
exploring the effectiveness of NGOs and functionally similar organizations in
controlling racially unfair police practices in this nation.  I am, therefore,
principally concerned more with the United States Constitution than the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the pages that follow.  Perhaps even
more pointedly, I explore the actual and potential local political consequences,
more than the legal doctrinal implications, of the work of the NGOs and their
brethren in this area.
My measure of effectiveness therefore turns on two relevant NGO social
functions: using sunshine to deter police abuses and giving effective voice to the
Minow, supra note 114, at 75 n.18.  The focus of this article, however, is on problems in this part of the
world, namely, within the United States.  Moreover, I argue shortly that racial auditors can play a role
in stimulating more active political engagement by “ordinary people” than would otherwise be possible.
120. See Claude E. Welch, Jr., Introduction, in NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 1, 10.
121. See id. at 6, 10; infra Part III.A–B (discussing grass-roots organizing).
122. See infra Part III.A.
123. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 16 (1998).  See also Winston, supra note 77, at 36–51 (com-
paring Keck and Sikkink’s model to other models and analyzing the effectiveness of these four tactics).
124. See infra Part II.A.1.
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racially disempowered.125  Routinely exposing police conduct to the light of day,
what Erik Luna calls “transparent policing,”126 is critical to deterrence precisely
because the police so often operate under a code of silence.127  They often work
alone or in small teams, exercising wide discretion in the use of force or its
threat to ferret out crime.128  The code of silence often prevents the few officer
witnesses from revealing fellow officers’ misdeeds.129  Furthermore, the officers’
primary incentive is often to find the wrongdoer by the most effective means
necessary, even if that sometimes means bending the law.130  This phenomenon
is exemplified by “testilying,” the widespread practice in certain police
departments of lying about how evidence was seized, thus “beating”
suppression motions.131  Perhaps more often, the police culture of political
darkness leads to constitutional abuses stemming from negligence, ignorance,
and ennui rather than from nefarious officer scheming.132  Yet such ignorance
and laziness can lead to wrongful seizures, unreliable confessions, and tainted
lineups.133
Race plays a particularly important dual role.  Racial stereotypes and
subconscious biases can negatively affect police perceptions of danger and of
suspicious behavior.134  For example, African Americans might be stopped and
frisked and subjected to excessive police force more often than whites, as is
probably the case.135  But, if properly done, appeals to common racial interest
and unity can serve as a powerful motivating force among racial minorities to
125. See infra Part IV.
126. Luna, supra note 9 (coining the term “transparent policing”).
127. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” As Evidence of Bias and
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998) (presenting a detailed
analysis of the police code of silence and previous failures to crack it).
128. See ANTHONY BOUZA, POLICE UNBOUND: CORRUPTION, ABUSE, AND HEROISM BY THE
BOYS IN BLUE 213 (2001) (“Policing is mainly an individualistic pursuit, undertaken by the lone entre-
preneur or, more likely, with his or her partner. It is the one cop, or pair, entering upon a wide variety
of unknowns, that marks the genre and produces the need for initiative and independent action.”);
SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
1950–1990 21–53 (1993) (discussing sources of, and efforts to control, police discretion, especially in the
areas of search and seizure).
129. See Chin & Wells, supra note 127, at 242–44.
130. See BOUZA, supra note 128, at 13–46 (summarizing social and bureaucratic forces pushing the
police to bend, sometimes to break, the law to enforce it).
131. See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 9, at 761–69 (summarizing the causes of, and potential
solutions for, the phenomenon of testilying).
132. See, e.g., EDWIN J. DELATTRE, CHARACTER & COPS 51 (2d ed. 1994) (“Few actions erode the
confidence of the public or the police in their own department as much as the indifference of command
officers to misconduct by their personnel.”); id. at 52–53 (arguing that law enforcement must
adequately train officers in handling constitutional ambiguities and not trust to luck).
133. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000) (collecting ten stories of wrongful convictions,
often stemming from sloppy police work).
134. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 107, at 404–09 (summarizing the literature).
135. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 14, at 16–55 (discussing the disparate impact of searches and sei-
zures); HARRIS, supra note 15, at 48–90 (offering a more detailed analysis of statistical data); CYNTHIA
LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM,
NYU Press (forthcoming June, 2003) (discussing race and excessive force claims against the police).
TASLITZ_FMT_2.DOC 05/29/03  10:10 AM
Summer 2003] RACIAL AUDITORS 239
press for change, and, in the context of an appeal to more widely shared
political principles, can lead to coalition-building both among racial minorities
and with members of the white majority.136  This process of struggle will itself
give the disempowered a voice and aid in bridging gaps among groups
otherwise divided by race, income, gender, religion, or sexual orientation.
When NGOs serve in the role of monitoring police racial abuses to deter
state wrongdoing and to empower the marginalized of this country, the NGOs
act as racial auditors.  But, some organizations that are clearly not NGOs can,
under specified circumstances, serve a similar social role in regulating American
police forces.137  These non-NGOs thus also deserve the “racial auditors” label.
Racial auditors have been responsible for some of the most creative and
effective changes in the apparatus offered for minority involvement in
monitoring the police.
III
THE WORK OF RACIAL AUDITORS
A. Three Case Studies
1. The American Civil Liberties Union
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), established in 1920, is a
private voluntary organization committed to defending the Bill of Rights.138  The
ACLU includes a national office in New York City, a legislative office in
Washington, D.C., and staffed independent affiliates in almost every state.139  It
vigorously advocates a sometimes absolutist position on constitutional rights,
especially concerning freedom of speech and the separation of church and
state.140  The organization is especially committed to protecting the rights of
dissenters, even those opposed to the liberal principles for which the ACLU
stands.141  Consequently, the ACLU has even defended communists and Nazis,
alienating itself from both the political left and the political right.142  The ACLU
136. See infra Part IV.A (defending this point).
137. See infra Part III.C.
138. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 4 (2d.
ed. 1999) [hereinafter WALKER, ACLU].
139. Id. at 4.
140. See id. at 5.  These absolutist positions have led some commentators, especially conservative
ones, to heap fiery condemnation upon the ACLU and its affiliates.  See, e.g., WILLIAM DONOHUE,
TWILIGHT OF LIBERTY: THE LEGACY OF THE ACLU (2001); F. LAGARD SMITH, ACLU: THE
DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: THE SEDUCTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA (1996).
141. See HAIG BOSMAJIAN, THE FREEDOM NOT TO SPEAK 143 (1999) (discussing the investigation
of the ACLU as a “subversive” and “un-American” organization by the House Un-American Activities
Committee, during its 1940s and 1950s anti-Communist witch hunt); WALKER, supra note 138, at 5,
323–27; SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY IN MODERN
AMERICA 100–02 (1998) (discussing ACLU representation of the Ku Klux Klan) [hereinafter,
WALKER, RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY].
142. On the ACLU’s representation of Communists and Nazis, see WALKER, ACLU supra note
138, at 63–65, 118–19, 208–11, 323–27.  On the ACLU’s alienation from the political left, see, for exam-
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uses a variety of advocacy methods, from litigation, to lobbying, to selling
topical books on individual rights.143  The organization has a long history of
successfully defending minorities against majority power; its strongest advocates
boldly declare that, “With some justification, the ACLU can claim to have
shaped contemporary values.  Principles of individual freedom, protection
against arbitrary government action, equal protection, and privacy have
pervaded our society [because of the ACLU].”144  While some might consider
this praise an overstatement and question the wisdom of many of the ACLU’s
positions, the ACLU has unquestionably played an important modern role in
expanding the rights of criminal suspects, the broader civil rights of racial
minorities, and the legal protections at the intersection of race and equality in
the justice system.145
The ACLU is the racial auditor most closely fusing the data-dissemination
and advocacy functions.  One telling example is its war on racial profiling.
a. Driving while black.  One major battle has been over the
phenomenon of “driving while black” (“DWB”), the police use of race,
consciously or not, as a weighty factor in deciding whom to stop for traffic
violations and whom thereafter to search.146  One of the major claims of the
opponents of DWB is that the traffic violations are but a pretext for fishing
expeditions for illegal drugs.147
One victim of DWB in Maryland, Robert Wilkins, brought suit against the
Maryland State Police after they had stopped and searched his rental car as he
and his family were returning from a funeral.148  The ACLU represented Wilkins
in an action claiming that the stop was based on a racial profile, violating
several civil rights and other statutes.149  Although the police initially denied the
allegation, they settled when a document, the “Criminal Intelligence Report,”
containing an “explicit profile targeting African Americans,” was discovered.150
The most important part of the settlement agreement was that the state police
would “keep data on every traffic stop that resulted in a search, and submit the
ple, RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 149–62 (1997) (sneering at and debunking the
ACLU’s absolutist defense of the “speech we hate” to protect racist and sexist insults and harassment
and some forms of on-campus racial and gender intimidation); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY
WORDS 51, 130–31 n.28 (1993) (criticizing what she sees as the ACLU’s willingness to defend some
forms of sexual harassment as protected free speech).
143. On litigation and lobbying, see WALKER, ACLU supra note 138, at 4–5.  To illustrate the
ACLU’s other efforts, a search on Amazon.com performed April 7, 2003, brought up twenty books by
the ACLU directed at laypersons on a wide variety of civil liberties topics.
144. See WALKER, ACLU supra note 138, at 3.
145. See id. at 237–78, 355–58.
146. See, e.g., KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: WHAT TO DO IF YOU ARE A VICTIM
OF RACIAL PROFILING 4–20 (2000).
147. See HARRIS, supra note 15.
148. See ComplaintWilkins v. Md. State Police (D. Md. 1993) (Civ. No. MJG 93–468) [hereinafter
Wilkins Complaint]; HARRIS, supra note 15, at 8–10, 35–37, 60–61 (summarizing the Wilkins case).
149. See HARRIS, supra note 15, at 60–61; Wilkins, Complaint, supra note 148.
150. HARRIS, supra note 15, at 61.
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data to the court for a period of three years so that it could monitor whether the
state police had in fact changed their ways.”151
The ACLU retained Dr. John Lamberth of Temple University to analyze
the newly-collected data.152  Lamberth compared the state police statistics with
his own road population and violator surveys that he had conducted on
Interstate 95, the main route covered by the state police’s drug interdiction
efforts.153  Lamberth found that blacks and whites violated traffic laws at the
same rate, with blacks constituting only seventeen percent of the driving
population on that road.154  Yet African Americans constituted seventy-two
percent of those stopped and searched.155  This disparity was 34.6 standard
deviations from the mean, a measure of statistical significance that, said
Lamberth, was “literally off the charts.”  Lamberth concluded:
While no one can know the motivation of each individual trooper in conducting a
traffic stop, the statistics presented herein, representing a broad and detailed sample
of highly appropriate data, show without question a racially discriminatory impact on
blacks . . . .  The disparities are sufficiently great that, taken as a whole, they are
consistent and strongly support the assertion that the state police targeted the
community of black motorists for stop, detention, and investigation within the
Interstate 95 corridor.156
The data collection and dissemination strategy used by the ACLU in its
lawsuit against the Maryland State Police is one model that the ACLU has used
in similar fashion elsewhere in the country, particularly in one suit involving the
Illinois State Police157 and another against the Philadelphia Police.158  But the
ACLU has also sought to reach broader audiences through issuing an
overarching Special Report examining the DWB problem nationwide.159
Importantly, the Special Report made extensive use of narratives in addition to
numerical data.  Twenty-six narratives of racial discrimination involving at least
twenty-six separate cities were recounted to demonstrate the nationwide scope
151. Id.; see also Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. Md. State Police (D. Md. 1993) (Civ. No. MJG
93–468) [hereinafter Wilkins Settlement Agreement].
152. See HARRIS, supra note 15, at 61.
153. See id.
154. See id; DAVID A. HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S
HIGHWAYS: AN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION SPECIAL REPORT 18–20 (1999), available at
http://www.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html [hereinafter ACLU SPECIAL REPORT] (giving a more
detailed and precise summary of Lamberth’s data and methodology).
155. Report of Dr. John Lamberth (plaintiff’s expert) 4, 6, Wilkins v. Md. State Police (D. Md.
1993) (Civ. No. MJG 93–468) [hereinafter Lamberth Report].
156. See id. at 9; See also HARRIS, supra note 15, at 62.
157. See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff’d 251 F. 3d 612 (7th Cir.
2001). ACLU SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 154, at 15–16 (discussing Chavez).  Results were less san-
guine, however, for the plaintiffs on appeal. See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F. 3d 612, 636–33 (7th
Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff in a racial profiling case must show that similarly situated individuals
in a non-protected class were not stopped or arrested under similar circumstances).
158. ACLU SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 154, at 17–18; ACLU, FOURTH MONITORING REPORT:
PEDESTRIAN AND CAR REPORT AUDIT (1998) available at http://www.aclu.org/community/pennsyl/
dwbreport.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003) (reporting that data from police districts chosen for analysis
revealed significantly disparate rates for stopping minority drivers).
159. See ACLU SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 154, at 10.
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of the problem.  The narratives were also designed to impress upon the reader
the sense of humiliation and insult that DWB stops create.160  That pain was
portrayed as a central part of profiling’s social cost, yet a part that could not be
adequately conveyed by numbers alone.161  One narrative, again from Maryland,
illustrates the point:
Charles and Etta Carter, an elderly African American couple from Pennsylvania, were
stopped by Maryland State Police on their 40th wedding anniversary.  The troopers
searched their car and brought in drug-sniffing dogs.  During the course of the search,
their daughter’s wedding dress was tossed onto one of the police cars and, as trucks
passed on I-95, it was blown to the ground.  Mrs. Carter was not allowed to use the
restroom during the search because police officers feared that she would flee.  Their
belongings were strewn along the highway, trampled and urinated on by the dogs.  No
drugs were found and no ticket was issued.162
Other narratives included these: In Trumbull, Connecticut, police questioning
why an African-American woman was even present in the largely white town;
Portland, Oregon, police stopping an African-American woman for claimed
seatbelt law violations when she and her passengers all had their seatbelts on;
and Raleigh, North Carolina, police removing door panels, molding, and seats
from, and deflating the tires of, a car driven by a stopped black driver.163  The
narratives covered a wide range of respondents, from advertising executives, to
social workers, to athletes.164  The breadth and depth of the narratives, and the
corresponding statistical data, made it hard to dismiss these reports as “mere
anecdote.”165  The Special Report emphasized, however, that litigation can be
difficult, costly, and slow.  Accordingly, the ACLU called for federal and state
legislation and voluntary local actions as additional parts of the effort to end
DWB stops.166  The desired legislation and voluntary actions centered once
again on data collection.167
Data collection helps to prove that the DWB problem is real and not simply
a rare, if unpleasant, phenomenon; that disparate stops are not only due to
racially differential rates of offending; and that the social costs of such stops is
unduly high.168  The narratives also help to capture the public imagination.169  But
160. See id. at 10–17.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 10.
163. See id. at 10–17.
164. See id.
165. See Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why the First
Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism, and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 781, 819 (1996) (discussing the high Court’s willingness in constitutional analysis to
rely on anecdote noteworthy for its “breadth and detail” when combined with other converging sorts of
data, such as statistical information).
166. See ACLU SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 154, at 10–17.
167. See id.
168. See HARRIS, supra note 15, at 48–128.
169. See infra note 465 and accompanying text (explaining the power of empathy).  Professor Harris
notes that, where there is no supporting data collected, racial profiling has been accepted as involving
“anomalies,” its alleged victims “portrayed as crackpots, malcontents, criminals, or race baiters.”
HARRIS, supra note 15, at 175.
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data is further necessary to aid the police in curing the problem, as law
professor David Harris explains:
A police chief . . . who does not have data on the specifics of what officers under her
command are doing and how they are doing it is at an extreme disadvantage.  She will
find it hard to know what decisions to make, what personnel she needs, or how to
deploy existing assets without information that will tell her how effective her current
efforts are.  Accurate and timely information is a prerequisite for managing any
organization, including law enforcement agencies.170
Data demonstrating the existence of the problem is, therefore, not enough.
Police departments must track individual officers’ activities, the location and
reason for each stop, the financial and time costs of additional police record-
keeping responsibilities, and the racial makeup of the community being
patrolled.171
How the data is obtained and distributed also matters because the simple
process of data-collection and recording, if done properly, can help to promote
community trust in the police.172  Thus, one of the ACLU’s premiere consultants
on the profiling issue recommends that law enforcement align their data-
collection efforts with independent partners, including researchers in
universities and think-tanks.173  Involving independent consultants will improve
the quality of data analysis, but, the consultant explains, will also foster public
confidence in the results by avoiding the impression that reports are but an
instance of “the fox guarding the henhouse.”174  Moreover, the consultant
recommends, the police must convene a community task force including
representatives of rank-and-file officers, the local community, and concerned
organizations like the ACLU, NAACP, and National Urban League.175  The
task force should have input on all anti-profiling efforts, including data
collection and dissemination, partly because “when all of these constituencies
become a real part of the process from the beginning, the result is likely to be
not only a better outcome but an outcome in which all of the participants have a
stake.”176  ACLU participation in similar efforts in San Jose and San Diego,
California, led to muted rather than angry reactions upon the release of
damaging reports, and community groups and prominent citizens
170. HARRIS, supra note 15, at 176.
171. See id. at 177–83.
172. See id. at 178 (“The smartest, most forward-thinking police departments will . . . collect data
because it is in their interest to have accurate, comprehensive information to help them understand
officer and departmental behavior and to address complaints before they undermine the effectiveness
of efforts police make at reaching out to members of the community.”); David Harris, Racial Profiling
Revisited: “Just Common Sense” in the Fight Against Terror?, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2002 at 36, 38
(“Even if we ignore the high social costs—distrust of all government, including police and the legal
system; exacerbation of existing problems such as residential segregation and employment discrimina-
tion; and destruction of valuable law enforcement initiatives such as community policing—racial pro-
filing as a means to crime reduction simply does not deliver.”).
173. See HARRIS, supra note 15, at 184–85.
174. See id. at 184.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 184–85.
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enthusiastically stepped forward to support police reform efforts.177  Professor
Harris, in the context of discussing these reactions, describes the ACLU as “the
organization that has clearly done the most to promote action against profiling
across the country.”178
The importance of community involvement in data collection, analysis, and
distribution, and in planning concrete responses to the lessons taught by the
data, was underscored by recent ACLU efforts to address broader aspects of
racial profiling.  Those efforts took place in the specific context of violently
explosive protests against racial profiling in Cincinnati, Ohio.
b. Law on the streets of Cincinnati.  In early April, 2001, an unarmed
teenager, Timothy Thomas, was shot to death by Cincinnati police officers.179
The officers were pursuing Thomas on an outstanding arrest warrant for two
alleged misdemeanors and numerous traffic offenses.180  The shooting sparked
protests in Cincinnati’s African-American community; protestors alleged that
the officers used excessive force because of Thomas’s race.181  Thomas was the
fourth black male killed by the Cincinnati police since 1995; the police had not
killed one white suspect during that time.182  Feelings ran so high that the
protests turned violent, with newspapers describing the reaction as a riot.183
But the protests and resulting violence were about far more than the
excessive use of force.  Protestors were also angered by what they viewed as
years of degrading racial profiling by the local police.184  A teenager interviewed
by the Washington Post seemed to capture the sense of the community:
“The riots are not just a reaction to the killing of an African-American male, but to
the injustice to our people for so long,” said Christopher Johnson, 16, as he stood on
the church steps.  “Just walking down the street I get asked [by police], ‘What are you
doing?’ I pay taxes like they do.  I should be able to walk down a public street.”185
177. Mark Arner & Joe Hughes, Police Stop Blacks, Latinos More Often; Data from Profiling
Report Echo Fears of S.D. Minorities, S.D. UNION TRIB., Sept. 29, 2000, at A1 (reporting that damning
results of a study evoked praise rather than blame by leaders of the affected community, who had been
involved in the study process); Tony Perry, San Diego Promises More Study to See If Blacks and Lati-
nos Are Being Singled Out by Officers Because of Skin Color, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at A1
(reporting that minority group members and the ACLU, having been included in the study process,
supported the city’s police chief as he released a report which concluded that these same minorities had
been subjected to racially disparate stops by the police); cf. Taslitz, Stories, supra note 26, at 2283
(explaining the importance to a sensible Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of giving minority commu-
nities voice).
178. HARRIS, supra note 15, at 185.
179. Amy DePaul & Peter Slevin, Cincinnati Officials Impose Curfew; Mayor Acknowledges Race
Woes as City Acts to Quell Violence, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2001, at A1.
180. See id.
181. See Francis X. Clines, In Aftershock of Unrest, Cincinnati Seeks Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2001, at A11 (suggesting that the protests were sparked partly by concerns that the Thomas shooting
was the latest in a long line of excessive force cases) [hereinafter Clines, Aftershock].
182. See Francis X. Clines, Appeals for Peace in Ohio after Two Days of Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Clines, Appeals for Peace.].
183. See id.
184. See id.; Clines, Aftershock,  supra note 181; DePaul & Slevin, supra note 179.
185. DePaul & Slevin, supra note 179.
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Indeed, shortly before the Thomas shooting, the Cincinnati Black United
Front and the ACLU of Ohio had filed a lawsuit accusing the city’s police force
of a thirty-year pattern of racial profiling, including unduly frequent traffic and
jaywalking stops, often involving unnecessary humiliation and use of force.186
Cincinnati was, of course, an infamous site of riots in the violent summer of
1968, after African Americans charged that they were harassed by local police
abusing the discretion granted them by loitering laws.187  That allegation was
supported the next year by the Kerner Commission’s Report examining the
causes of those riots and of similar violence in seven other cities.188  The recent
ACLU suit essentially alleges that little has changed since 1968.189
The 2001 Cincinnati violence and resulting bad press for the police force
created an atmosphere conducive to the defendants settling quickly.  Plaintiffs
took advantage of this situation by offering to submit their complaint to a
mediation.190  Judge Susan J. Dlott accordingly appointed a special master, Dr.
Jay Rothman, “a mediator experienced in two decades of conflict resolutions in
the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and other global trouble spots.”191  Judge
Dlott’s charge to Dr. Rothman was to begin the settlement process “by studying
the impassioned, informed views of Cincinnati residents.”192
Dr. Rothman used a questionnaire addressed to 3,500 representatives of
various segments of the community concerning their goals for future police–
186. See Clines, Appeals for Peace, supra note 182; see also Clines, Aftershock, supra note 181;
DePaul & Slevin, supra note 179.
187. See DePaul & Slevin, supra note 179.  See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Mob Violence and
Vigilantism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 564–65 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds.,
2002) (discussing social forces causing the 1968 urban riots in Cincinnati and other major cities).
188. See DePaul & Slevin, supra note 179; see also Taslitz, Mob Violence and Vigilantism, supra note
187, at 565.
189. See DePaul & Selvin, supra note 179 (“We have not a few isolated incidents . . . .  We have a
pattern perceived by the Kerner Commission in 1968 and perceived continuously to this day.  It’s diffi-
cult for the city to credibly deny that this problem exists.”) (quoting Raymond Vasvari, Legal Director
of the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio).
190. See No Agreement Yet in Profiling Lawsuit, CINCINNATI POST, Apr. 2, 2002, at 1A.  Whether
the plaintiffs or Judge Dlott started the mediation ball rolling is unclear.  Compare id. (crediting the
plaintiffs) with John Halpin, A Model for Peace Service in Cincinnati, GLOBAL PEACE SERVICES USA,
Sept. 2002, at 1 (crediting Judge Dlott as the instigator).  What all agree on, however, is that even if
Judge Dlott made the suggestion, the plaintiffs ran with it, and the parties and their mediator played
major roles in giving the process its final shape.  As John Halpin, a Board member of Global Peace
Services USA, put it:
Judge Dlott recognized that the courtroom wasn’t always the best place to resolve such deep-
rooted issues in which healing is necessary.  She suggested to attorney Ken Lawson that he
find another way to resolve the issue.  Lawson’s co-counsel Alphonse Gerhardstein, in turn,
contacted the Andrus Family Foundation, based in New York, and asked if they would help
fund an alternative method of resolving the lawsuit.  They eagerly agreed and suggested Jay
Rothman as the man to do it.
Id.  Whether the plaintiffs originated the idea or not, their successful efforts create a model for future
such efforts by racial auditors.
191. Francis X. Clines, A City Tries to Turn Candor Into Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at
A22 [hereinafter Clines, Candor].
192. Id.  See Jay Rothman and Chris Soderquist, From Riots to Resolution: Engaging Conflict for
Reconciliation, THE SYSTEMS THINKER 13, Oct. 2002, at 2 (detailing the workings of the Cincinnati
collaborative process).
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community relations in the city.193  Dr. Rothman’s mediation firm, the ARIA
Group, divided respondents into eight stakeholding groups: African Americans,
youths twenty-five and under, city officials and employees, religious/social
service leadership, police and families, business/foundation leaders, whites, and
other minority citizens.194  The responses were converted into “platforms
representing consensus goals agreed upon by self-selected representatives in 12
four hour feedback sessions.”195  The goals heavily emphasized the idea of
“respect”: respect for African-American community safety, for the citizens
themselves, and for the police.196  Additional themes included the importance of
collaborative citizen–police law enforcement, monitoring of the police, and
mutual accountability.197  The information collected formed the basis for
extensive negotiations among all stakeholder groups.198  Those negotiations bore
fruit when a settlement was reached creating a “collaborative” agreement
among all stakeholders.199  The settlement agreement was ratified by the
ACLU’s thirty-member state board, Cincinnati’s police union, the City Council,
and the Cincinnati Black United Front.200  The deal committed the police to
“bias-free policing,”201 that is, providing “police services in a fair and impartial
manner without any discrimination on the basis of race, color, or ethnicity.”202
To achieve that goal, the police committed themselves to “community problem-
oriented policing” (“CPOP”), an “information intensive strategy that places a
premium on data, intelligence, community input, and analysis.”203  CPOP relies
on measuring outcomes, training officers as problem-solvers, “crime mapping”
(constant data analysis of the frequency, location, and nature of crime), and
police-community interaction.204  The agreement also created a new citizen
compliance board and committed the city, in consultation with the parties, to
“take appropriate action to track compliance” with the police’s promise to
combat bias.205
193. See ARIA GROUP, CINCINNATI POLICE–COMMUNITY RELATIONS COLLABORATIVE, avail-
able at http://www.ariagroup.com/.FINAL_document.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. See id.; Taslitz, Stories, supra note 26 (on value of respect).
197. See ARIA GROUP, supra note 193.
198. See Clines, Candor, supra note 191.
199. See Francis X. Clines, Deal Reached on Policing in Cincinnati, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at
A16.  A collaborative agreement, unlike a consent decree or a typical mediation, involves participants
well beyond the parties to the lawsuit, including a wide array of community representatives.  See Aria
Group at http://www.ariagroup.com/FAQ (last visited Nov. 22, 2002).
200. See Kevin Osborne, Profiling Accord Ready for Signing, CINCINNATI POST: ONLINE EDITION,
at http://www.cincypost.com/2002/apr/10/sbprofo41002.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
201. Id.
202. Collaborative Agreement at ¶ 50, In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(No. C–1–99–3170) [hereinafter Collaborative Agreement].
203. Id. ¶ 17, 21.
204. Id. ¶ 22–26.  For an impassioned defense of data-driven policing, see JACK MAPLE, THE
CRIME FIGHTER: PUTTING THE BAD GUYS OUT OF BUSINESS 92–119 (1999).
205. See Collaborative Agreement, supra note 202, at ¶ 50.
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Data was at the heart of this compliance-monitoring strategy.  The city
agreed to develop a “system for consistently informing the public about police
policies and procedures” and to conduct, again in consultation with the parties,
a “communications audit” to improve community awareness of police policies.206
Annual and quarterly reports detailing problem-solving activities were also
required.207  A Monitor was empowered to review all data relevant to
implementation of the agreement and to report the results to a court-appointed
“conciliator” who would evaluate the Monitor’s reports, instruct parties on how
to improve compliance, and give the parties an opportunity to cure any flaw
before the court becomes involved in the enforcement process.208  Among the
Monitor’s duties was supervision of the development and implementation of a
“mutual accountability plan,” which required full documentation of all
favorable and unfavorable police conduct, and regular meetings with the parties
to study the results.209  The parties were also mandated to create an “Evaluation
Protocol” to assist monitoring.210  That protocol must include periodic surveys of
citizen satisfaction with the police, parsed by race, gender, age, and
neighborhood, using probability samples that must include citizens who have
had direct police encounters, periodic observations of a representative sample
of police problem-solving projects, and annual statistical compilations of police-
community interactions.211  The Monitor was also granted full and unrestricted
access to police and city staff and databases and must be involved in periodic
compliance reports.212
206. Id. ¶ 29(h).
207. Id. ¶ 29(i), (j).
208. See id. ¶¶ 30, 110–14.
209. Id. ¶ 30.
210. Id. ¶¶ 30–33.
211. See Collaborative Agreement, supra note 202, at ¶¶ 34–42.
212.   See id. ¶¶ 100–13.  Despite these fairly aggressive efforts to alter policing in Cincinnati, a few
colleagues to whom I presented this paper—especially one who is a former Cincinnati resident—
expressed pessimism about the likely long-term success of these efforts, and worried that weaker
groups like the Black United Front (“BUF”) are inevitably co-opted, diverted, and weakened by
participating in mediation with stronger parties.  The BUF was keenly aware of the dangers of co-
optation, insisting for that reason that any agreement be backed up by the force of a court order.
Furthermore, the BUF has made clear its willingness to turn to direct citizen action should the
Collaborative prove to be disappointing.  Telephone Interview with Dr. Jay Rothman, Director of the
Collaborative for Police Community Relations (Feb. 2, 2003).  Thus, though not aimed at the
Collaborative, as of this writing the BUF is still encouraging an economic boycott of the City until it
makes greater efforts to include more African Americans in the City’s economic successes.  Id.  Long-
term success partly turns on the continued flow of money to support the Collaborative’s activities.  The
initial effort combined the Andrus Foundation monies with hundreds of thousands of dollars raised by
local religious organizations, law firms, and other contributors.  Id.  After that five-year period is up,
the expectation is that the effort will continue under the auspices of a variety of then-existing
institutions.  An effort is being made to raise $20,000,000 to create a problem-solving institute that will
continue to pursue the Collaborative’s goals as one of its primary missions.  Id.
 Dr. Rothman believes that the Collaborative effort differs from earlier ones in several ways likely
to promote long-term success.  I paraphrase and elaborate on his analysis:
The Collaborative’s goal is not to regulate the police but to create a new set of relationships in which
police and community work together toward shared aspirations.
Primacy is given to mutual respect.  Respect, by definition, precludes co-optation.  Although the BUF
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In short, the agreement was reached via an inclusive data collection and
dissemination process, and it created a more inclusive, data-intensive process as
a way of deterring abusive police practices, fostering greater police–community
respect and mutual trust, and improving the quality and fairness of police
services and citizen safety.213  However, if courts close the doors on racial
profiling suits, as some are starting to do, lawsuits may become a less effective
means of obtaining similar agreements.214  Still, progress has been made on
racial profiling in some cases without relying upon the courts.  Indeed, a
growing mass anti-profiling movement has done much to promote legislative
and administrative solutions.215  Whether sparked by lawsuits or grassroots
political action, however, inclusive data-driven strategies like those followed in
Cincinnati are instructive and promising.
may not have put all its eggs in the collaborative basket, continued respectful treatment as an equal
partner and positive results should promote greater trust.  But that does not mean replacing good deeds
with good words.  Good words that accomplish nothing will undermine any willingness to accept the
police as acting in good faith.  Correspondingly, the police are wary of being blamed for all ills rather
than being embraced as willing partners.  If the police are not treated with respect by the community,
they are likely to resist introspection and true teamwork with the citizens they police.
Implementation and institutional design are the results of a true bottom-up process.  Neither the BUF
nor the ACLU represents all community views.  Neither the police union nor the City’s lawyers repre-
sent all police views.  This process consults the community residents, beat officers, and other ordinary
persons to identify and solve problems, promoting individual and group voice and maximum participa-
tion.
The Collaborative relies heavily on the creation, collection, distribution, and use of information by and
to all stakeholder groups and to the broader public.  Such continued transparency promotes a healthy
tension to keep everyone on his or her toes.  “Trust but verify” seem to be the watchwords.
The monitor for the Collaborative has just recently been appointed.  Only time will tell whether the
Collaborative will achieve its goals.  But it is a novel and soundly designed project worthy of careful
attention and continuing study.
213. The Collaborative Agreement’s approach seems consistent with most or all of what I have
called the “Six Principles of Respect” for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
1)  Balancing appropriately the needs for individualized and group justice;
2)  Racial and ethnic Consciousness;
3)  Giving minority communities voice;
4)  Sharing institutional obligations among the three branches of government;
5)  Promoting the citizenry’s monitorial role in regulating the police;
6)  Ensuring a high quantity and quality of evidence to justify police action.
See Taslitz, Stories, supra note 26, at 2282–84.  Professors Sandler and Schoenbrod have recently
written a passionate condemnation of consent decrees in institutional reform litigation.  See ROSS
SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN
GOVERNMENT (2003).  They raise numerous objections to the consent decree process: It is run by the
lawyers in a narrow “controlling group;” it displaces democratic processes with secretive ones run by
elites; it leaves the controlling group unconstrained by checks and balances; it mandates compliance
with rigid minutiae over efforts most likely to achieve the goals set in changing circumstances; and it
may involve the courts in enforcement for decades.  Id. at 204–21.
I do not necessarily accept all these criticisms of consent decrees, but they do offer useful insights.
What matters most for my purposes here is that the parties to the Cincinnati Collaborative carefully
avoided what they saw as the inaccurate “consent decree” label.  Telephone Interview with Dr. Roth-
man, supra note 213.  The flexible, bottom-up, stakeholder-driven, transparent Collaborative process
was designed precisely to retain the consent decree’s strengths while correcting for its weaknesses.  Id.
214. See Taslitz, Stories, supra note 26, at 2321 n.413 (summarizing the reasons why “the burdens of
proving civil [racial profiling] claims are substantial”).
215. See HARRIS, supra note 15, at 144–207.
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2. Amnesty International
Amnesty International (“Amnesty” or “AI”) makes less use of the courts
and is less advocacy-oriented than the ACLU.  Nevertheless, Amnesty does
advocate for change by making specific policy recommendations, lobbying
legislators and executive branch officers, and engaging in letter-writing
campaigns, among other activities.216  Amnesty is “the world’s preeminent
human rights advocacy organization,” called the “conscience of the world” for
its efforts at documenting and publicizing human rights abuses.217  Amnesty was
founded over forty years ago with the idea of collecting information on political
prisoners, then using volunteer activists to shower oppressive governments with
letters calling for the prisoners’ immediate and unconditional release.218  Since
then, Amnesty was awarded the Nobel Peace Price for documenting human
rights abuses in Argentina, organized an international rock concert tour to
encourage human rights awareness, played a major role in the 1993 Vienna
World Conference on Human Rights, and generally “set the standard for other
human rights organizations to follow.”219  AI’s culture is one of international
solidarity on human rights issues, democratic decision-making, and massive
membership mobilization.220  Its message is that “ordinary people, from every
nation, and every walk of life, should and can do something to secure human
rights for all.”221  Its primary tools are data generation and collection, followed
by publicity and “moral shaming” to change abusive governmental conduct.222
One of Amnesty’s strategies has been to provide a focus on the particular
human rights abuses common in a particular country.  In part, Amnesty does
this by means of “country campaigns,” which bring the membership’s efforts
and world attention to bear on a small number of countries for a specific, but
extended, period of time.223  At the end of 1998, Amnesty launched its “Rights
for All” campaign, focusing on human rights abuses in the United States,
including an analysis of police practices and of racial biases in the criminal
justice system.224  The campaign was considered by many to be especially
important because of the United States’ self-portrayal as a human rights
bastion; Amnesty thus spent over two years planning this ambitious campaign.225
That one-year campaign included efforts to mobilize other countries to
diplomatically pressure the United States to reform its institutions.226  In
Belgium, Amnesty presented the U.S. embassy with a giant syringe filled with
216. See generally Winston, supra note 77, at 25.
217. Id. at 25.
218. See POWER, supra note 112, at xi.
219. See Winston, supra note 77, at 25.
220. See id. at 30.
221. Id. at 30–31.
222. See id. at 50.  See generally DRINAN, supra note 112 (evaluating the successes and weaknesses
of a post-World War II international human rights strategy relying on the power of public shaming).
223. See POWER, supra note 112, at 253; Winston, supra note 77, at 39–40.
224. POWER, supra note 112, at 253–59.
225. See Winston, supra note 77, at 40.
226. POWER, supra note 112, at 277; Winston, supra note 77, at 40.
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cards written by school children protesting U.S. juvenile justice and reliance on
the death penalty.227  In the Netherlands, Amnesty worked on protesting police
brutality in Florida.228  In Nepal, Amnesty presented the U.S. embassy in
Katmandu with 40,000 signatures on a banner calling for American attention to
human rights.229  AI members throughout the world were asked to write to the
U.S. state and federal governments asking for the creation of independent
monitoring bodies to guard against police brutality, including stopping the use
of hog-tying and stun guns.230
The centerpiece of the campaign was a country report, Rights for All,
documenting U.S. human rights abuses, combined with follow-up or satellite
reports on specific issues.231  One important follow-up report was Race, Rights
and Police Brutality.232
Both Rights for All and Race, Rights and Police Brutality made use of brief,
but emotionally powerful, narratives, much like those used by the ACLU.233
These narratives focused on unjustified police shootings, use of dangerous
restraint procedures, misuse of police dogs, and use of stun belts throughout
various cities and states in this country.234  The reports also bemoaned the
widespread nature of racial profiling, noted racial disparities and abuses in both
inner cities and affluent suburbs, and documented significantly lower levels of
confidence in the competency and fairness of the police among blacks than
among whites.235  Police department secrecy, police codes of silence, police
failure to gather adequate data on abuses, and the underfunding of
“independent” civilian review boards were among the factors that Amnesty
identified as magnifying both the level of abuse and the racially tilted
227. POWER, supra note 112, at 277.
228. Id. at 278.
229. Id.
230. Winston, supra note 77, at 40.
231. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RIGHTS FOR ALL (AMR 51/035/1998 1998),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/index.html [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L, RIGHTS FOR ALL].
232. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY
(AMR 51/147/1999 1999), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/index.html [hereinafter AMNESTY
INT’L, RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY].
233. See AMNESTY INT’L, RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY, supra note 232; AMNESTY
INT’L, RIGHTS FOR ALL, supra note 231.
234. This was especially true of AMNESTY INT’L, RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY, supra
note 232.
235. See id.; AMNESTY INT’L, RIGHTS FOR ALL, supra note 231; see also YUEN J. HUO & TOM R.
TYLER, HOW DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS REACT TO LEGAL AUTHORITY (Public Policy Institute of
California ed., 2000) (presenting a recent empirical study of minority group attitudes toward the police
in California).  Professors Huo and Tyler conclude that, compared to whites, African Americans and
Latinos reported lower levels of satisfaction in their interactions with legal authorities—especially the
police—and consequently less willingness to comply with the directives of legal authorities.  See id. at
viii.  These same minority groups also experienced less procedural fairness in dealing with authorities
than did whites, and these perceptions of fair treatment were more important than case outcomes in
influencing the level of satisfaction with the police.  See id. at viii–ix.  Furthermore, different minority
groups and whites shared relatively similar conceptions of what constitutes procedural fairness: unbi-
ased, respectful, individualized assessments of each person by the authorities.  See id. at ix–x.  Proce-
dural fairness mattered most to those minorities most strongly identifying with American Society, even
where these same minorities shared a strong sense of ethnic identity.  See id.
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distribution of abuses.236  Amnesty therefore counseled greater police
department “transparency” and improved, regular data collection by police
departments as two of its suggested solutions.237
Amnesty International USA’s Executive Director, William F. Schulz,
thereafter detailed these and other reports’ results in a chapter of his recent
book.238  Schulz, too, focused on differences among the races, particularly
between whites and blacks, both in victimization by the police and in the
perceptions of such victimization.239  He focused less on narrative and more on
hard numbers.  His general tack was to argue—apparently aiming toward
middle-class white America—that all Americans’ self-interests are harmed by
unduly aggressive policing generally and by racial profiling and its cognates
specifically.240  Lawsuits against abusive police and administrative investigations
into their conduct are costly, he argued; the guilty defendant may be released
along with the innocent when widespread frame-ups are occasionally revealed,
as happened in the Los Angeles Ramparts investigation; and safety is
diminished when distrustful minority communities cease to cooperate with the
police in investigating and preventing crime.241  Schulz expressly cautioned
whites against the risks of racial unrest:
Nothing threatens to rip this society apart racially any faster than disparity in
treatment at the hands of the police.  It has happened over and over before.  Have we
forgotten that nearly every one of the incidents of urban unrest in 1968 was touched
off by arrests of blacks by white officers for minor offenses?  Have we forgotten the
experience of Los Angeles in 1992 following the acquittal in the Rodney King case, a
conflagration that did more than $700 million worth of damage in this country?  Are
we aware that St. Petersburg, Florida was the scene of a similar, if less costly, riot as
recently as 1996 following the killing of a black motorist by a white officer?  Do we
really want to gamble that the United States has “put all this behind us?”242
236. See AMNESTY INT’L, RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY, supra note 232; AMNESTY
INT’L, RIGHTS FOR ALL, supra note 231.
237. See AMNESTY INT’L, RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY, supra note 232; AMNESTY
INT’L, RIGHTS FOR ALL, supra note 231.
238. WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS
BENEFITS US ALL (2001).
239. See id. at 154–56.
240. See id. at 156–62.
241. See id.  Concerning minority community distrust of the police, Schulz had this to say:
A good percentage of successful police work depends on cooperation from the law-abiding
elements in any community.  If huge segments of the community are alienated from law
enforcement authorities, mistrustful of them or frightened, that bodes ill for the willingness of
those community members to extend a helping hand.  Social commentator Dinesh D’Souza
could never be accused of being a “bleeding heart liberal.”  His reason for opposing racial pro-
filing is quite pragmatic: “Government-sponsored . . . discrimination has the cataclysmic social
effect of polarizing African-Americans who play by the rules and still cannot avoid being dis-
criminated against.  Even law-abiding blacks become enemies of the system because they find
themselves treated that way.”
Id. at 159.
242. Id. at 158.  See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING
PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002) (offering an extended analysis to
explain why procedural justice, a belief that police and courts are acting in good faith, and a stronger
sense of connection to the broader American community without sacrificing racial identity, are likely to
promote safer streets, police legitimacy, and community cooperation with law enforcement).
TASLITZ_FMT_2.DOC 05/29/03  10:10 AM
252 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:221
Perhaps playing on precisely the sort of white fears that have contributed to
oppressive criminal justice system policies, Schulz suggested that the best way to
assuage those fears is more racial fairness, not less; he argued that fairness is
cheaper than its opposite, and that whites’ reaction to their fears has been
counterproductive in the past.243  Schulz thus urged the same sort of reforms as
Amnesty did in the centerpiece reports of its U.S. campaign.
Two of the “satellite” reports leading up to, accompanying, or following the
1998 U.S. country campaign are worth addressing because each illustrates
specific additional important points about Amnesty’s tactics, aims, and social
role.244
First, in its report on police abuse in Chicago,245 Amnesty demonstrated its
ability to aid in uncovering patterns and institutional problems where others see
only a few “bad apples.”246  In Chicago, the Office of Professional Standards
(“OPS”), a civilian-staffed office of the police department, processes
complaints.  But the OPS is limited to looking at individual cases and lacks a
computer system capable of tracking the race of complainants, the types of
complaints, the districts where they occur or “other factors which may enable it
to discern patterns of concern.”247
Additionally, a police union contract prohibited the Chicago Police
Department, including OPS, from considering an officer’s prior complaint
history in determining the officer’s responsibility for a specific allegation of
misconduct.248  Furthermore, in all but the most serious cases, no information is
made public concerning the outcome of a complaint or the reasons for a
decision.  This combination of forces made it hard to spot patterns of abuse or
department-wide institutional failures in Chicago.249  The Amnesty report on the
Chicago Police drew on multiple sources of data to discern various patterns of
abuse, including excessive use of force and the sharp racial disparities among
those victimized by the police.250  The report also criticized the Department’s
procedural rules that atomized complaints into a series of discrete, individual
cases.  For Amnesty, police misconduct is a systemic problem requiring systemic
solutions.251
243. See id. (Schulz’s views); infra text accompanying notes 344–62 (white fears of black
dangerousness).
244. See infra text accompanying notes 245–267.
245. See AMNESTY INT’L, USA, SUMMARY OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS ON
POLICE ABUSE IN CHICAGO (51/168/1999 1999), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/index.html
(last visited Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L, CHICAGO].
246. On the flawed “few bad apples” theory of police misconduct, see BOUZA, supra note 128, at
23–28, which reveals that institutional practices and police culture can lead even the most honest
officers to behave in ways inconsistent with the broader community’s values.
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Second, though many of Amnesty’s reports are brief and synthesize data
collected elsewhere, Amnesty also engages in in-depth original investigation
that can be of tremendous significance.  Most notably, Amnesty authored a
major report on police brutality in the New York City Police Department
(“NYPD”).252  That report arose from an eighteen-month investigation,
including two research visits to New York City by Amnesty delegates from the
United Kingdom.  These delegates met with lawyers for alleged brutality
victims, members of civil rights groups, local officials from the NYPD’s Internal
Affairs Bureau and from the Civilian Compliance Review Board (“CCRB”),
and representatives of the office of the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York and from the Bronx District Attorneys’ Office.253
Amnesty obtained documentary and other information from the City
Comptroller’s Office, the Office of the City Council, court records, newspaper
articles, and police reports and guidelines on the use of force.254  Moreover,
Amnesty reviewed over ninety individual cases of alleged ill-treatment and
excessive force from the late 1980s through early 1996.  The report contained
detailed narratives summarizing each of these ninety cases.255  The report’s
central conclusion was this:
The alleged brutality occurred across a wide area of New York City and involved
victims from a variety of social, racial and ethnic backgrounds.  However, the most
serious complaints tended to be concentrated in high crime precincts and in precincts
with large minority populations.  More than two-thirds of the victims in the cases
examined were African-American or Latino and most, though not all, of the officers
involved were white.  Nearly all of the victims in the cases of deaths in custody
(including shootings) reviewed by Amnesty International were members of racial
minorities.
Statistics published by the Civilian Complaint Review Board in its bi-annual
reports also indicate that minorities are disproportionately the victims of police abuse
compared to the overall racial composition of New York City.
. . . .
. . . [W]hile it appears that much of the abuse is directed toward racial minorities, the
problem of excessive force within the PD is not confined exclusively to white officers,
but may reflect a wider police culture.256
The report further concluded that minority victims (unlike white victims) were
nevertheless unlikely to bring civil lawsuits.257  The report found internal
252. See AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: POLICE BRUTALITY AND EXCESSIVE
FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (51/36/96 1996), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/index.html  [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L, NYPD BRUTALITY].
253. Id. at § 2.1.
254. Id.  For a detailed and fascinating history of the NYPD’s ups and downs, see JAMES LARDNER
& THOMAS REPPETTO, NYPD: A CITY AND ITS POLICE (2000).
255. AMNESTY INT’L, NYPD BRUTALITY, supra note 252, at § 2.7.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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discipline of offending officers to be lax.258  As many as forty percent of abuse
victims were never even suspected of crime by the police.259
Even though Amnesty’s Los Angeles and Chicago reports were “well
received and contributed to changes in those departments,” the NYPD
repeatedly refused Amnesty’s requests for statistical data, and then condemned
the report as flawed for lacking such data.260  Even if the NYPD had been
forthcoming, it maintained weak records of abuse incidents, making them hard
to track.261  Earlier investigations, such as the Mollen Commission report, had
caused little change.262
Amnesty’s report recommended improved recordkeeping, greater
departmental transparency to the public, increased resources to the CCRB,
meatier disciplinary proceedings open to the public, appointment of an
independent inquiry into police brutality and excessive use of force in the
NYPD, implementation of a standing independent monitor or auditor, and
greater minority recruitment.263
Amnesty’s U.S. country campaign did not radically alter institutional and
systemic problems with policing practice in the United States.264  Nevertheless,
the campaign did achieve some discrete changes.  For example, the Los Angeles
District Attorney’s Office re-opened a police program to investigate police
shootings.  The report also got the ball rolling on international attention to
human rights violations in the United States, led to an unprecedented debate
among policymaking elites in this country about police brutality, energized
other U.S.-focused NGOs working on police reform by adding credibility to
their efforts, led to sustained media coverage of these problems,265 and
promoted modestly more aggressive local reform in several places where city
reports had been issued.266
Yet, for all the success, Amnesty concluded its campaign more aware than ever how
incremental and arduous change is, even in an open society where criticism is allowed
and the media are prepared to magnify it.  Institutional inertia and a large measure of
public indifference at best, at worst hostility, are obstacles that in their own way are as
difficult to surmount as the walls of a repressive dictatorship.267
258. Id.
259. See SCHULZ, supra note 238, at 157 (“[T]he [racial] differential in treatment also holds when
comparing encounters with police that do not result in arrests.”); AMNESTY INT’L, NYPD BRUTALITY,
supra note 252.
260. See SCHULZ, supra note 238, at 153.
261. Id. at 153–54.
262. See AMNESTY INT’L, NYPD BRUTALITY, supra note 252, at § 2.9.
263. See id. at § 6.
264. See POWER, supra note 112, at 274.
265. Id. at 274–76.
266. See SCHULZ, supra note 112, at 155–62.
267. POWER, supra note 218, at 279.
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3. The United States Commission on Civil Rights
I have the least to say about the efforts of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights  (“the Commission”) because its primary tool is the same as
Amnesty’s: the issuing of reports condemning certain practices.  Indeed, the
Commission is limited by its authorizing legislation to collecting and
disseminating information.268  Nevertheless, the Commission merits separate
consideration both because of the depth and breadth of some of its reports and
because it is an “independent” organization whose members are appointed
partly by the President of the United States and partly by Congress, 269 and
whose funding is largely from the United States Treasury.  This appointment
process has been rightly criticized for so politicizing the Commission recently as
to affect its vigilance as a protector of civil rights, the power of its reputation of
non-partisanship, and the quality of its scholarship.270  Indeed, recent battles
between conservatives and liberals on the Commission now commonly make
their way into the mass media.271  Nonetheless, when the political forces have
been properly aligned, the Commission has played a useful role as a racial
auditor.272  Furthermore, the Commission’s status as a governmental entity gives
it certain advantages over the NGO auditors that may help to compensate for
the disadvantages caused by Commission members’ partisan in-fighting.273
I want to focus on two important reports prepared by the Commission.  The
first is a report published in August, 2000, concerning police practices in New
York City, one of several recent reports by the Commission on policing in
major American cities.274  As a quasi-governmental entity, the Commission often
proceeds by hearing, as it did with its New York Report.275  At that hearing, the
Commission received “hundreds of pages of sworn testimony from the mayor,
the police commissioner, the chair of the Civilian Complaint Review Board
(“CCRB”), other state and city officials, religious leaders, [and] representatives
of civic and civil rights advocacy groups,” and also heard from numerous
persons victimized by police misconduct.276  Commission staff received 32,000
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(a) (Supp. 2002).  Foster Rhea Dulles identified the Commission’s three
goals in its early years: “to gather facts which would lay the foundation for civil rights legislation, to
stimulate action by Congress and the Executive, and to serve as the conscience of the nation by expos-
ing failures to secure and protect civil rights.”  Frye, supra note 68, at 454–55 (1987) (summarizing
FOSTER RHEA DULLES, THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION: 1957–1965, at x (1968)).
269. Since 1983, four members of the Commission have been appointed by the President, two mem-
bers by the president pro tempore of the Senate upon recommendation of the majority and minority
leaders (not more than one coming from the same party), and two members appointed by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives upon the recommendation of the majority and minority leaders (not
more than one from the same party).  See 42 U.S.C. § 1975(b)(i)(A–C) (Supp. 2002).
270. See generally Frye et al., supra note 68.
271. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, No Room for Bush’s Civil Rights Appointee, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002,
at A21.
272. See infra text accompanying notes 282–308.
273. Id.
274. See UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
NEW YORK CITY (2000) [hereinafter COMM’N, POLICE IN NYC].
275. See id. at xi; Frye et al., supra note 68.
276. COMM’N, POLICE IN NYC, supra note 274, at 95–96.
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pages of documents subpoenaed by the Commission from agencies testifying at
the hearing.277
The most important set of documents reviewed by the Commission were
“UF-250s,” the first report that NYPD policy requires each officer to complete
after stopping, frisking, or arresting a person.278  Those reports record a wide
variety of information, including the race of the person stopped and frisked and
the reasons for the stop.279  Although the Commission found reason to believe
that UF-250s under-reported stops and frisks and relied solely on the individual
officer’s description of events, no better data was available.280  Furthermore, the
NYPD gave the Commission access only to the Department’s computerized
UF-250 data summaries, omitting helpful details.281  Nevertheless, the data was
sufficiently detailed for the Commission to conclude:
An examination of the UF-250 data indicates that NYPD officers routinely stop
blacks and Hispanics out of proportion to their presence in the general population.  In
many precincts . . . significant disparities exist between the actual population of
Hispanics and primarily African-Americans within New York’s communities, and the
racial distribution of UF-250 subjects reported by the NYPD.  In addition, a number
of minority New York City residents also contend that they are more likely to be
stopped and frisked, as well as detained by the police.282
The NYPD prepared a lengthy response to the Commission’s earlier draft
report.  That response argued that police merely stopped suspects fitting the
description given by crime victims of the offenders.283  But the Commission,
relying on expert testimony, concluded instead that a “significant proportion of
the UF-250s that were filed by NYPD officers in 1998 did not originate from
victim identifications.”284  The Commission focused, as to this point, on the
City’s Street Crimes Unit (“SCU”).  For example, Sergeant Noel Leader
testified that “Street Crime rides around the city.  And they stop individuals
with no complainant, with no victim.  They arbitrarily of their own initiation
stop individuals . . . .  Street Crime . . . stops male black and Latinos randomly in
the street without any victims.”285  Similarly, New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer explained that “it is the officer’s own observation that initiates the stop
and frisk.”286  Members of the SCU itself admitted, according to the
277. Id. at xi.
278. Id. at 95–96.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id.  A collection of other interesting critiques of recent NYPD practices can be found in
ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY
(Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001).  The NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy is situated within a
brilliant broader theoretical and empirical critique in BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER:
THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 173–75 (2001).  For a discussion of some of the
positives of the modern NYPD’s strategies, see ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME:
INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES IN POLICING (1999).
282. COMM’N, POLICE IN NYC, supra note 274, at 103.
283. See id. at 106 (discussing NYPD response).
284. See id.
285. Id. at 105 (quoting testimony of Sergeant Noel Leader).
286. Id. (quoting testimony of Attorney General Elliot Spitzer).
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Commission, to calling in phony complaints matching a suspect’s description if
the suspect indicated a willingness to complain about the stop’s legality.287
A second report worth mentioning briefly is a November 2000 document
concerning police practices nationwide.288  That report largely synthesized other
city reports done by the Commission and investigatory work done by other
organizations.289  The Commission also engaged in a “briefing,” inviting five
especially prominent criminal justice experts to make presentations to the
Commission.290  The Commission found evidence of racial profiling throughout
much of the country, inadequate cultural sensitivity training, slow and toothless
internal regulatory controls, and modestly helpful, but ultimately inadequate,
external controls on police misconduct.291
Two of the report’s recommendations merit special attention.  First, the
Commission found that there were too few civilian review boards and that
“most . . . that do exist are severely underfunded, understaffed, and lack any
enforcement power.”292  Accordingly, the Commission recommended enhancing
funding and granting review boards subpoena power and disciplinary authority
over police misconduct investigations.293  Second, the Commission agreed with
sentiment repeatedly stressed in this article, that policing must be viewed
holistically to identify practices and patterns.294  Since 1994, when Congress
passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (“Violent Crime
Act”), it has been unlawful for state and local police to engage in a pattern or
practice of conduct depriving persons of rights protected by the Constitution or
the laws of the United States.295  However, the Violent Crime Act authorized
only the Attorney General to bring civil actions under the legislation, seeking
equitable and declaratory relief.296  The Justice Department has, through the
Special Litigation Section of its Civil Rights Division, brought at least four
major suits under the Act.297  But the process of litigating these cases is lengthy
and costly, and individuals have no standing to sue for monetary damages or
any other relief.298  Accordingly, the Commission called on Congress to increase
funding for Attorney General suits under the Act and for legislation permitting
private parties to bring actions.299
287. Id. at 107.
288. UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISITING WHO IS GUARDING THE
GUARDIANS?: A REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2000) [hereinafter
COMM’N, REVISITING THE GUARDIANS].
289. See id.
290. Id. at 5.
291. Id. at ix–xi.
292. Id. at 63.
293. Id.
294. See id. at 67–69.
295. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000).
296. See COMM’N, REVISITING THE GUARDIANS, supra note 288, at 68.
297. See id. at 68–69.
298. See id. at 72.
299. See id.
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These two short examples reveal a number of advantages that the
Commission has over the ACLU and Amnesty as racial auditors.  The
Commission’s subpoena power makes it easier for it to obtain certain sorts of
information, and concentrated public hearings provide a dramatic avenue for
citizen voice and a vivid focal point for the public’s attention.  Furthermore, the
Commission’s bipartisan composition but quasi-governmental status sometimes
gives it an air of neutrality and expertise meriting public respect.  On the other
hand, efforts are periodically made to “pack” the Commission with those of a
particular ideology, as is currently happening.300  If current efforts succeed, the
Commission may lose its will to proceed so vigorously in rooting out wrongful
police behavior.  Yet it has been an effective tool in uncovering patterns of
abuse, and its prestige is sufficiently great that the NYPD, for example, thought
it worthwhile to prepare a point-by-point response to the Commission’s
allegations.301
B. Racial Auditors’ Symbiosis with the Media
There are other outlets, most particularly the mass media, for disseminating
information about the police, race, and crime.302  Certainly the mass media
directly reach many more recipients than do racial auditors.303  Nevertheless,
racial auditors fill important gaps in public information left by other media
sources while bearing a symbiotic connection to the mass media.
The major news wire services, such as Reuters, UPI, and API, and major
news organizations like the New York Post and CNN, have information-
gathering resources far more expansive than anything that can be marshaled by
racial auditors.304  However, these vast resources must be spread across many
subjects, and these entities face tremendous pressure for timely, even near
instantaneous, “on the spot,” reporting.305  Racial auditors, by contrast, have a
“constant focus on just one kind of news—human rights news.”306  They are also
more interested in the thorough checking and verification that gains them a
reputation for accuracy, reliability, and balance than in being the first on the
scene.307
Moreover, powerful market and other institutional forces skew the content
and hamper the quantity and quality of political information disseminated by
the mass media.  Information is a “public good,” which ordinary markets tend
300. See Lewis, supra note 271 (recounting political maneuvering between Democrats and Republi-
cans to shift the balance of power on the current Commission from liberals to conservatives by altering
the Commission’s membership).
301. See COMM’N, POLICE IN NYC, supra note 274, at 106 (discussing NYPD response).
302. See generally RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998).
303. See Winston, supra note 77, at 36.
304. See id. at 36–37.
305. See id.
306. Id. (describing Amnesty International).
307. Id. at 36–37.
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to underproduce.308  Information is intangible, which makes it difficult to
adequately establish and maintain property rights in much of what an individual
entity gathers.309  Property rights are especially unlikely to vest in political
information; its gatherers must face the probability that any “investment they
make in producing information will benefit others as well as themselves.”310
This inability to exclude nonpayers arguably results, as with all public goods, in
the underproduction of political information.311
Because information about who bears the benefits and burdens of
government action is widely diffused, individual citizens also have little
incentive to produce it.312  The costs in time and coordination make collective
citizen action unlikely.313  Smaller, more motivated special interest groups, who
manage to overcome these costs, worsen the problem because they focus only
on one side of a narrow set of issues whose resolution benefits them
disproportionately.314  Accordingly, they produce information emphasizing a
decision’s benefits rather than its costs, yet the costs may be so widely
distributed that the harm to each individual is too small to motivate him to
organize with other victims.315  Similarly, the demand for political information
falls below its full social value.316  Good government is also often a public good,
benefiting the ignorant and the well-informed alike.317  “Many citizens seem
likely therefore to free ride on the information-acquiring efforts of their fellows
rather than to incur the costs of becoming informed themselves.”318
There are counter-forces at work to increase the quantity of political
information, but these forces may be weak and work to distort quality.  Notably,
advertising enables information collectors to realize more of the profit from
their efforts, thereby converting information from a public to a private good.319
But advertising revenue depends upon expected audience size, and large
308. See Lillian R. Bevier, The Invisible Hand of the Marketplace of Ideas, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 233, 242 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds.,
2002).
309. Id.
310. Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 20
(1986).
311. Bevier, supra note 308, at 242.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 242–43.
314. See id. at 243.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 207–37 (1957) (on the “rational
ignorance” phenomenon); Bevier, supra note 308, at 243.
318. Id.  Solutions to this problem vary, from increased government regulation to prod more infor-
mation availability, to subsidies to achieve that goal. Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 220 (1993) (“[T]he market will produce too little information . . . .  For this reason, a
regulatory solution, solving the public good problem, is justified.”) with Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech
Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 559 (1991) (“[I]f
the government intervenes in the market at all, it should subsidize speech rather than limit it.  Legal
restrictions on information only further reduce a naturally inadequate supply of information.”).
319. Bevier, supra note 308, at 244.
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audiences often do not want the kind and quantity of political information
needed for optimal citizen deliberation.320  Consequently, many information
providers have turned to “infotainment,” the packaging of political information
in entertaining formats that maximize audience appeal.321  Infotainment has the
virtue of bringing more political information to more people, but it has the vices
of “catering to the lowest common denominator of public taste,”322 the taste of
wealthier, bigger-spending slices of the audience,323 and the dictates of wealthy
corporate advertisers.324  Some commentators have therefore described this
process as “market censorship.”325  Such censorship can mean that network
executives even refuse to broadcast certain stories.326  More often,
“[o]rganizational culture normally steers reporters away from sensitive topics
before a confrontation point by defining response to certain public information
needs as beyond the resources the firm is willing to commit to news, or outside
the proper purview of news.”327  Market forces may also mean that, even when
stories are covered, certain perspectives simply never get aired—a result that
can also be the inevitable outcome of a producer’s need to pick and choose
what will be covered.328  Institutional factors other than profitability also hamper
mass media news quality.  Rigid (usually daily) deadlines have led to a “beat
system” in which reporters are assigned to cover specific governmental
operations each day.329  This creates a risk that reporters, eager not to jeopardize
relationships with their primary sources, become “insiders” more receptive to a
particular viewpoint.330  Reporters also rely heavily on government press offices,
which creates similar problems.331
All these forces are especially powerful in crime coverage, particularly
coverage involving issues of race.  Seriousness of harm to individuals, rather
than to society overall, is most vivid and sells best.332  Crime beat reporters
facing deadlines and needing routinized, steady information sources rely on
320. See id.
321. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 5–6 (1993) (coining
“infotainment” term); Bevier, supra note 308, at 245 n.35 (explaining the infotainment-generation pro-
cess).
322. Bevier, supra note 308, at 245 & n.34 (citing Rodney A. Smolla, Report of the Coalition for a
New America: Platform Section on Communications Policy, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149 (1993)).
323. See Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101 (1993).
324. See SUE CURRY JANSEN, CENSORSHIP: THE KNOT THAT BINDS POWER AND KNOWLEDGE
153–78 (1991).
325. Id. at 167.
326. PATRICK COLM HOGAN, THE CULTURE OF CONFORMISM: UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL
CONSENT 68 (2001).
327. JOHN H. MCMANUS, MARKET-DRIVEN JOURNALISM: LET THE CITIZEN BEWARE? 26 (1994).
328. See HOGAN, supra note 326, at 71 (on silencing views); Bevier, supra note 308, at 247 (discre-
tion).
329. Bevier, supra note 308, at 246.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 247; see also MARTIN A. LEE & NORMAN SOLOMON, UNRELIABLE SOURCES: A GUIDE
TO DETECTING BIAS IN NEWS MEDIA 45 (1990).
332. See SURETTE, supra note 302, at 61.
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police sources, whose access and trust they must gain.333  The police and other
criminal law enforcement agencies also now use public information officers
(“PIOs”) to coordinate the flow of information to the news media.  Reporters
accordingly drift toward sympathy with the police perspective and dependence
on information already pre-filtered by state agencies.334  The exception is the
rare instance in which police crime or corruption has broken into the public
eye.335  Furthermore, entertainment value means that juicy, atypical crime
stories that either meet audiences’ pre-existing expectations or are novel only in
their severity crowd out coverage of more typical crimes.336
Several structural factors skew the media’s presentation of the role of race
in the criminal justice system.  Television coverage, for example, reflects an
inadvertent class bias: Middle-and-upper-income persons, a group that is
disproportionately white, have the skills and resources to afford bail, get good
legal representation, and get advice on handling the press.337  In short, they look
good on television.  Police are also more likely to protect their privacy.338  But
poor, low-status offenders, a group that is disproportionately comprised of
racial or ethnic minorities, often do not make bail, and are more likely to
appear disheveled, poorly dressed, and threatening on the news, when reporters
cover their “perp-walks” to the station, frequently having been alerted by the
police.339  Similarly, blacks accused of crimes are often shown in the custody of
white or both white and black officers, while white suspects are shown
accompanied only by white officers, perhaps sending the message that blacks
are not trusted to exert police authority over whites.340  Yet these observations
likely result from residential segregation and the practice of police forces of
“assigning police of different races to specific neighborhoods.”341  Moreover,
“market censorship” forces and “confirmatory bias”—misperceiving or
misremembering facts inconsistent with strongly held expectations—can lead to
unintended racial bias in crime coverage.342  For similar reasons, African-
American explanations for crime, views on criminal responsibility, and analyses
of police behavior are rarely offered.343
333. Id. at 63.
334. Id. at 63–64.
335. See id. at 64.
336. Id. at 64–66.
337. ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 46–59
(2000).
338. Id. at 85.




342. See HOGAN, supra note 326, at 74–75 (confirmatory bias); JANSEN, supra note 324, at 153
(market censorship); cf. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 337, at 84–85 (acknowledging that at least
some, though by no means all, racial bias in crime coverage stems from subconscious forces).
343. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 337, at 87.
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One recent study of local television news coverage—the primary source of
news for most Americans344—illustrates the result of these forces.  News
coverage in Chicago significantly over-represented the percentage of black
offenders relative to white offenders as the perpetrators of crime, while under-
representing the proportion of black victims, “even though Blacks in Chicago
and most core cities are more likely to be victimized.”345  Nor were contextual
explanations offered to explain the disparity in coverage, feeding prior
conceptions of black criminality.346  Furthermore, blacks were four times more
likely than whites to be shown in mug shots, “which make their subjects look
guilty,” and far more likely than whites to be shown without their names.347
Namelessness may suggest that “individual identity does not matter, that the
accused is part of a single undifferentiated group of violent offenders: just
another Black criminal.”348  Blacks were also represented twice as often as being
under physical control, “handcuffed, grasped, or restrained by an officer,” and
much more likely to be shown in street or jail clothing than whites.349
Political elites also have an incentive to stoke white fears of crime generally
and black criminality specifically.350  Raising the crime issue gets votes, and, for
whites, automatically stimulates “an image of dangerous Blacks.”351  Politicians
of both major parties further have an incentive to portray crime as largely
random violence, as “ever-increasing, patternless, pointless.”352  Random
imagery frees liberals from confronting the reality that violent crime is
disproportionately committed by the poor and racial minorities, though not
nearly as disproportionate as the media suggest.353  Thus, liberals can avoid
openly scheming to undercut minority interests while simultaneously diverting
attention from the hot-button social problems that may explain the disparate
crime rates.354  Conservatives simultaneously can avoid the inference that
344. Id. at 79.
345. Id. at 81.
346. Id.  See generally KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE
FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998).
347. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 337, at 82.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 83.  Entman and Rojecki found, however, that Chicago newspapers revealed the race of
the offender via text or photograph significantly less often than Chicago television.  See id. at 88–90.
Ray Surrette suggests, however, that there is evidence that consumers picture violent offenders as black
even where the offender’s race is unidentified:
[M]any crime reports give no description of the perpetrator, leaving the public to fill in the
image.  It follows that since most crime news is about violent interpersonal crime, the image
that is constructed is that of a faceless predator.  Thus it was found that the public’s image of
criminals reflected the typical street criminal—a young, unemployed black male.
 SURETTE, supra note 302, at 68–69 (emphasis added).
350. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 337, at 92.
351. Id.  For a history of politicians’ manipulation of crime as an issue, see TED GEST, CRIME &
POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT’S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN FOR LAW AND ORDER (2001).
352. JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: HOW WE TALK ABOUT NEW CRIMES AND NEW VICTIMS
25 (1999).
353. Id. at 23.
354. Id.
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poverty and social inequality cause crime; random pathology or dysfunctional
sub-cultures are claimed to be the real culprits.355
Racial auditors can, at least in theory, help to serve as a corrective for mass
media bias.  Citizens differ in their level of interest in political information and
in their willingness to invest resources in absorbing it, the intensity of interest
likely varying with the importance of the particular policy question at issue to
those citizens.356  Racial auditors who respond to the needs of these specialized
information markets can and do bring more diverse and higher quality
information to these citizen subgroups.357  In doing so, they create competitive
forces that can pressure mass media outlets into greater accuracy and
completeness in their own reporting because a reputation for inaccuracy can
harm market share.358  Lillian Bevier explains:
Prodded by their various audiences, and reflecting their constituents’ particular
concerns, these alternative information suppliers will often delve more deeply into
apparent realities, interpret events with greater sophistication, and analyze data more
thoroughly than the mainstream media is inclined to do.  In doing so, of course, their
principal motivation is to satisfy their own customers.  While pursuing this goal, they
serendipitously constrain, even if they do not completely eliminate, the mainstream
media’s ability to portray falsehood as truth or to omit key facts from otherwise
apparently complete accounts.359
This constraining role on the mass media is, however, likely a modest one
unless racial auditors can themselves reach something approaching a mass
audience, even if only at the level of local media markets.360  Yet their heavy
reliance on careful, extensively documented reports ensures a small
readership.361  Moreover, the same market forces undermine the mass media’s
extensive coverage of racial auditors’ efforts: “[T]he profusion of so many
images, the blurring of the lines between fiction and fact (reconstructions,
factoids, and documentary dramas), and the relativist excesses of
postmodernism and multiculturalism make the representation of old-fashioned
human rights news more difficult than ever.”362
Racial auditors, recognizing this “CNN effect,”363 are starting to take video
cameras on search missions and to launch media-attracting training activities as
ways to get the mass media’s attention.364  Auditors are also trying to circumvent
the mass media by making more extensive use of the Internet and
experimenting with ways to use the public’s anxieties about race and class as the
355. Id. at 24.
356. See Bevier, supra note 308, at 253–54.
357. Id. at 254.
358. Id. at 252, 254.
359. Id. at 254.
360. Cf. Winston, supra note 77, at 38.
361. See id. (making a similar comment concerning Amnesty).
362. Stanley Cohen, Government Responses to Human Rights Report: Claims, Denials, and Counter-
claims, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS 517, 542 (1996).  See generally STANLEY COHEN, DENIAL AND
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (1995).
363. Winston, supra note 77, at 38.
364. Id.
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very means for gaining the public’s attention.365  Auditors also historically have
done better in reaching elite media, and often focus their information
campaigns on both elite citizens and elite policymakers.366  This combination of
efforts aimed at elites and popular masses—sometimes combined with
corporate support—has led to important successes in the area of criminal
justice.367  Perhaps more importantly, geographically localized, intensive
information campaigns—like that in New York City—and local combinations of
creative advocacy with coalition-building and media drama—like the ACLU’s
efforts in Cincinnati—may be promising models for effecting broader and more
extensive contributions to social change.368  Finally, “success” can be defined
more broadly than by the size of the auditors’ audience, as the following
examination of the political emotions reveals.
IV
THE POLITICAL EMOTIONS
To feel as much as to think is central to being human.369  Emotions motivate
human action, centrally constitute human relationships, and are an inseparable
part of human reasoning.370  Certain social science models, such as those based
on conceptions of “rational choice,” often disparage emotion as the antithesis of
reason.371  The notion of reason as a matter of cold, careful, and informed
calculation reflects our culture’s broader history of dichotomizing our mental
world into thinking versus feeling.372  The law, too, has often praised
dispassionate reason as the essence of justice.373
365. See id. at 26, 44 (discussing the Internet); infra Part IV.B (discussing racial anxiety and the
public’s attention).
366. Bevier, supra note 308, at 37, 39–40.
367. See id. at 53 n.28.
368. See supra Part III.B–C.
369. Research in cognitive psychology demonstrates
that the reason/emotion dichotomy is false.  Emotion often plays some role in our reasoning.
Emotions identify what matters to us and permits us to assign values to what we perceive and
do.  The emotionless person is an irrational person.  Furthermore, emotions are a central part
of our moral and social judgments.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
1039, 1054 (1998) (citing supporting philosophical theory and empirical data) [hereinafter Taslitz,
Abuse Excuses].
370. See id.; Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note 26 (human relationships); infra text accompa-
nying notes 389–408 (human motivation).
371. See GEORGE E. MARCUS ET AL., AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT 5
(2000) (“[T]he rational choice school has been subject to criticism by outsiders who are uncomfortable
with its disciplined and narrow focus on human behavior as interest-calculation. . . . [T]he rational
choice perspective [is] so self-disciplined in consistently excluding affect-related variables from its
models.”) (citation omitted).
372. See sources cited supra notes 370–71.
373. As Susan Bandes has said:
In the conventional story, emotion has a certain, narrowly defined place in law.  It is
assigned to the criminal courts.  It is confined to those—like witnesses, the accused, the
public—without legal training.  In this story, there is a finite list of law-related emotions—
anger, compassion, mercy, vengeance, hatred—and each emotion has a proper role and a
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But a growing trend in the social sciences and in law recognizes that the
emotion—reasoning dichotomy oversimplifies reality.374  In this part, I join that
trend, making no pretense of fully defending its wisdom here.375  I do hope,
however, to illustrate the usefulness of an emotion-laden jurisprudence in
understanding some of the fundamentally political aspects of the Fourth
Amendment.376
The Fourth Amendment permits the state, under certain circumstances, to
use force to interfere with our privacy, property, and locomotion rights—rights
that are critical to a meaningful life and the proper exercise of citizenship.  The
ease with which the Amendment permits such interferences, therefore,
necessarily has political consequences and fosters political reactions.  Such
reactions can help to prevent state excesses, restore Fourth Amendment
equilibrium, and promote the people’s sense of the state’s legitimacy.
Understanding these benefits, and the potential costs, requires an
understanding of the role of emotions in political judgment.  I have already
touched very briefly on the emotions of “empathy,” “sympathy,” and
“compassion,” though space constraints require me to leave a more detailed
discussion of their meaning and political significance for another day.377  This
Part will focus on three sets of political emotions to illustrate the point: (1)
enthusiasm, (2) anxiety, and (3) political honor.  Strictly speaking, the last of
these three, “political honor,” involves certain aspects of a trait of character.378
However, “character” is defined as a disposition to act, think, or feel certain
ways in certain sets of circumstances,379 and it is the feeling-related aspects of
political honor in which I am most interested.
fixed definition.  And it is portrayed as crucially important to narrowly delineate that finite list
and those proper roles, so that emotion doesn’t encroach on the true preserve of law: which is
reason.
Susan Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 2 (Susan Bandes ed. 1999).
374. For a quick summary of the recent literature, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Race and Two Concepts of
the Emotions in Date Rape, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 9–12 (2000) [hereinafter Taslitz, Two Concepts].
See also Taslitz, Abuse Excuses, supra note 369, at 1054 (“A justice system devoid of emotion is soon
one devoid of the common man’s respect.”).
375. For such a fuller defense, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996), and the magisterial MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT (2001).
376. I have written elsewhere about other aspects of the emotions relevant to Fourth Amendment
reasoning.  See, e.g., Taslitz, Stories, supra note 26 (respect); Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note
26 (privacy).
377. See supra notes 104–09; infra note 465 and accompanying text (briefly defining the emotions of
empathy, sympathy, and compassion).
378. See infra Part IV.C (defining “political honor”).
379. Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 374, at 48, 52 (“Our emotions [and thoughts] are important
aspects of our character.  Our disposition to feel and act on emotions reflects our disposition to do good
and evil, our character.”).
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A. Enthusiasm
1. Overcoming Political Habits
Recent empirical social science suggests that most political decision-making
is a matter of habit.380  Democrats usually vote Democratic, and Republicans
vote Republican.  Liberals vote for initiatives to raise taxes; conservatives
oppose them.  Ideology, partisanship, and interest group identity rule the day,
not informed, open-minded issue examination.381
Even habitual behavior, however, is costly.382  Voting when we are sleep-
deprived or must drop the kids off at day care, donating to a political campaign
when we are strapped for cash, or protesting when we already work sixty hours
per week to make ends meet are not easy.  These activities require sacrifices of
time, money, and energy, albeit sometimes of small amounts.  Our willingness
to act habitually, therefore, turns on the degree of enthusiasm that we feel for a
particular issue or candidate—a sense that “this guy can really win and make a
difference,” for example, so that campaigning seems worth the effort.383
Repeated failure to act habitually, perhaps because of feelings of frustration or
despair, can weaken the force of a political habit over time, just as its
enthusiastic repetition can strengthen it.384
Appeals to a group’s racial identity can be one powerful way to amplify its
enthusiasm.  Class-consciousness has rarely had widespread appeal to
Americans.385  We do not strongly identify with the “working class” or the
“upper class,” and the appeal of class-based calls to action has been consistently
declining.386  In multicultural modern America, race offers a stronger sense of
solidarity.387  Because persons classified as members of certain racial groups are
stigmatized, organizing them in same-race groups around issues of racial
380. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 371, at 1–11, 52–53.
381. See id. at 51–52.  For a discussion of the role of cognitive habits in human reasoning more gen-
erally, see Mihnea Moldoveanu & Ellen Langer, When “Stupid” Is Smarter than We Are: Mindlessness
and the Attribution of Stupidity, in WHY SMART PEOPLE CAN BE SO STUPID 212–31 (Robert J. Stern-
berg ed. 2002).
382. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 371, at 51–52; Moldoveanu & Langer, supra note 381, at 222–
28.
383. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 371, at 51–52.
384. See id.
385. See BELL HOOKS, WHERE WE STAND: CLASS MATTERS vii (2000) (“Many citizens of this
nation, myself included, have been and are afraid to think about class . . . .  Our nation is fast becoming
a class-segregated society where the plight of the poor is forgotten and the greed of the rich is morally
tolerated and condoned.”).
386. See id. at 5 (“We live in a society where the poor have no public voice.”); id. at 70 (“[W]e all
know that the rich live apart from the rest of us and that they live differently.”).
387. Too often, however, race has “been used to obscure class, to make the white poor see their
interests as one with the world of white privilege.”  Id. at 5.  Without minimizing the grave dangers
revealed in our history of white racial consciousness, I argue here that minority racial consciousness has
been, and can be, a powerful and progressive political organizing force for racial minorities.
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oppression can build individual and group self-esteem.388  Sharing common
experiences can reveal patterns of oppression, foster community, and generate
righteous indignation.389  African Americans in particular, several studies
suggest, often have an usually strong sense of group loyalty and solidarity.390
They frequently have what sociologist Charles Lemert has called a “weak-we”
identity.391
“Weak-we” individuals construct their self-conception from their local
experiences—from the reality of their material world and the social practices
that tangibly and intangibly affect their daily lives.  “Strong-we” individuals
instead have a more autonomous, isolated sense of themselves rooted in
abstract notions of justice projected onto all humanity.392  The more local weak-
we sense of self as tied to a particular group draws its greatest psychological
strength from that group and is most likely to develop group-consciousness.393
Because blacks are so much more often weak-we selves than are whites, blacks
are likely to respond well to race-based appeals.394  Race becomes a source of
strength and pride, not merely a marker of social stigma.395
388. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 78–84 (2002).  Professor Lani Guinier explains fur-
ther:
What was missing from my conversation with my son [about why race matters] was recog-
nition that being forced to identify with a group of people can be an unexpected blessing.
Those who are racialized by society may miss out on a specific kind of individual liberty, but
they gain a different perspective on wholeness and its relationship to freedom.  They learn to
appreciate the importance of friendship, of solidarity, of connection.  They also may learn
from a place at the bottom or on the margin to be skeptical of authority, to distrust hierarchy,
to find comfort in community.
Id. at 4.  On the negative role of race in stigmatizing entire groups, often at the subconscious level, see
GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002).
389. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 388, at 88–89.
390. See id. at 85–91.
391. See CHARLES LEMERT, FRENCH SOCIOLOGY: RUPTURE AND RENEWAL SINCE 1968, 104
(1981); GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 388, at 88–89 (discussing Lemert’s work).
392. See LEMERT, supra note 391, at 104. (defining these terms).  In Lemert’s words, for a weak-we
person, the “we” “refers to occasional, but deeply understood, groupings of individuals sharing similar
or same historical experiences, usually below, or marginally outside, the world to which the first group’s
[strong] ‘we’ refers.”  Id.
393. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 388, at 88–89.
394. See id.
395. Guinier and Torres amplify this point further:
Race-consciousness can affirm the individual’s ability to cope with the challenges of discrimi-
nation.  It can offer solace to people who might otherwise individuate the stigma of being posi-
tioned at the bottom of a racial hierarchy, by granting access to a sense of community and not
just critique.
Id. at 82.  Political scientists have long recognized the value of such “relational goods” in promoting
political activity.  See Carole J. Uhlaner, “Relational Goods” and Participation: Incorporating Sociabil-
ity into a Theory of Rational Action, 62 PUB. CHOICE 253–85 (1989).  “Relational goods” include group
identity, social interaction, and recruitment, each of which are incentives to political action that are
available only to individuals in their roles as group members.  See JAN E. LEIGHLEY, STRENGTH IN
NUMBERS?: THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 7 (2001).  These
rational benefits result in information exchange, thus reducing the costs of political participation to
individuals.  See id. at 7.  Interestingly, there is significant evidence that reducing the costs of participa-
tion has a greater effect on raising minority political involvement than it does Anglo political involve-
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But naked appeals to race alone are insufficient.  Those appeals must take
place in institutions that promote group interchange and discussion.  The effect,
in the words of Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, is that:
Racial solidarity gives those who may feel racially marginalized the political
confidence to organize and take risks.  The bonds of trust that form around common
cultural rituals and practices also help them transcend class differences and gain
confidence.  A collective awareness of systemic racial injustice can move those who
have been marginalized to participate in public life rather than withdraw from it.  The
process of participation itself becomes an act of discovery, offering the rewards of
fellowship and community awareness that come from being part of joint decision-
making.396
ment, although raising the perceived benefits has the opposite effect, elevating Anglo involvement
more than it does minority involvement, though the size of the differences may vary depending on the
racial or ethnic minority group in question.  See id. at 8.  Tactically, this observation means that rela-
tional and other information-disseminating efforts may be especially important in motivating minority
group political action, again suggesting the importance of properly crafted data dissemination and
exchange efforts by racial auditors.
396. GUINER & TORRES, supra note 388, at 81.  Some researchers have concluded that black politi-
cal participation has fallen since the 1970s because “the decline of the civil rights movement resulted in
fewer opportunities for Blacks to participate.”  LEIGHLEY, supra note 395, at 25.  The expansion of the
number of, and energy devoted to, race conscious political organizations and activities recommended
by Guiner and Torres may help to close this opportunity gap.  Small successes by such groups can have
powerful cumulative effects.  This increased perceived political empowerment by blacks—such as a rise
in the number of elected black officials in a particular locality—raises black mobilization to, and
engagement in, political activity.  See id. at 26–27, 49.  Group size—an increase in the percentage of
blacks in a broader community—also increases black participation in local elections, though group size
has little effect on black involvement in other sorts of political activity.  See id. at 144.  These observa-
tions may vary for other minority groups because of a complex set of contextual reasons.  See id. at 171
(noting, for example, that greater population size encourages Latino participation in a wider range of
political activities than is true for blacks).  What can seem to be fairly said for many minority groups is
that relational strategies will be particularly effective for at least some such groups, and reduction in the
costs of political participation—partly via enhanced information dissemination—is likely to aid all
minority groups.  See id. at 171, 173.  Similarly, enhancing group members’ sense that their action can
make a difference in outcomes also helps.  See id. at 9–10.
Finally, all group members can be mobilized if asked, though who does the asking matters.  See
LEIGHLEY, supra note 395, at 165, 173.  Individuals are most likely to join a political effort if asked by
those they know, whatever their race, though this effect is enhanced for African Americans when asked
by those of the same race.  See id. at 142–44.  But knowing who does the asking has powerful signifi-
cance even apart from the race of the asker.  See id.  This last observation suggests that the sort of
cross-racial coalitions proposed by Guinier and Torres can be self-perpetuating: The more opportuni-
ties there are for interracial “asking,” the more likely are the participants to join in a common cause.  In
political scientist Jan Leighley’s words, “the similarities regarding why individuals participate may be as
great as the differences.  And those ‘relational goods’ might well be the incentives that build stronger
communities in a more diverse democratic society.”  Id. at 165.
This optimism must be tempered, however, by another observation: The more racially and ethni-
cally diverse any community is, the less likely that anyone of any race will participate in political action,
or so Leighley believes the data shows.  See id. at 171.  If Leighley is right, then Guinier and Torres may
also be right, first, in arguing for spaces in which relatively homogenous groups can be themselves, and,
second, in insisting on cross-racial efforts that are still largely initially led by racial minorities in the
hope that high political energy may thereby be retained.  See GUINER & TORRES, supra note 388, at
12–22.  Leighley herself surmises that the willingness of political elites skillfully to avoid racially polar-
izing efforts at mobilization and to embrace cross-racial coalitions matters greatly.  See LEIGHLEY,
supra note 395, at 173.  She further suggests that this requires appeals to substantive issues that matter
equally to individuals of many races.  See id. at 74.
In my later discussion of political honor, I address the power of ideas to supplement perceived
group self-interest as a way to mobilize political resources.  But there are no easy solutions, for racial
homogeneity risks Balkanization, while cross-racial organizing offers the promise of unity but at the
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This process of race-based exchange and calls for response to racial injustice
generates the enthusiasm that leads people to act consistently with their
political habits and dispositions.  Habitual political behavior, though involving
subconscious processes, is not an entirely subconscious affair.397  To the
contrary, many enthusiastic individuals will learn more about a campaign or
debate by wider reading and conversation, investigations necessary for affective
judgment about how enthusiastic to be.398  But absent the special circumstance
of “political anxiety” (discussed shortly), learning is done primarily to reinforce
habits and energize actions.  Viewpoints may be refined, justifications
improved, but the bottom line remains unaltered: The “joint decision-making”
becomes more about when and how (that is, about tactics) but not what to do.399
2. Promoting Counterpublics
Guinier and Torres seem to suggest that racial group-based participatory
processes can lead not merely to heightened enthusiasm about pre-existing
views, but also to novel positions.400  Professor Kendall Thomas indeed argues
for the importance of race-based group decision-making precisely because it
will develop “oppositional counterpublics.”401  The value of such counterpublics
is partly that they quell group anger by helping to create a real prospect for
political victories on some issues, but also that society as a whole benefits from
having those who always stand ready “‘to ask awkward questions, to shine light
potential cost of growing indifference.  Critical, nonetheless, is a bold attitude of willing experimenta-
tion and optimistic action, building on the resources and strengths of the past as modified by the adven-
turousness of the future—the attitude expressed by Guinier and Torres and that I hope I bring to the
project of racial auditing.  See generally PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, BLACK PRIDE AND
BLACK PREJUDICE (2002) (demonstrating that increased black pride and solidarity generally does not
translate into black antipathy toward other minorities or toward whites; most blacks are willing to work
on political projects with whites and ethnic minorities; blacks and whites share many—though not all—
of the same principles and values; and blacks frequently demonstrate a willingness to make decisions
based upon principle, even when it is arguably contrary to raw or narrow black self-interest).  Snider-
man and Piazza’s work thus buttresses the argument that appeals to black identity and solidarity to
build black political enthusiasm can be fully consistent with broad, principled, cross-racial coalitions
much like those envisioned by Gunier and Torres.
397. “Habit,” as used by political scientists, does not, therefore, have precisely the same meaning as
when the term is used in evidence law.  In evidence law, there are two views: either an oft-repeated
(albeit conscious) response to a very situationally specific stimulus (for example, brushing your teeth
every night before you go to bed) or acting in semi-conscious fashion, not completely within our control
(for example, arriving at a destination without conscious awareness of how you drove there).  See
STEVEN FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 140–44 (2002).  Political habits are often
conscious and do not automatically ensure a response to a specific stimulus.  See MARCUS ET AL., supra
note 371, at 802.  Instead, they require environmental factors to generate enthusiasm for political
action, the resulting action being “habitual” only in the sense that it requires almost no thought con-
cerning what action to take.  The individual’s choice is simply between no action or the usual one.  See
id. at 63–64.
398. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 371, at 48–53.
399. See id. at 93–94.
400. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 388, at 95–96, 147–53 (“in-between spaces” as
“laboratories of Democracy”).
401. Kendall Thomas, Racial Justice: Moral or Political?, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY
78, 86–87 (Austin Sarat et al. eds. 2002).
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in dark corners, and expose abuses of power.’”402  Political scientist Jane
Mansbridge’s view concerning the oppositional nature of these counterpublics
resonates with Thomas’:
The goals of these counterpublics . . . [include] working out alternative
conceptions of self, of community, of justice, and of universality, trying to make sense
of both the privileges they wield and the oppressions they face, understanding the
strategic configurations for and against their desired ends, deciding what alliances to
make both emotionally and strategically, deliberating on ends and means, and
deciding how to act, individually and collectively.403
3. Novelty and “Good” Group Polarization
Mansbridge, Thomas, Guinier, and Torres all claim to reject any
“essentialist” view of a uniform black perspective on any issue.404  Thomas
expressly urges the value of intra-group dissent to sound deliberation, and the
importance of a low-cost exit for members who can no longer abide by the
group’s decisions.405  But there is a danger that the sort of deliberation Thomas
describes becomes but an instance of the phenomenon of “group
polarization.”406  Group members who talk primarily to like-minded thinkers are
often observed over time to become more extreme—more polarized—in their
views.407  Rephrased, political habits are strengthened and refined but not
fundamentally changed or replaced by truly alternative perspectives.  Group
402. See id. at 88 (quoting IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY’S PLACE 234–35 (1996)).  See also NANCY
FRASER, JUSTUS INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION 81
(1997) (using the phrase “subaltern counterpublics”); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED
CONSTITUTION 55–69, 97–102 (2001) (arguing that no political victories are final, and everyone believes
that he or she has a real chance to prevail on some issues some of the time, including reversing current
dominant positions at a future time).  On the value of dissenters in challenging the accepted wisdom
and monitoring abuses of power, see STEVEN H. SCHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE
MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999).
403. Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 46, 58 (S. Benhabib ed. 1996).
404. See, e.g., GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 388, at 15–16 (explaining that political race is not
about being, but doing; it is an action, not a thing); Thomas, supra note 401, at 101 n.28.
405. See id. (emphasizing pluralism inherent in the phrase “black civic publics,” denoting more than
one such public, thus affirming disagreement and dissent as constructive forces in black political life
and recognizing dissenters’ power by giving them the credible threat of exit from the group if the dis-
senters’ views are not fully and fairly heard).  Thomas further notes that his terminology embraces a
common “political culture” rather than a common “racial culture,” for example, joining black-skinned
persons from the United States, the South Caribbean, Europe, Central America, and Africa to mobilize
against police brutality or for environmental justice in New York City.  See id.
406. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 65 (2001) (“The term group polarization refers to some-
thing very simple: After deliberation, people are likely to move toward a more extreme point in the direc-
tion to which the group’s members were originally inclined.”)(emphasis in original)[hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM]; see also PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 73–
76 (1999) (defining group polarization, reviewing empirical data supporting it, and analyzing its effects).
407. The posited reasons for the group-polarization effect are first, that members of a group of like-
minded persons thereby hear a limited argument pool, thus entrenching their positions; and, second, in
an effort to be perceived favorably by themselves and by other group members, they adjust their posi-
tions toward the group-dominant one, prodding a “‘spiral of silence’ in which people with minority
positions silence themselves, potentially excising those positions from society over time.”  SUNSTEIN,
REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 406, at 67–68; see also WALLACE, supra note 406, at 73–80 (offering a simi-
lar, more detailed, explanation).
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polarization can sometimes be dangerous, particularly when it involves the
actions of violent hate groups.408  But in the case of racial counterpublics, and
within limits, such polarization may be desirable because it heightens the
enthusiasm of often silenced groups to make their voices heard in public fora.
Cass Sunstein has made an analogous point:
Of course we cannot say, from the mere fact of group polarization, that there has
been a movement in the wrong direction.  Notwithstanding some of the grotesque
examples . . . [of ill social effects], the more extreme tendency might be better rather
than worse.  Indeed, group polarization helped fuel many  involvements of great
value—including, for example, the civil rights movement, the antislavery movement,
and the movement for sex equality.  Each of these movements was extreme in its time,
and within-group discussion certainly bred greater extremism; but extremism should
not be a word of opprobrium.  If greater communications choices produce greater
extremism, society may, in many cases, be better off as a result.  One reason is that
when many different groups are deliberating with one another, society will hear a far
wider range of views as a result.409
Sunstein’s observation—that group polarization from within-group
homogeneity might paradoxically produce more heterogeneous public
deliberation and therefore better-informed public policy choices—stems from
the reality that high-status members in deliberating bodies tend to speak more
and to be more influential than lower status members.410  Lower-status members
often lack confidence in their abilities or fear retribution.411  Marginalized
groups may therefore self-silence or be discouraged when they do speak
because, even if politely heard, they may be ignored.412  In this light, “a special
advantage of enclave deliberation is that it promotes the development of
positions that would otherwise be invisible, silenced, or squelched in public
debate.”413  The confidence, enthusiasm, and energetic conversation of within-
group extremism might mean that more, not fewer, voices are heard in the halls
of power.
Yet views that are too extreme may lead to ignoring counter-evidence that
there is a better way and may foster the sort of intolerance that undermines
coalition building, serving only the interests of the status quo.414  To avoid that
408. See SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 406, at 62–65.
409. Id. at 75.
410. See id. at 76; cf. TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 27, at 69–73 (summarizing
empirical data on this phenomenon’s impact in rape trials).
411. See SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 406, at 76; TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra
note 27, at 73–75.
412. See SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 406, at 67–68, DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note
142, at 24–25, 64, 103–04 (on minority silencing).
413. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 406, at 76.
414. As Sunstein says:
Group polarization is a common phenomenon . . . .  Recall that no shift should be expected
from people who are confident that they know what they think, and who are simply not going
to be moved by what they hear from other people.  If, for example, you are entirely sure of
your position with respect to nuclear power—if you are confident not only of your precise
view, but of the certainty with which you ought to hold it—the positions of other people will
not affect you.
See id. at 79.
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result, specific efforts must be made to ensure the presence and airing of diverse
views within a same-race institution and to reach out, during the process of view-
articulation, to supportive members of other groups who may have a different
perspective.415  Importantly, there is a necessary tension between building group
enthusiasm for habitual political action and simultaneously seeking to
encourage more novel, in-depth political thinking.  Human motivation is
complex; individuals and groups can be prompted to follow habit while
debating that habit’s wisdom.  Such debate among racial counterpublics in the
United States can genuinely contribute over the long run to changes in political
habits without detracting from their ability to build enthusiastic action among
those still engaged in habitual thinking.416  Therefore, when new ways of
thinking do occur, they are but a bonus for the quality of public debate.
This brief discussion of enthusiasm suggests important lessons for racial
auditors.  First, an express focus on conscious or subconscious racial
discrimination in policing is a powerful way to motivate racial minorities as
troops in the battle for reforming police search and seizure and excessive force
practices.  Second, those troops are likely to fight their best when they are
creatively and widely involved in decision-making concerning reform, as was
415. Sunstein explains, for example, that a group of twelve people deliberating about global warm-
ing in which half the group starts favoring one view of whether the problem is serious and half favoring
the other will often ultimately move individual members toward more moderate positions.  See id. at
79–80.  He also describes experiments with the “deliberative opinion poll,” in which people’s views are
polled only after diverse citizens with varied perspectives have first been brought together to exchange
views.  See id. at 84–85.  Although group polarization sometimes resulted, often participants proved
willing to move away from (rather than more vehemently embracing) their original positions.  See id. at
84–85.
Again, racial activists must walk a fine line.  As noted above, group polarization can sometimes be a
good thing for public deliberation.  But if the goal of political activism is in part to build coalitions more
likely to bring about concrete short-term gains and alter wider public attitudes to aid longer-term gains,
then polarization that is too extreme may undermine the basis for sincere, respectful partnership and
exchange.  Inter-group personal interactions create shared experiences, which “help to promote and to
ease social interactions, permitting people to speak with one another, and to congregate around a
common issue, task, or concern, whether or not they have much in common.”  Id. at 95.  Furthermore,
shared experiences between “people who would otherwise see one another as quite unfamiliar, in
extreme cases as nearly belonging to a different species, can come instead to regard one another as
fellow citizens with shared hopes, goals, and concerns.”  Id. at 96.  Such fellow-feeling can itself be a
benefit, but it may also, more concretely, lead to cooperative political projects.  See id. at 96.  Personal
contact is critical.  Cf. WALLACE, supra note 406, at 82–83 (dissenters are more willing to speak on-line
than off-line, but their views are also more likely to be ignored by the broader group than when they
are expressed face-to-face).
Racial auditors provide opportunities for multi-racial deliberation and action in the process of col-
lecting, disseminating, and advocating based upon information.  Because the auditors focus on an issue
of primary concern to the weakest parties in the nascent coalition (the racial minorities), that party’s
distrust of other groups’ members may decline, setting the stage for further inter-group action.  Yet
there is always the danger of depriving racial minority groups of the private spaces they need or of too
diluting their views in a broader coalition. The Cincinnati experiment might suggest a helpful middle-
ground: A local auditors’ group, largely composed of racial minorities, made common cause with a
national, more experienced, and better-funded multi-racial auditor, the ACLU.  See supra Part III.A.2;
cf. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 388, at 102 (describing a successful effort at coalition-building
between black and white workers while acknowledging existing racial divisions).
416. See supra note 415 (illustrating this possibility).
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apparently true of the ACLU mediation efforts in Cincinnati.417  Shying away
from race, or relegating it to but one matter of minor relevance to police
performance, may cause auditors to lose the fully energetic assistance of the
very persons most harmed by police conduct.
But these lessons are only tentative ones because too exclusive a focus on
race has a potentially undesirable political effect: raising white anxieties about
“dangerous” minority groups.418  Raising such anxieties too much can undermine
cross-racial coalitions and even lead to open racial conflict.419  Anxiety can serve
positive functions too, but it does so only under a special set of circumstances
that require reformers to move deftly in their affective dance with their hoped-
for future partners in social change.
B. Political Anxiety
1. Anxiety’s Fearful Advantage
Politically salient information that is novel or threatening creates anxiety in
the recipient.420  Anxiety jolts actors out of their political habits, goading them to
gather information (including information that contradicts their expectations)
and to deliberate carefully about their choices, much in the manner suggested
by traditional rational choice theory.421  That deliberation may lead to the same
outcome as habitual action, but it also may lead to complete changes in opinion.
A Democrat may defy his habit, voting for a Republican candidate in this one
instance, or a conservative might support this one particular tax hike that he
deems wise.422  Moderate doses of anxiety can thus disengage actors’ political
habits while activating serious political judgment.423
Understanding when and why this is so may profitably start with a
comparison to anxiety’s close cousin—fear.  Fear is not an ordinary emotion,
but rather one of the “vehement passions.”424  Such passions “drive out every
other form of attention or state of being.”425  There is nothing else in the world
to the fearful person but himself and the source of his fear.426  Moreover, fear’s
time horizon is short; we fear grave (usually physical) harm about to befall us in
the future.427  Fear’s great power is that it focuses our attention on a single
thing—the danger.428  But that focus cuts the frightened person off from the
417. See supra Part III.C.
418. See infra text accompanying notes 455–79.
419. See id.
420. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 371, at 57–58.
421. See id. at 48–53, 80–82.
422. See id. at 95–125.
423. See id.
424. PHILIP FISHER, THE VEHEMENT PASSIONS 43 (2002).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 72; see also FEIGENSON, supra note 95, at 83–84 (citing others and offering definitions of
the cognate terms of “dread” and “terror”).
427. FEIGENSON, supra note 95, at 84; FISHER, supra note 424, at 72.
428. Professor Fisher explains:
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social world and from his sense of mutual obligations to others.429  Fear is
therefore radically inconsistent with political activity and individual
contribution to fulfilling the social contract.430  Indeed, when we are overcome
with fear, we often later apologize to those we have ignored while we were
obsessed with our own safety.  We apologize because we understand that we
have insulted those around us, treating them, however temporarily, as unworthy
of our notice, care, and concern.431  Fear—or at least fear that does not
immobilize the individual—grants him intense powers of concentration, but at
the cost of political and social interaction with others.
Anxiety is fear’s relatively gentler relative.  An anxious person “perceives
an uncertain, existential threat to his or her well-being.”432  Anxiety is not so
time-limited as fear, for the threat that induces anxiety may be in the distant
future, or at an uncertain future time and place.433  Indeed, though anxiety may
arise from a specific threatening person or condition, anxiety may also stem
from the sense that a vague, non-specific, ill-defined threat may come from
persons unknown.434  Robert Nozick called this last sort of anxiety “general
anticipatory fear,”435 a “fear of everyone, at every minute, and across the full
range of imaginable damaging acts.”436  It is akin to the ever-present concern of
urban-dwellers with random street violence or of women with a rapist leaping
from the bushes.437  Anxiety, like true fear, focuses our attention on a perceived
threat, pressing us to craft ways to reduce or eliminate the danger.438  But unlike
true fear, anxiety does not cut us off from the social and political worlds in
which we live.  Indeed, it is in those worlds that we may find our salvation.439
Professor Phillip Fisher offers a vivid example, drawn from Shakespeare’s
Merchant of Venice.  The play opens with a melancholy Venetian merchant,
What fear or grief, falling in love, anger, jealousy, shame, and the vehement passions in gen-
eral make clear is that, by means of the passions, an absorbing concentration on one present-
time object in the outer world exists at the expense of any and all other possible attention.
Instead of a diversified investment in persons and objects, in events just past or in the near or
slightly more remote future, the impassioned state solidifies attention in the direction of one
monopolizing fact: the recent death of a parent, the snarling dog on the path in front of me,
the contemptuous insult that I have just noticed . . . .
FISHER, supra note 424, at 62.
429. See id. at 63–66.
430. Id. at 63–65.
431. Id. at 66.
432. FEIGENSON, supra note 95, at 84.
433. Id. at 109–10.
434. Id.
435. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 65 (1974).
436. FISHER, supra note 424, at 110.
437. See id. at 19.  Although Fisher sometimes loosely uses the word “fear,” he makes clear later
that in this portion of his book, he is speaking about what is commonly called anxiety.
438. See id. at 109–56.
439. See id.
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Antonio, having financed a lengthy and expensive sea voyage.440  His friends
speculate about the cause of his mood, proposing that:
[O]nce he has sunk his wealth into the voyage and the ship disappears from sight, the
wind cooling his soup makes his mind picture what harm a wind might do at sea.
When he looks at the sands running through his hourglass, he is forcibly reminded of
sandbars, shallows, and flats and imagines his ship wrecked and sunk in sand.  Even if,
in desperation or anxiety, he goes to church to pray for the ship, the stone walls of the
church make him think of rocks onto which his ship might be driven by a storm and
sunk to “scatter all her spices on the stream, /Enrobe the roaring waters with my
silks.”441
Antonio responds that he has no such worries because he has, in modern
terms, “diversified his risks,”442 by investing his wealth in several ships, many
bound for different destinations, and not investing all his assets during any one
year.443  Antonio’s claim to be free from anxiety is unconvincing.  His response,
more fairly read, is that his anxiety over his investment prompted him to gather
information, ponder his commercial options, and act to reduce his risk.
Explains Fisher, “Ships, destinations, and time are all diversified to reduce
merchant anxiety or, as Nozick calls it, general anticipatory fear.”444  A social
venture—commercial exchange, hiring sailors, and buying goods—had a social
solution: seeking variety in the exchanges, hirings, and purchases that bring
profit.  Just as anxiety spurred Antonio’s commercial judgment, so can it spur a
citizen’s political judgment.
2. The Dangers and Blessings of Radical Anxiety
Where race and criminal justice are involved, however, appeals to citizen
anxiety can be a double-edged sword.  Amnesty International USA Executive
Director William Schulz’s argument that white self-interest requires an end to
police brutality (if it does not end, blacks will riot) is an excellent illustration of
how inducing anxiety can ultimately reinforce, rather than replace, political
habits—at least those habits of the white majority.445
440. See id. at 112; see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 1, sc. 1.  For
a general and persuasive discussion of the value of Shakespeare’s work in understanding legal concepts,
see generally DANIEL KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS?: SHAKESPEARE’S LEGAL APPEAL
(1994).
441. FISHER, supra note 424, at 112–13 (quoting Shakespeare, supra note 440, at act 1, sc. 1.).
442. Id. at 113.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 245–50.  Anthony Bouza has sought to offer a similar
reminder to forgetful whites of the physical dangers of their own indifference to black suffering: “The
overclass will not admit that its practices of privilege and exclusion create pressures for the underclass
that drive it to revolt.  This takes the form of street crime and, occasionally dotted over our history,
riots.”  BOUZA, supra note 128, at 28.  I do not take issue with the reality that a group of people who
perceive the legal-political system as ineffective, indifferent, or corrupt may react with violence as a
(sometimes subconscious) form of protest.  See Andrew E. Taslitz, Mobs and Vigilantism, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 564–66 (2002).  I simply worry that pointing out this reality
in the case of African-American oppression carries a risk of being counterproductive.
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Whites already associate blacks with violent criminality.446  The media
repeatedly emphasize the disproportionate number of African-American males
in our country’s prisons and jails.447  “Reality” police television programs
“showcase Black criminals front and center,” including videotapes of angry
black males cursing law enforcement.448  Mainstream conservative
commentators, like Abigail and Stephen Thernstrom, join the chorus, declaring,
“If the African-American crime rate suddenly dropped to the current level of
the white crime rate, we would eliminate a major force that is driving blacks and
whites apart and is destroying the fabric of black urban life.”449  Even Harvard’s
well-known African-American law professor, Randall Kennedy, writes, “Just as
race can signal heightened risk that a black person will die younger . . . [and]
experience more unpleasant encounters with the police . . . than a white person,
so, too, can race signal a heightened risk that a black person will commit or has
committed certain criminal offenses.”450
To be sure, counter-images of black success increasingly fill the airwaves
and the movie theaters.451  But such images have the unfortunate effect of
raising white ire at “undeserving” blacks stealing “white jobs” via affirmative
action.452  The violent, negative images continue to have a greater effect than the
positive ones, reducing white empathy and heightening white animosity.453
446. See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE
REPARATIONS 113 (2000).  Professor Feagin explains:
Another common white stereotype is that of the dangerous black man.  This seems to be a
staple of white thinking, including the thinking of white leaders and intellectuals speaking or
writing about the black “underclass.”  A majority of whites seem to view the generic street
criminal as a black man . . . .
As a result of these common stereotyped images, many whites have fearful reactions to a
black man encountered in public settings such as on streets, in public transport and in eleva-
tors.  In my interview studies, numerous black men have reported aversive reactions taken by
white women and men when they are walking the streets of U.S. towns and cities.  Many
whites lock their car doors, cross streets, or take other defensive precautions when a black
man is near.
Id. at 113–14.
447. See, e.g., ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 337, at 78–93 (recounting images of black violence
and criminality in television news and daily newspapers).
448. See RUSSELL, supra note 346, at 2.
449. STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE 285
(1997).
450. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 145 (1997).
451. See RUSSELL, supra note 346, at 1–4.
452. Compare id. at 4 (“The contradictory media representations of Blacks reflects a double-edged
resentment: the threat of both Black crime and Black success . . . .  While the media portrays neutral
and in some cases positive, images of Blacks, these images cannot compete with the overwhelmingly
negative characterizations.”), with CAROL M. SWAIN, THE NEW WHITE NATIONALISM IN AMERICA:
ITS CHALLENGE TO INTEGRATION 109–29, 184–220 (2002) (noting simultaneous white fear of black
criminality and white anger over black advancement via affirmative action).  But see LEON E.
WYNTER, AMERICAN SKIN: POP CULTURE, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE END OF WHITE AMERICA
(2002) (arguing that media marketing to multi-racial audiences is leading to the concept of all skin
colors as “American skin,” though not specifically addressing the impact of media on race’s role in
criminal justice policy).
453. See ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 337, at 91 (noting empirical support for this proposition);
RUSSELL, supra note 346, at 2–4 (similar analysis).
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Whites, feeling their lives and property threatened, “seek to eliminate that
threat as expeditiously as possible,”454 thus favoring harsher criminal sentences
and scapegoating black criminality as emblematic of the breakdown in social
order.455  That combination is not a recipe for breeding white concern over
warrantless, suspicionless searches of blacks or over their victimization through
police brutality.  Amnesty’s flirtation with a focus on the dangers of increased
black criminality is thus a risky one.  Similarly, the success of the ACLU’s effort
to present racial profiling as an ineffective strategy for reducing crime, and one
that unduly impinges on “innocent” blacks’ freedom of movement, is
uncertain.456  Demonstrated ineffectiveness of current profiling practices would
seem to appeal to white self-interest: A different tactic will better lessen
violence and more readily protect white families.457  On the other hand, the
strategy unintentionally reminds whites that there is a “black threat” to be
addressed.  Furthermore, the white assumption of black criminality may spur
indifference to the plight of blacks who are wrongly stopped and frisked; they
become seen as an acceptable cost in the war on crime.458  The strategy must be
executed delicately to succeed.
Moreover, the phenomenon of “defensive attribution” may also hamper
white concern for police abuse of blacks.  “Defensive attribution” describes the
jury response observed in studies of blame-assessment in tort trials.459  Although
jurors are not themselves facing a threat to their personal safety, they may
“imaginatively project” themselves into the accident victim’s situation, leading
the jurors to become “anxious or afraid at the prospect of suffering such an
accident themselves.”460  Yet, rather than jurors’ embracing the plaintiff’s
perspective, researchers discovered, the opposite sometimes happened.  Where
there was evidence of comparative negligence (contributory wrongdoing by
both plaintiff and defendant), the more severe the injury, the more the jurors
blamed the plaintiff for the accident.461  The jurors arguably did so because of
their belief in a “just world” in which only the deserving suffer.462  By blaming
the victim, jurors believe that they, being blameless, can avoid similar
misfortune.463  Analogous results have been found in criminal cases as well.464  If
454. See SWAIN, supra note 452, at 129.
455. See Kennedy, supra note 21, at 855–68 for a discussion of scapegoating and black criminality.
456. See infra Part V.A–B (recounting Amnesty’s and ACLU’s efforts in this area).
457. See HARRIS, supra note 15, at 13 (arguing that racial profiling is less effective than its alterna-
tive).
458. COLE, supra note 14, at 16–55 (arguing that current Fourth Amendment doctrine is politically
viable because it protects the white majority, which remains largely indifferent to the reality that
aggressive search and seizure practices disproportionately impose costs on the poor among racial
minorities).
459. See FEIGENSON, supra note 95, at 84–85.
460. Id. at 84.
461. See id. at 85 and sources cited therein.
462. See id.  But see COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE: FEMINIST AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 84–85 (1995) (explaining that evidence on the existence of a “just
world” explanation for the attribution of responsibility in rape cases is mixed).
463. See FEIGENSON, supra note 95, at 85.
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many whites view blacks’ being illegally stopped as blacks’ fault because of their
own criminality, then defensive racial anxiety rather than empathy might
result.465  Indeed, where the “victim” is considered blameworthy, jurors may
react toward the victim with anger, further blocking empathy.466  Some
psychologists dispute whether defensive attribution is adequately empirically
supported; even the concept’s many continuing proponents concede that the
same stimuli may evoke empathy in some observers, anxiety or anger in others,
with no clear explanation of the disparity.467  Nevertheless, the research
highlights the real risk of a white backlash to strategies aimed at racial
empathy.468
464. See id.
465. More precisely, “empathy” is the ability to stand in another person’s shoes, to feel, as much as
possible, what they feel, to see the world from their perspective.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 375, at 301–02,
327–28.  One can empathize and still be horrified by the other person’s thoughts and feelings, or indif-
ferent to them, or moved only to condescending pity.  See id. at 328–29.  Empathy is therefore often a
prerequisite for sympathy—the kind of concern that moves us to action on another’s behalf.  See id. at
330–35.  But empathy alone does not guarantee sympathy; more is required.  Thus, Professor Martha
Nussbaum explains, “compassion” involves painful awareness of another person’s serious, undeserved
misfortune.  See id. at 302.  “Sympathy” and “compassion” refer to similar concepts, except that “com-
passion” creates images of more intense suffering by either the victim or the observer.  See id.  Once
empathy has enabled an observer to see the world through the sufferer’s eyes, the observer must then
make three judgements before concluding that such suffering merits compassion: first, the belief that
the suffering is serious, not trivial; second, the belief that the person does not deserve the suffering; and
third, the belief that the suffering of another is a significant part of the observer’s own goals and proj-
ects.  This last belief is easier to hold when the observer imagines similar possibilities between his situa-
tion and the sufferer’s.  See id. at 315–21.  Differing life experiences and preconceptions may make
empathy hard to achieve; even once achieved, an observer may feel no sympathy for the sufferer.
Without sympathy, the observer will not act to alleviate another’s suffering.  But, as just noted, achiev-
ing sympathy requires the observer to see the sufferer’s situation as serious, fault-free, and similar to
the observer’s vulnerabilities.  Yet these three assessments turn on moral judgements and accurate
information.  See id. at 316–17 (explaining the importance of social and familial teachings and similar
class and racial backgrounds); id. at 414 (asserting that in a just society, the assessments necessary to
compassion must be allied to a reasonable ethical theory).  Moreover, Nussbaum argues, a just society
should design its institutions to promote compassion that is rooted in sound ethical theory.  See id. at
401–15.  Such a society can still be a pluralistic liberal society when the guiding theory is one that seeks
to advance certain central human capabilities consistent with diverse views of what constitutes the good
life.  See id. at 416–18.  Those capabilities include physical safety, mobility, and treatment of each
person as of equal worth with others.  See id.  These are among the capabilities protected by the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
For my purposes, the bottom line suggested by Nussbaum’s reasoning is this: Absent aggressive
societal action in the form of careful institutional design guided by a “respect-full” political morality,
perceived social differences among groups will make it hard for the more powerful among us to feel
either empathy or sympathy for the less powerful.  See generally, Taslitz, Stories, supra note 26, at 2266–
67 & n.60 (defining a “respect-full” political morality and jurisprudence in the Fourth Amendment con-
text).  That absence of feeling will choke off motivation to improve the plight of minorities victimized
by unwise political conduct, and indeed, might instead encourage a view of police as ill-treated by the
presumptively criminal classes.
466. FEIGENSON, supra note 95, at 85.  Rephrased, my suggestion is that many whites will presump-
tively hold all blacks responsible for the perceived criminality of blacks as a group.  Correspondingly, if
an individual African American is wrongly stopped, he is seen as partly responsible for not correcting
the perceived wrongs of his group.  The costs of improper searches and seizures of innocent blacks are
thus seen as, at best, regrettable but acceptable in the war on crime.
467. See id. at 84–85.
468. Cf. RICHARD DELGADO, THE RADRIGO CHRONICLES (1997) (exploring racial empathy).
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Additionally, humans have a strong tendency to resist giving up their
preconceptions.  They will filter out information that counters their assumptions
while absorbing information that supports them.469  Therefore, anxiety must be
quite high before minds will open to new ideas.  But the higher anxiety is, the
closer it comes to fear.470  Remember, however, that a fearful person is an
asocial, self-involved person, one unlikely to look beyond immediate dangers to
his well-being or to care for others’ fate.471  Fearful whites are therefore unlikely
to voice concern for state injustice visited upon blacks.
A focus on black concerns can also be perceived by whites as selfish identity
politics.  If blacks are seen as serving their own narrow ends rather than the
goal of universal justice for all, that, too, may anger whites as well as members
of non-black racial or ethnic minorities.472
3. Anxiety and the Collective
Despite these risks, there are countervailing reasons to be hopeful that an
anxiety-producing political strategy centered on race (but not exclusively so)
can succeed if carefully crafted.
First, empirical research demonstrates that political anxiety can be sparked
by perceived threats to the collective good as well as to individual welfare.473
Which pull is stronger—the individual or the collective—depends on individual
circumstances and values.474  For many people, especially those with a strong
sense of group identity (whether to a political party, particular political cause,
or a racial, ethnic, or religious group), a sense of the collective good is a central
part of their individual identity.475  The state’s explicit or implicit approval or
rejection of a group’s values is perceived, respectively, as honoring or insulting
the group itself and each of its individual members.476  State action honoring a
group’s status is likewise viewed as preserving the group members’ particular
way of life, indeed as preserving fundamental political morality.477  To a
conservative Christian fundamentalist, legalized abortion is an assault on his
individual beliefs, his religious group’s core values, and the sanctity of the
nation’s political soul.478  To a gay activist, criminalized sodomy is the essence of
469. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 371, at 61; Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I, supra note
76, at 410–19 (describing “epistemological filters”).  See generally PIATELLI-PALMARENI, INEVITABLE
ILLUSIONS: HOW MISTAKES OF REASON RULE OUR MINDS (1994) (on cognitive errors that filter
information or alter its weight).
470. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 371, at 61.
471. See supra text accompanying notes 433–54.
472. See TODD GITLIN: THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS (1996) (addressing the alleged fail-
ures of identity politics).
473. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 371, at 134–35.
474. See id.
475. See Richard Abel, Fighting Words, 1 MARGINS 199 (2001).
476. See RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH 72 (1998) (recounting reac-
tions to the Smithsonian’s Enola Gay exhibit).
477. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313–31 (1997).
478. See DAVID GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING
OF ROE V. WADE 606 (1998) (quoting Christianity Today as reacting to the Supreme Court’s affirming
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a regime repressive of diversity in sexual orientation.479  And to a white liberal
Democrat, assaults on race-based affirmative action, on strong protections for
the disabled, and on the right to counsel are painful assaults on his vision of our
nation’s commitment to equality under law.480
This last example is particularly important because it illustrates that people
can experience anxiety from assaults on their most dearly held principles even
when their material or psychic self-interest, narrowly defined, is not involved.
But the harder question is whether anxiety can be instilled in people based on a
threat to the collective, but not to the individual, contrary to that individual’s
political habits and principles.  The Enron collapse discussed in this article’s
introduction may form the basis for a useful example.
In the wake of Enron, several additional scandals involving deception in the
securities market and in accounting practices by other major corporations and
their auditors hit the press.481  Some commentators feared a general loss of trust
by the public in the securities market, while others worried that confidence in
the capitalist system itself was at stake.482  The most stalwart conservative
Republican legislators—ideologically opposed to increased government
regulation of any sort—demanded energetic enforcement of existing securities
laws, more expenditures on criminal prosecution, and new regulations
governing securities marketing and accounting practices.483  To some extent, this
was a matter of self-interest: fear that the scandals would chase buyers and
sellers from the market, harming the economy and prompting voters to seek
a woman’s right to choose an abortion by condemning the Court because it had “explicitly rejected
Christian moral teaching” and “clearly decided for paganism and against Christianity”).
479. See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW 149–73 (1999).
480. See, e.g., THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 61, 79 (2002) (recounting that although civil rights groups and the
Republican Party eventually found common ground on the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
liberal Democrats were the prime movers for the ADA in the Senate, while conservatives criticized the
act as a “lawyer’s employment act” that would result in extended and expensive litigation); COLE, supra
note 14, at 63–95 (passionately defending a robust right to counsel); CHARLES LAWRENCE & MARI
MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1999) (offering a
progressive view on affirmative action).
481. See ELLIOT & SCHROTH, supra note 8, at 178–79.
482. Lanny Davis, former Special Counsel to President Clinton, explained:
[T]he underlying cause of Enron’s fall—a corporate culture of secrecy and obfuscation—is not
unique to that company.
. . . .
If that culture isn’t replaced by more transparency and accountability, regulated and
enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and U.S. prosecutors, the credi-
bility and integrity of the various stock markets in which millions of Americans are now
invested could be seriously undermined.
Davis, supra note 1; see also ELLIOT & SCHROTH, supra note 8, at 9 (“[T]he damage and upheaval
caused by trading manipulations and accounting fraud, monitored by politicized enforcement, could be
the seeds of serious calamity in the future.”).
483. See Paul Merrion, Hastert, GOP Scramble to Lead the Corporate Reform Parade, CRAIN’S CHI.
BUS., July 15, 2002; Susan Milligan, House Approves Tough Action Against Corporate Fraud, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 17, 2002, at A1.
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retribution against the party in power.484  At least anecdotally (and based upon
an admittedly small sample), I have Republican acquaintances who doubt they
will personally suffer any long-term financial loss but worry that, without more
regulation, respect for a minimally active state and the capitalist system that
they so admire will wither, to the great detriment of this country.  Furthermore,
self and collective interest merge to the extent that they worry that such
reduced respect for big business will work to their party’s disadvantage and
foster the political ill-health of America.485  Similarly, whites initially unreceptive
to recognizing black oppression by the police, perhaps because they believe in
police as guardians of safety and in black criminality,486 might find their beliefs
contradicted by vivid depictions of innocent blacks harassed by the police.  If
significant evidence is offered that such abuses are widespread, this novel
information might encourage these whites to read more in magazines outside
their usual view, and to converse more with those having contrary
perspectives.487  That may result in the sort of anxiety about their principles that
can change at least some minds, much in the way that leading conservative
commentators like William F. Buckley have come around to supporting the
legalization of using certain illicit drugs.488
Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres have made a related but slightly different
point.  They argue for a conception of political rather than biological race.
“Political race” starts by using race as a way to organize people of color, as they
are defined by the broader society, but does not end there.489  The experiences
of people of color, argue Guinier and Torres, are like the “canary in the coal
mine”: Their pain and illness warn of a threat to the health, even the life, of the
principles that define the American polity.490
484. See James Kuhnhenn, Congress Agrees On Business Reform Bill, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
July 25, 2002, at 1A (“Negotiators from the Senate and House reached a deal Wednesday on legislation
to curb the corporate abuse that has driven stock prices into a deep rut, agreeing to impose stiff regula-
tion on accountants and harsher criminal penalties on executives who defraud investors.”); Milligan,
supra note 483 (“[T]he House’s rush to outdo the Senate displays the political sensitivity on Capitol
Hill to the issue of corporate irresponsibility and the worry, some analysts and lawmakers say, that
Democrats will try to use the issue against Republicans in the fall elections.”).
485. See ELLIOT & SCHROTH, supra note 8, at 12–64 (cataloguing the various corporate scandals
that led to public concern with corporate reform); Merrion, supra note 483 (describing Republican
Party activists’ anxiety over Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia, and the general decline in trust in big busi-
ness).
486. See supra text accompanying notes 455–79.
487. See supra text accompanying notes 429–53 (explaining how political anxiety can open previ-
ously closed minds).
488. See WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., ON THE FIRING LINE 230 (1989) (“The largest single cause of
crime in the eighties is the high price of illegal drugs.  To legalize drugs would eliminate this crime, but
would leave society with the social consequences of coping with its drug addicts, presumably in greater
number . . . .  [S]ociety isn’t prepared to make the exchange of free drugs for less crime.  The reasons
are cultural, philosophical, and other . . . .”); see also JAMES L. NOLAN JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE:
THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 52 (2001) (“Even conservative pundit William F. Buckley,
though not easily classified as a libertarian, joins ranks with those supporting the legalization of
drugs.”).
489. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 388, at 78–80.
490. See id. at 11 (“Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner’s canary: their distress is
the first sign of a danger that threatens us all.”).
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Learning from the experiences, thoughts, and needs of people of color thus
helps to diagnose America’s political illnesses—the individual, group, and
institutional power imbalances in the American soul.491  The plight of racial
minorities is appealed to because of the danger it reveals to us all; political race
therefore has a more inclusive goal than does traditional identity politics.492
Those “politically raced” black can include Latinos, Asian Americans, and
whites, whether working class or privileged.493  Political race encourages people
of color to lead the movement because of their unique perspectives and
experiences but seeks coalition-building with those of all races based upon
shared principles.494  The key point is that the political race idea, if correct,
optimistically asserts that the circle of the sympathetic can be widened based on
a strategy of portraying a threat to the common good.  The anxiety raised by
novel information given to otherwise uninformed whites may therefore help to
foster white willingness to embrace a new view of America as, in part, a racial
polity.495
More selfish, less principled appeals to white material needs can also help,
of course, by convincing whites to define those needs broadly.  Analogously, the
“more jurors dread a risk,” empirical research reveals, “the greater the ‘stain’
they may place on the person who created the risk, and hence, the greater the
causal and legal responsibility they will attribute to that person in order to
justify the stain.”496  Rephrased, risks of things jurors particularly fear will be
perceived as greater than they are, and the source of the risk as more culpable.
Thus, Amnesty’s recent arguments that human rights violations cost Americans
money, jobs, and safety might have psychological power because those
violations pose a risk to whites where it hurts: their persons and their
pocketbooks.  They may prime whites to be more receptive to the idea that the
creators of the risk—here, the police—are culpable.497  Similarly, in the case of
racial profiling, the argument might be that its absence will mean cheaper, more
effective law enforcement, fewer lawsuits, and thus lower taxes and more bang
491. See id. at 14–15.
492. See id. at 16–17.
493. See id. at 19–22.  Guinier and Torres argue that whites might join a political race movement
because of four characteristics of these movements: (1) race today is less rigidly constructed by pseudo-
scientific certainty; (2) no individual alone speaks for the group so that conscious association, participa-
tion, and identification with the group is easier; (3) members are given “not only choice, but also
voice,” the opportunity to change the way in which the group responds to perceived injustice; and (4)
the political race concept evolved as part of a project organized around both race and democratic poli-
tics.  Id. at 21–22.
494. See id. at 19–20.  Guinier and Torres also believe that people of color must lead the movement
because the greatest “impetus for seeing patterns of injustice usually comes from the group that has the
greatest connection” to the experience.  Id. at 19.
495. On the idea of a “racial polity,” America’s social contract partly being defined by clauses con-
cerning the rules of racial engagement, see CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT (1997).
Although Mills uses this idea as a means of political critique, Guinier and Torres view this sort of racial
realism as simply making race-based appeals necessary and as suggesting that race can simultaneously
serve to liberate and promote solidarity as well as to oppress.
496. FEIGENSON, supra note 95, at 86.
497. See supra text accompanying notes 240–47
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for the buck.498  An even more emotionally powerful approach would advertise
police abuses as extending as well to white, middle-class suspects.  As noted
above, however, any appeals that acknowledge black violence may unleash
undesirable emotive counter-forces.
4. Mutual, Shared, and Reciprocal Fear
Finally, the ideas of mutual and shared anxiety add to optimism.  “Mutual
anxiety” occurs when each of us fears the other.499  If five people are stranded on
a lifeboat for weeks, each might worry that, to survive, his fellows passengers
might assault, then eat him—a hypothetical variation of a well-known case.500
To assuage that fear, each passenger might forswear such action and work with
the others as a team to row to safety quickly, before hunger becomes so great
that all bets are off.  Selfish individualism is therefore replaced by collective
action in the interest of group survival.501  “Shared anxiety” occurs when several
people face similar dangers at once.502  Each member of a platoon of soldiers
traversing a minefield fears death or disfigurement.  If one steps on a mine, the
others may feel relieved that they did not, but each of them can better imagine
the wounded man’s pain and better understand one another’s fear.503  The
opening of this “path to the imagination of the situation of others” reveals to
each of us our interdependence.504  Though this example involves true fear of
imminent physical harm, the same principle applies to the more existential,
temporally uncertain, continuing threats that characterize anxiety.505  Mutual
fear and shared anxiety thus lead to what Phillip Fisher calls a positive
“aesthetics of fear,” that is, the paradoxical notion that the ugliness of fear
breeds the beauty of interdependence, sharing, collective action, and
understanding:
Once the aesthetics of fear tries to model mutual, reciprocal, or general fear, or any
condition involving more than one person’s state, and once it is uncertainty and a long,
open future rather than a one-time episode that we are interested in, and, finally, once
conditions rather than events become our concern, then it is the [forward-looking]
economic model [of future benefits] rather than the [backward-looking] legal-ethical
model [of judging past blame] that proves rich, suggestive, and, in the end, necessary
to aesthetics.506
498. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
499. See FISHER, supra note 424, 113–14.
500. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASE STUDIES 14–18 (2d ed. 2002) (summarizing the
facts of the infamous case of Thomas Dudley); cf. LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 8–11
(1988) (discussing the real-world circumstances: five spelunkers who were trapped by a landslide ate a
companion to survive).
501. Cf. DAVID SLOAN WILSON, DARWIN’S CATHEDRAL (2002) (arguing that morality and religion
are the result of evolutionary forces aiding group survival).
502. See FISHER, supra note 424, at 140–41.
503. See id.
504. See id. at 156.
505. See id. at 131.
506. Id.
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The bottom line, therefore, is complex.  Racial auditors should disseminate
novel and even threatening information to build black enthusiasm and white
anxiety.  That information should be presented in a fashion that defines white
self-interest broadly and appeals to widely-shared social values.  The
information should focus on police racial discrimination, but it should
demonstrate both how that discrimination in itself harms minorities and why it
should be viewed as part of a broader, principled problem affecting all races.
The information must be vivid and powerful enough to create white anxiety but
not so vivid as to push whites over into abject fear.  Moreover, black criminality
and violence must be minimized.  This is a hard task to achieve, but it is
essential to building a multi-racial coalition for police reform.  Amnesty
International and the United States Civil Rights Commission can be criticized
for undue reliance on sometimes dry, technical reports aimed only at elites.507
On the other hand, they both have generally sought to foster a sense of
principled anxiety, of danger to individuals as endangering the common good.
Amnesty’s hint at a strategy of appealing to white fear of black criminality is
unwise.  But its efforts to define white self-interest broadly, though offensive to
some of its members because it smacks more of self-interest than principle, may
be a good start to a more effective new strategy.508  That new strategy should
supplement, but not replace, the appeal to principled anxiety.
Coalition building and white support can be less important where problems
are treated as more localized and where elites are the primary immediate
audience.  Thus in Cincinnati, the organization of African-American
community groups in the wake of racial violence, combined with the principled
support of the already sympathetic ACLU, was sufficient to promote a
promising experiment in social change.  The implicit threat of future black
violence may have given these groups their trump card with worried elites, but
this threat may have been less of an advantage had broader coalitions been
forged with the white grassroots.509
Apart from appealing to racial minorities’ enthusiasm and the white
majority’s anxiety, racial auditors may also succeed by appealing to an old-
fashioned notion still important to all Americans: honor.
C. Political Honor
1. American Political Honor Defined
“Honor” is a trait of character: the principled ambition to live up to one’s
code of honor.510  A “code of honor” is a set of widely agreed-upon principles, a
collection of social rules of conduct governing all members of a community,
507. See Winston, supra note 77, at 38.
508. See supra text accompanying notes 245–48.
509. See supra Part III.A.2 (summarizing the events in Cincinnati).
510. SHARON KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 1–3 (2002).
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though individuals’ interpretations of the meaning of some rules may vary.511
An honorable person will do what the code demands, even if he thereby gains
neither recognition nor material aid.512  Indeed, doing what one understands to
be dictated by a code of honor may be wildly unpopular at the time that the
action is taken.513  Honor’s exercise therefore requires courage in the face of
giant odds, making honor a “powerful source of individual agency, especially
for the members of the marginalized and minority groups . . . who are least
likely to be on the winning end of public opinion and the political authorities
that distribute recognition.”514  Nevertheless, the honorable person also
fervently hopes one day to receive recognition for his reverence for, and
principled loyalty to, the sacred social code to which he adheres.515
Honor is ultimately a form of principled self-interest, for one who embraces
it cannot live with himself if he violates the code.  He thus acts to preserve his
self-respect, first and foremost, but also to gain the respect of others within his
community.516  Former President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy,
in his book, Profiles in Courage, recounted the stories of a number of brave
leaders.  He explained that why these leaders acted had little to do with an
unselfish love of others in political life:
If this be true [that they were courageous men], what then caused the statesmen
mentioned in the preceding pages to act as they did?  It was not because they “loved
the public better than themselves.”  On the contrary, it was precisely because they did
love themselves—because each one’s need to maintain his own respect for himself was
more important to him than his popularity with others—because his desire to win or
maintain a reputation for integrity and courage was stronger than his desire to
maintain his office.517
Honor is thus an obligation to oneself rather than to others.518  An individual’s
willingness to meet that obligation when his code is challenged is measured not
by his or intentions but by his deeds.519  Honor may therefore “animate risky and
unusually ambitious forms of action.”520  Only a relatively small percentage of
the populace will display such principled courage, but honor is often shown by
511. See id. at 28–29.
512. See id. at 19–20.
513. See id. at 20.
514. Id.
515. I am adopting for my current purposes the idea of the “secular social sacred” developed by
Joseph Kennedy in a different context.  See Kennedy, supra note 21, at 845–48.  I use the term to
convey the idea that certain codes of social behavior play essential roles in promoting societal
cohesiveness such that members of a society accord those codes an attitude akin to that of the sacred.
Cf. WILSON, supra note 501, at 5–85 (summarizing natural and social science evidence on the “secular
utility” of religion in promoting group cohesiveness).
516. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 135–44.
517. JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 250–51 (Harper & Row 1964) (1957); see also
KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 135 (quoting and reflecting on Kennedy’s views).
518. KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 5.
519. See id. at xi–xii.
520. Id. at 10.  See generally JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC (2001) (explaining the role of honor in the early political life of the nation and the
risky actions, including life-threatening ones, that it inspired).
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the soldiers as much as the officers, the members of the everyday masses as
much as the glorified heroes.521  Because honor inspires principled action in the
face of steadfast opposition, even danger, men and women of honor are
necessary to defend against tyranny.522
Yet honor can also encourage tyranny.  Whether honor serves liberal or
illiberal ends depends upon the substantive content of the governing social code
of honor.523  Antebellum Southern honor, for example, embraced not only what
was brave but what was right.524  Yet what was “right” included the violent
debasement of an entire class of persons based upon their race because of a
code embracing the idea of property rights in human beings as the basis for a
moral, just society.525
There have been conflicting codes of honor revered by different groups in
U.S. society.526  But in post-Civil War America, and especially in America after
the Civil Rights movement, the “principles of liberty and equality articulated by
the Declaration have formed the core of one common code of honor in the
United States . . . based on universal principles of abstract right . . . attached to a
shared national political identity rather than sited in the extrapolitical
intermediary associations of honor.”527  Whatever the drafters of the original
Declaration may have meant its words to mean, the American people have
made of it a code of political honor rooted in principles of equal respect for
all.528  Abraham Lincoln perhaps first gave voice to a view then held by many,
521. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 16–17.
522. See id. at xi (stating that honor is at its best when “one rises to defend individual liberties
against encroaching political power or the threat of majority tyranny”).
523. See id. at 7–8.
524. See id. at 6 (“The student who lives up to the honor code prefers her principles to her inter-
ests . . . .  She acts, rather than simply reacting to the pressure of her circumstances.”); BERTRAM
WYATT-BROWN, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN CULTURE: HONOR, GRACE, AND WAR, 1760S–1880S
(2001) (reviewing the spiritual and political roots, and required bravery, of the Revolutionary and
antebellum Southern codes of honor).
525. See Taslitz, Mutual Indifference, supra note 18, at 1316–22 (summarizing the antebellum
South’s code of honor and its connection to slavery and racial violence).  See generally KENNETH S.
GREENBERG, HONOR & SLAVERY xiii (1996) (“[A]ll issues of [Southern] honor relate to slavery.”);
WYATT-BROWN, supra note 524 (offering a more detailed treatment).
526. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 26–27.
527. Id. at 27.
528. As Pauline Maier said:
Abraham Lincoln gave expression to a powerful strain in the American mind, not what all
Americans thought, but what many did.  The values he emphasized—equality, human rights,
government by consent—had in fact been part and parcel of the Revolution, and as much the
subject of controversy then as later.  Lincoln and those who shared his convictions did not
therefore give the nation a new past or revolutionize the Revolution.  But as descendants of
the revolutionaries and of their English ancestors, they felt the need for a document that
stated those values in a way that could guide the nation, a document that the founding fathers
had failed to supply.  And so they made one, pouring new wine into an old vessel manufac-
tured for another purpose, creating a testament whose continuing usefulness depended not on
the faithfulness with which it described the intentions of the signers but on its capacity to con-
vince and inspire living Americans.
PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 208
(1997).
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albeit not most, Americans,529 that war cannot inspire sacrifice “without the
promise of something better, than a mere change of masters.”530  As early as
1861, he described the Northern cause in the Civil War as saving a form of
government “whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men—to lift
artificial weights from all shoulders—to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for
all—to afford all, an unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race of life.”531
The rebellion was, said Lincoln, an effort “to overthrow the principle that all
men are created equal.”532  Though Lincoln and the United States overall have
often failed to live up to these words, it has been the struggle of American men
and women of honor to bring deed in line with creed ever since.533
Indeed, as long ago as the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville recognized the
strong need for honor to overcome majority tyranny and mild despotism in a
democracy, especially in the American form of democracy.534  According to
Tocqueville, honor easily weakens in a democracy because rapid change and
diversity make codes of honor less clear.535  Equality also makes people more
similar, recognition more equal, and thus obscurity easier.536  Individualist
Americans amplify the problem, for they focus on themselves and those nearest
to them, frequently “abandoning ‘the greater society.’”537  Individualism erodes
social attachments, especially to intermediary bodies between the household
and the state.  Yet, complained Tocqueville, individuals standing alone are
weaker than when acting collectively, leading growing government power to fill
the void.538  Moreover, public opinion in all modern democracies comes to have
unprecedented power.539  That power can silence the vigorous dissent that
promotes the critical reflection necessary for an effective democracy.540
Furthermore, democratic citizens lack the security provided by lineage, title,
and hereditary fiefs.  Accordingly, materialism and love of money, especially in
529. See id. at 207–08.
530. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Constitution, in IV COLLECTED WORKS OF LINCOLN 169
(Roy Basler ed. 1953); see also MAIER, supra note 528, at 207 (discussing Lincoln’s Fragment).
531. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress, in IV COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 530, at 438; see
also MAIER, supra note 528, at 207 (discussing this quote).
532. Abraham Lincoln, Response to a Serenade, in VI COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 530, at 320.
533. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001) (arguing that the American nation must now embrace
the “secret constitution” of equal respect articulated by Lincoln and implicit in our later constitutional
struggles).
534. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley ed.
1972).
535. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 73.
536. See id. at 74–75.
537. Id. (quoting from Tocqueville).
538. See id. at 76.  For a magisterial analysis of Tocqueville’s views on the strengths and dangers of
public opinion in a democracy and on his political theory of America more generally, see SHELDON S.
WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL AND THEORETICAL
LIFE (2001).
539. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 76.
540. See id. at 77.
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America, bring the lure of security to the point of obsession.541  Materialism, too,
weakens social conscience and makes it easy for a government that offers its
citizens material comfort to buy the populace’s complacency.542  Even
enlightened self-interest will be an insufficient counterweight to majority
tyranny, said Tocqueville, given the citizenry’s weakness caused by
individualism and materialism.543  Liberty can therefore be maintained, he
argued, only if it is fervently valued as an end in itself by those with the courage
to defy encroaching public authority.544
In America’s “legalistic spirit,” however, Tocqueville saw hope.545  The
independence of the judiciary, he believed, made it more attached than
common folk to the defining principles of the republic.546  Furthermore, lawyers
were a “quasi-aristocracy” because of their “respect [for] the law and old
things.”547  The jury system, too, taught citizens to revere the law and think in
principled rather than solely instrumental terms.548  The commitment to
individual rights, in Tocqueville’s view, had aristocratic roots: “[R]ights
resemble fiefs, territory within which an individual is entitled to exercise
command.”549  Rights enable self-mastery, freeing individuals from servility to
others and expressing the love of liberty.550  The law has become America’s
common code of honor.
2. Social T-Cells and Citizen Character
Some free speech theorists have long spoken in analogous terms about the
close ties between character and free speech.551  They argue that a culture that
prizes expressive liberty must nurture citizen character traits that include an
inquiring spirit, distrust of authority, and the willingness to confront evil.552
These traits are valued “not for their intrinsic virtue but for their instrumental
contribution to collective well-being, social as well as political.”553  These traits
541. See id. at 78–79.
542. See id.
543. See id. at 80.  One author has argued that modern social science teaches a similar lesson: that
the submission of the people even to oppressive rulers can often be bought or subtly coerced via eco-
nomic and social pressures and subtle emotional appeals.  See HOGAN, supra note 326.
544. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 83.  For a review of those aspects of the American character
about which Tocqueville was most sanguine, see MICHAEL A. LEDEEN, TOCQUEVILLE ON AMERICAN
CHARACTER (2000).
545. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 88–90.
546. Id.
547. See LARRY SIEDENTOP, TOCQUEVILLE 62 (1994) (describing the “quasi-aristocracy”); James
Ceaser, Alexis de Tocqueville on Political Science, Political Culture, and the Role of the Intellectual, 79
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 656, 665 (1985) (quoting Tocqueville on “law and old things”).
548. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 88–90.
549. Id. at 92.
550. Id. at 93.
551. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the Present, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 61, 61–63 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey
C. Stone eds. 2002).
552. See id.
553. Id. at 62.
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are realized in action, not in words alone.554  John Milton, an early proponent of
this view, wrote in Areopagitica, his 1644 protest against licensing systems for
books and pamphlets, “I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue,
unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary.”555
For Milton, political evil could be “contained and repaired” only by a “citizenry
that is energized in a countervailing way: intellectually independent, morally
engaged, politically resilient, not afraid to speak out or to stand up.”556
Additionally, dissenters must voice their protest because they can thereby
shape, and be vindicated by, the future, and because only people open to novel
ideas can remain vibrant, understanding their history in liberating ways.557  More
modernly, Louis Brandeis has similarly praised the love of novelty and the
courage to speak as central to freedom.558  Only a nation of “courageous, self-
reliant men,” argued Brandeis, combined with an inventive spirit, make for a
vital, well-governed democratic society.559  “[T]he greatest menace to freedom is
an inert people,” he famously declared, and the “path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.”560
Vincent Blasi, the leading advocate of free-speech character theory today,
argues that “rallies, meetings, and publications can inform dissenters that they
are not so isolated, not so far on the margin, as they might have assumed.”561
Facilitating and energizing solidarity is a central function of free speech
regimes.562  Moreover, “the spectacle of some persons standing up to authority
or convention or corruption or evil or mediocrity can enhance in others the
sense of duty to take enough responsibility for their convictions to act on
them.”563  For Blasi, free speech reminds us that private citizens are an important
part of our system of checks and balances.564  But the citizenry’s checking
function turns on its having information about abuses of authority and a
populace with an independent, skeptical, persevering, deliberative nature ready
to heed and act on the whistleblower’s warning.565
Information is thus needed to activate what David Brin has called our
“social T-cells.”566  The body’s T-cells offer early warnings of danger, calling the
rest of the bodies’ defense mechanisms to arms.  Similarly, social T-cells—
554. See id. at 63–64.
555. John Milton, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 716, 728 (Merritt Hughes
ed. 1957).
556. See Blasi, supra note 551, at 65.
557. See id. at 71.
558. See id. at 73–78, 80, 83.
559. See id. at 78.
560. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
561. See Blasi, supra note 551, at 86.
562. See id.
563. Id. (emphasis added).
564. See id. at 87.
565. See id. at 87–88.
566. See DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 133–36 (1998).
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educated, skeptical, high ego citizens, who see hidden patterns, distrust
authority, and act on strongly held beliefs—alert the rest of the polity to danger
to our liberties, calling all men and women to defend freedom.567  Information
activates a few social T-cells, who, in turn, search to find “some terrible mistake
or nefarious scheme,” motivating other T-cells and their sympathizers into
action.568
Martin Luther King, Jr. certainly acted as an early social T-cell in the battle
against racial segregation.569  But King’s heroism and creativity would have
meant little had other social T-cells, the many faceless civil rights advocates
whose names grace no history book, not joined the fight.570  Indeed, the civil
rights activists of the early movement in the 1950s and 1960s embraced some
very ancient notions of honor.571  Critically, many shared the willingness to risk
their lives and health in defense of liberty.572  The songs, sermons, freedom
schools, and church committees rekindled African Americans’ sense of self as
political beings, triumphing over fear and asserting self-mastery.573  Going to jail
became a badge of honor.574  Before the movement, many blacks lived under a
fear that they would randomly suffer physical harm at the whim of an arbitrary,
entrenched power.575  But,
“to participate publicly in civil rights demonstrations, even in larger cities, made
participants feel distinctly vulnerable to verbal, not to mention physical, abuse from
angry whites.  But what was different about risking such vulnerability was that it was
chosen rather than experienced as fate.” . . .  [N]onviolent demonstrations served a
function similar to that of the duel in so far as it provided an arena in which one could
prove to oneself and to others that one had conquered the fear of death and therefore
become one’s own master.576
Resistance brought self-respect and did so by reminding whites of the American
code of honor’s commitment to equality.577  The willingness of movement
members to suffer for those beliefs struck a chord in many whites’ vision of
American honor, swelled the movement’s ranks, and made white Americans
take notice.578
567. See id.
568. See id. at 135.
569. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 168–80.
570. See id.
571. See id. at 175.
572. See id.
573. See id. at 176.
574. See id. at 185–86.  That sense of honor in struggle and imprisonment is palpable in reading S.
JONATHAN BASS, BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., EIGHT WHITE
RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND THE “LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL” (2001).
575. See KRAUSE, supra note 510, at 175–76.
576. Id. at 176 (quoting STEPHEN OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. (1994)).
577. For a thoughtful analysis of the connection between concepts of self-respect and the Civil
Rights Movement, see generally RICHARD H. KING, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE IDEA OF FREEDOM
(1996).
578. See, e.g., EDWARD P. MORGAN, THE 60’S EXPERIENCE: HARD LESSONS ABOUT MODERN
AMERICA 84–85 (1991) (concluding that the Civil Rights Movement of the ‘50s and ‘60s “had a pro-
found effect on white consciousness”); JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE
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3. The Organization Man and the Police
Honor faces a special challenge in fighting more local battles against faceless
public and private organizations.  Organizations define their own expectations,
and require that their members comply with instrumental (goal-oriented)
criteria for evaluating their employees’ performance.579  Rephrased,
organizations create their own codes of behavior, ignoring, as much as
possible—indeed “delegalizing”—all other criteria for proper conduct.580
Workers who bring other, outside criteria to bear on their decision-making and
actions, for example, relying on broader social values, are viewed as
“‘unpredictable and potentially destabilizing.’”581  The apparent obsession of
some major corporations such as Enron with the instrumental goal of
maximizing stock value as more important than honesty and clarity in financial
HISTORY OF JIM CROW 232–73 (offering an excellent summary of the latter part of the Civil Rights
Movement).  Recently a growing number of scholars have argued that whites embrace racial justice
primarily when they believe it will serve white self-interest.  See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS (2000) (arguing that the success of the Civil Rights Movement can be significantly attributed to
white elites’ fear that continuing Jim Crow would push the world’s people of color into the arms of the
Soviet Union during the Cold War); Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African Ameri-
can Fortunes—Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 369 (2002)
(defending this “interest convergence” thesis).  There is much truth in this thesis, but its advocates of-
ten define “self-interest” too narrowly.  I would add to raw, narrow self-concern the existence among
certain whites of the principled self-interest embraced by the idea of honor.  Agitation from below and
leadership from above can sometimes lead elites to work to alter social meanings, appealing to both
raw and principled self-interest as a way to lessen the oppression of racial and other minorities.  Cf.
JOHN D. SKRETNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002) (using an analogous approach to
explain why some minorities succeeded and some failed in the mid-to-late-twentieth-century Civil
Rights Movement, and why even the successes were sometimes limited).  The terms of engagement of
the Cold War were set by a post-World War II consensus on the importance of human rights that made
it important for the United States to be seen as embracing such rights to succeed in its competition with
the Soviet Union.  See id. at 7–9.  So conceived, white concessions to black demands for equality can
partly be explained by a combination of whites’ raw self-interest and principled self-interest, that is,
interest guided by a commitment to human rights.  Moreover, the history of the movement reveals that
at least some whites acted from an enthusiastic embrace of the principle of equality.  See MORGAN,
supra, at 84–85; RABBI MARC SCHNEIER, SHARED DREAMS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE
JEWISH COMMUNITY xiii (1999) (“Though blacks were the prime architects of [the Civil Rights Move-
ment] . . . the battle for freedom would have taken longer—and been even more torturous—if not for
the participation of the people who were not blacks and who put their own lives on the line to help
African Americans.”)
None of these comments are meant to excuse the missteps or insensitivities of even progressive
whites nor to excuse white backlash.  See FEAGIN, supra note 446, at 121–23, 127, 248, 251 (discussing
white backlash and the limitations of many white liberals).  See generally DEBORAH MATHIS, YET A
STRANGER: WHY BLACK AMERICANS STILL DON’T FEEL AT HOME (2002) (describing white insensi-
tivity).  Nor do I mean to detract attention from the African-American leaders, philosophers, and front-
line troops who made the movement happen.  Rather I mean only to make the points that human moti-
vation is varied and complex and that “self-interest,” rightly understood and when not crowding out
gentler motivations, is not always a bad thing.  See JAMES R. OTTESON, ADAM SMITH’S
MARKETPLACE OF LIFE 141–43 (2002) (defending Adam Smith’s view that self-interest, properly
understood, is one of the motivations for virtuous conduct); supra text accompanying notes 510–22
(defining and defending honor as principled self-interest).
579. See C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWER: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 21
(2001).
580. See id.
581. See id. (quoting in part ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST (1989)).
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reporting is a powerful illustration of this principle.582  Indeed, studies of
whistleblowers—those who face retaliation for speaking out in the name of the
public good—reveal that colleagues and superiors even try not to hear or read
what the whistleblower says because mere exposure to his words taints
organizational members and smacks of disloyalty.583  Colleagues often regard a
whistleblower “as though he were a space-walking astronaut who had cut his
lifeline to the mother ship.”584  The organization man is skilled at “doubling,”
treating the organizational part of his self as if it were his whole self while on
the job.585  Whistleblowers lack this skill and by their mere words remind the
organization men of their everyday selves and of the social world beyond the
organization.586  But this reminder is perceived as an “insidious disease, a
boundary violator.”587  That sense of infection explains why even purely
“internal” whistleblowers—those complaining entirely within the organization
but going over their superiors’ heads—still face equally severe retaliation to
that visited upon “external” whistleblowers.588  The sin of the purely internal
whistleblower is that he represents “the presence of the outside on the inside:
not just the unassimilated individual but the unassimilated citizen.”589
Whistleblowers show honor-loving natures when they bring the collective social
conscience of the community to bear on an organization despite the risk of
severe retribution.
Police forces face the same whistleblower dynamics, and police culture may
create even more extreme pressures to conform to organizational dictates.590
“Such a thing as ‘the police character’ exists uniquely because of the power of
the institution to shape and condition its members,” writes Anthony Bouza,
former Chief of Police in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and a former commander of
the Bronx, New York, police force.591  Bouza continues:
The moral courage to stand up and disagree or to point out wrongdoing or to
remonstrate when someone is committing a brutal or corrupt act has been
systematically exorcised from the body.  Nothing is rarer than dissidents publicly
disagreeing with their colleagues about the codes of conduct, as is clearly evident from
the cover-ups and studied silences accompanying serious acts of wrongdoing.
Whistleblowers, reformers, and other troublemakers are “snitches and rat finks” and
all ranks are to close against these menaces.592
To Bouza, much crime and corruption is a result of an underclass revolt, in
the form of street crime, against the privilege, exclusion, and indifference
582. See supra Part I.
583. See ALFORD, supra note 579, at 5, 20–22, 32.
584. Id. at 5.
585. See id. at 72–73, 115–17.
586. See id. at 12, 21–22.
587. Id. at 99.
588. See id. at 20.
589. Id. at 23–24.
590. See BOUZA, supra note 128, at 21.
591. Id. at 21.
592. Id. at 22.
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practiced by the overclass.593  That does not excuse criminality, argues Bouza,
but it does explain the sometimes not-so-subtle message sent to the police by
the mostly white, well-off, educated, and voting overclass that the police are to
keep the poor, jobless, uneducated, frequently minority underclass contained
and controlled in a tidy fashion that does not confront the overclass with its own
conscience or force it to “encounter unappetizing or threatening visions.”594  The
police get the message: work to stop, contain, and punish underclass crime in
darkness and obscurity.  That work becomes the organization’s primary
instrumental goal.595  Although most police likely embrace the vision “to protect
and serve,” they too often do so with the clouded vision and “doubled” moral
self so characteristic of organizational life.596  They come to see themselves as
“under siege” from the neighborhood communities whom they are sworn to
protect, the political establishment, and their own internal affairs bureaus.597
“Outsiders” are the enemy; insiders are “brothers on the force.”598
Criminal justice theorist Samuel Walker thus sees the function of a
generous, persistent individual rights-based criminal procedure culture as
communicating to the police that they must make the broadly defined political
community’s official values their own.599  Walker continues:
The values embedded in the principle of accountability have a broad community
orientation.  They include respect for all citizens and equality.  Even the vilest
criminal is due a minimum level of respect, and there can be no systematic
mistreatment of groups, whether they be racial minorities, the homeless, homosexuals,
or any others.  The very idea of accountability itself embodies the notion that others,
and the community as a whole, have a claim on you, and can properly ask you (the
police officer in this instance) to explain your behavior.600
Police department internalization of community norms does not arise from
mere paper rights.  They arise from muscular rights-in-action, defined and
enforced by public protest, community struggle, practical experimentation, and
community condemnation of individual and group suffering, all of which is
sparked by sunshine being spread into the dimmest corners of police
operations.601  Community vigilance and the impact of revelation over time are
required.  Yet whistleblowers alone cannot be counted on to provide enough of
the principled courage, the honor, needed to reintegrate police departments
into broader communities of political morality.  Whistleblowers are few; most
593. See id. at 28.
594. See id.
595. See id. at 13–14, 25–28.
596. Compare id. at 13, 21–22, 28 (discussing police psychology), with ALFORD, supra note 579, at
72–73, 115–17 (discussing “doubling”).
597. See generally MICHAEL L. MIDDLETON, COP: A TRUE STORY 67–105 (rev. ed. 2000) (explor-
ing officers’ “siege mentality”).
598. See id. at 85 (“It was ‘us against them’. . . .  Them not only encompassed the criminal element,
but also included law-abiding citizens who wanted equality and justice.”).
599. See SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY IN MODERN
AMERICA 138–45 (1998).
600. Id. at 139–40.
601. See id. at 139–41.
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face such brutal retaliation that they foreswear ever speaking out again, and the
laws protecting them, as other writers have thoroughly surveyed, are generally
weak and easy to circumvent.602  Moreover, they usually act alone, with few
resources at their disposal.603  Racial auditors, on the other hand, can provide
the cover of anonymity and the collective resources to break down police
organizational moral boundaries.  Racial auditors’ important, though not
exclusive, emphasis on race uses equality as the battering ram.  Racial auditors
represent a kind of group honor where they assert the “conscience [of the]
collective in the midst of the organization.”604
V
CONCLUSION
Several commentators, myself included, have recently written about the
value of transparency in exposing and deterring police violations of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure protections.605  I have made the modest claim
here, mostly by way of illustration, that racial auditors can be important
contributors to that process.  I do not claim that they alone are “the solution,”
nor even that they are the most critical part of a solution, for I have not had the
space here to do a thorough comparison to the many existing and proposed
institutional alternatives.  Nevertheless, racial auditors have contributed to
improving the quality of policing in Cincinnati, Los Angeles, Chicago, New
York, and other major American cities.606
What other work on transparency has ignored, however, is the role of
political emotions in any reform strategy.607  Here, I have sought to illustrate
602. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 579, at 18–19, 103–07, 113.
603. See id. at 138.
604. Id.
605. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 9; Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 9 (arguing that expanded dis-
covery in criminal cases can promote better citizen oversight of the police).  A greater judicial willing-
ness to look at evidence of patterns of police conduct, as has been proposed by Professor Susan Bandes,
see supra text accompanying notes 89–108, would create additional incentives for, and broaden the
scope of, defense efforts to obtain discovery from the prosecution.  The public availability of such
information would further ease the task of racial auditors.
606. See supra Part III.
607. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 9.  When I presented this paper to the faculty of the Washington and
Lee University School of Law, Professor Colleen P. Murphy pointed out that the political-emotions-
based strategy that I argue for has applicability in a wide range of other settings that clarify the concept.
She illustrated the point with her observation of a public service television announcement (“PSA”)
showing people of varied backgrounds expressing unity with another in the wake of the September 11,
2001, attack on the World Trade Center.  In a subsequent email, Ms. Murphy explained her point this
way:
I wanted to amplify my comments on the PSA shortly after 9/11 with the individuals of all
colors and cultures stating one by one “I am an American.”  I thought the clear message
was—don’t look at the person next to you as a terrorist or terrorist sympathizer just because
he or she “looks like one.”  I didn’t view it so much as a “let’s all feel good because we’re
melting-pot Americans. . . .”  Anyway, I do think that the commercial serves the three emo-
tions that you discuss (the anxiety of Americans about whether there are more terrorists in
our midst; the honor code of equality as Americans; and the enthusiasm of those who feared
racial profiling and retaliation).
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that role by focusing on how three sets of such emotions—enthusiasm, anxiety,
and feelings associated with political honor—matter to the work of racial
auditors.  The examination of those emotions teaches several lessons, each of
which can be the basis for further research and reform.
First, these emotions provide incentives for both elites and ordinary citizens
to expose police abuses.  Given the blue wall of silence, political pressure for
results in stopping crime, and a siege mentality, both elites and ordinary citizens
must be highly motivated and relentlessly aggressive to achieve long-term
improvements in police culture.  Auditors must refine their strategies to
augment the citizenry’s enthusiasm, anxiety, and sense of honor about reform.
An intense, but not a sole, focus on racial disparities in policing can be an
effective spur to mobilize minority community enthusiasm in challenging the
police establishment.  If racial discrimination is portrayed as a warning bell in
the night against the advancing forces of tyranny coming to oppress all citizens,
then a race-conscious politics of policing can be unifying, rather than divisive.
Race becomes a springboard for the principled defense of respect for all
persons rather than for identity politics.
If that springboard is to work for other minority groups and for whites,
however, auditors must likely instill anxiety in whites about the current state of
affairs.  That requires an appeal to white self-interest narrowly-defined, such as
the high cost of certain police practices or their ineffectiveness as crime control
measures.  But appeals to broader notions of self-interest must be made as well,
confronting whites with their own occasional hypocrisy and making them
vividly aware of practices at odds with the principles at the core of their sense of
self.  The goal is not to appeal to white pity or shame, which can be
counterproductive.608  It is to assault whites’ comfort that they can continue in
their indifference without sacrificing their very souls.609  Auditors must thus
make more effective, vivid popular appeals, using the Internet, storytelling, and
other media to reach a wider audience more effectively.
Second, the independence of most auditors from the police specifically, and
from the government more generally, is essential to their credibility, power, and
freedom of action.  Independence prevents their being co-opted.  Nor can they
be starved for resources by the government because the auditors’ own
fundraising efforts determine the level of their resources.610  On the other hand,
auditors rely at least in part on obtaining information from frequently
recalcitrant police departments.  Some governmental supplements to, and links
to, independent auditors may help to address this problem.  The United States
Commission on Civil Rights, for example, has the subpoena power that
E-mail from Colleen P. Murphy, Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law (Feb. 14,
2003) (on file with the author).
608. See Taslitz, Mutual Indifference, supra note 18, at 1300–03 (explaining why pity can forestall
change).
609. This was part of the same ultimately successful strategy of the abolitionists combating
antebellum slavery.  See id. at 1362–68.
610. See supra Part III.
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independent auditors like the ACLU and Amnesty International lack.611  A
suggestion by Professor Christopher Edley, a member of the Commission,
concerning minimizing the encroachment of anti-terrorism efforts onto civil
liberties offers analogous help.612  Edley argues that the courts have historically
done little to protect the narrowing of individual rights during war time.
Moreover, the sheer volume of concerns and bipartisan war fever render
congressional oversight unlikely and unduly deferential.  Furthermore, a
“watchful public will not protest, because the war will be mostly secret, mostly
for good reason.  Without transparency, public debate will be ill-informed or
nonexistent.”613  Edley’s solution: Congress should create in the new
Department of Homeland Security an independent Office of Rights and
Liberties.  That office would not decide what the rules should be, but would
seek to enforce the rules set down by other authorities and to collect the
information necessary for other authorities’ rule-creation.614  The Office would
be headed by a Senate-confirmed Director, who would act like a “super-
inspector general, but focused solely on monitoring compliance with civil
liberties and civil rights norms in the government-wide war.”615  Career
professionals would staff the Office, and the Office would have the powers to
“subpoena documents, interview witnesses under penalty of perjury and
aggressively audit both policymakers and foot soldiers.”616  The Office would
also receive complaints and issue quarterly reports, one unclassified for the
public and one classified for Congress.  Additionally, it would have the power to
seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas without first turning to the Justice
Department and to impose administrative fines on individuals violating statutes
or regulations meant to protect civil liberties.  Finally, the Office would have a
“part-time, bipartisan advisory board designed to build public confidence in its
operations and in the general conduct of the war.”617
Edley’s proposal could be a model for further research exploring the
creation of a similar independent Office of Rights and Liberties in municipal
police departments.  Such an office would be no substitute for independent
auditors.  Any government entity faces dangers of fund-starvation and capture
by those they regulate.  Moreover, governmental entities cannot by definition
constitute the engaged action of an independent citizenry that the best
611. See supra Part III.C.
612. See Christopher Edley, Jr., A U.S. Watchdog for Civil Liberties, WASH. POST, July 14, 2002, at
B7.  The political auditing function discussed in this article also provides further support for my argu-
ment elsewhere that citizen oversight panels are needed to monitor the expanded public use of video
surveillance cameras in the wake of the War on Terrorism.  See Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra
note 26, at 164–74, 182–87.
613. Id.
614. Edley’s suggestion has borne some legislative fruit.  See Homeland Security Act, H.R. 5005,
107th Cong. (2002) (establishing office for civil rights and civil liberties in the new Department of
Homeland Security.)
615. Edley, supra note 612.
616. Id.
617. Id.
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democracies require.  Nevertheless, such an Office would make it easier for
independent racial auditors and the public to obtain information that might
otherwise be too long withheld within fortress police departments.  If the Office
Advisory Board were mandated to include a certain number of seats to be held
by independent racial auditors, that would also be an important bridge between
the auditors and the police, a bridge that would inform auditors without
compromising their independence.  Furthermore, having an Office whose
primary goal is to monitor department-wide police compliance with civil
liberties norms and to shed light on norm violations may serve an important
symbolic function in reminding police that they are bound by the broader
society’s standards of political morality and not only by the local standards of
police morality.
Third, racial auditors play an important function in unifying “the People” in
whom the Fourth Amendment vests protection.618  A democracy must serve all
the people, not merely a subset thereof.619  Racial auditors involve many
otherwise marginalized people in the process of governance, replacing silence
with voice, complacency with passion, quiescence with indignation.  Racial
auditors appeal to basic principles of equality and respect for all, serving both as
“T-cells” of honor to attack assaults on the heart of the body politic and as
goads to others to join the fight.  In the process of coalition-building, racial
auditors encourage cross-community understanding and solidarity.620
Fourth, how information is gathered and from whom matters.  Activities
such as the ACLU’s efforts at mediation in Cincinnati or Amnesty’s interviews
of police victims in New York in furtherance of data collection and
dissemination help to build solidarity, promote community enthusiasm, and
foster creative dialogue likely to promote more informed, productive decision-
making and experimentation.621
Finally, racial auditors are at their best when they mix data collection and
dissemination strategies with straightforward advocacy.  The ACLU used
litigation in Cincinnati both as a means for gathering more information about
the police and as an incentive for crafting more novel, promising solutions.
Amnesty combined its report-writing strategy with letter-writing campaigns and
legislative and executive lobbying in its efforts to root out abusive police
conduct in the United States.622 All these efforts seem to be bearing significant
fruit.  Thomas Jefferson once said that the tree of liberty must be refreshed
618. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
619. See Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note 26, at 158–69 (illustrating this point by considering
how an alternative conception of Fourth Amendment privacy to that currently embraced by the Court
can enhance the political power of gays and the poor).
620. See supra Part IV.
621. See supra Part III.A.2.
622. See supra Part III.A.2.
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from time to time with the blood of patriots.623  I prefer to think that today,
liberty’s life depends on an engaged, activist citizenry goading America to live
up to the best of its principles and dreams.
623. See JEAN M. YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON THE CHARACTER
OF A FREE PEOPLE 114 (1998) (quoting Jefferson: “The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to
time with the blood of patriots and tyrants”).
